The Three Lemons

 

 

Picture: Andrew Linnett,Crown Copyright

 

For centuries historians have struggled to explain the United Kingdom's frequent military defeats,but it was not until the advent of internet forums that the military illiteracy behind the deaths of hundreds of thousands of British soldiers became well documented,however,senior officers have long recorded their ignorance for posterity through the medium of defence procurement and herein we shall discuss several current projects.

 

 

Picture: Jack Eckersley,Crown Copyright

 

An equivalent to and contemporary of the British Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle,A.S.CO.D. (Austrian Spanish COoperative Development) was developed by Austria and Spain,but despite needing a much larger number of vehicles,the British Army chose the improved A.S.CO.D. 2,rather than an all new design or a Warrior variant,as the basis of it's transformational Future Rapid Effects System which later became Ajax,an armoured reconnaissance vehicle which has neither the protection to withstand hits from weapons such as the 9M133M Kornet-M missile and 2A46 tank gun nor the fire power to suppress them,and which therefore must conduct reconnaissance by stealth,a task which requires neither medium armour nor a medium cannon,however,as Ajax currently does not work it may never enter service,which would be most fortunate.

 

 

Picture: Corporal Lee Matthews,Crown Copyright

 

Designed almost half a century ago,the Apache attack helicopter,as one of the few aircraft capable of delivering large numbers of precision weapons at night,had it's "happy time" attacking Iraqi forces during the liberation of Kuwait in Nineteen Ninety-one,a dozen years after that,during the invasion of Iraq,a force similar in size to the British Army's entire front line attack helicopter fleet was shot to pieces,in half an hour,by the poorly trained and equipped Medina Division over Karbala and in the Afghan war and Iraq wars combined more Apaches were lost than any other manned aircraft type,nevertheless,British Army officers decided that in an era of precision guided weapons a helicopter,with a large signature,which flies at slow speed and low altitude in close proximity to,and direct line of sight of,the enemy was the future of air warfare,before ordering another fifty,which may still be in service for the aircraft's eightieth birthday.

 

 

Picture: Unknown photographer,© Commonwealth of Australia

 

The Boxer armoured truck,which shall already be a dozen years old by the time it enters British service,uniquely combines a modular hull which increases it's size,weight and cost for negligible benefit with a profile larger than a Main Battle Tank,ground pressure four times higher than an equivalent tracked vehicle,mechanicals which are exposed to enemy fire,a machine gun armed remote weapon station and protection against cannon fire both of which are inadequate in the front line and unnecessary anywhere else,and an ability to drive across Europe which,as the war in Ukraine has demonstrated,is utterly irrelevant.

 

More British Defence Cuts Coming Soon?

Various media outlets have recently been reporting that the British Ministry Of Defence will have to make significant additional cuts in the near future.

These cuts will be on top of the significant reductions announced in the Strategic Defence and Security Review in October 2010.

The Financial Times reports that there is a shortfall of at least £1,000 Million a year in the defence budget.

Other sources report the shortfall may be as high as £2,000 Million.

It is difficult to know whether these reports are correct given the media's history of inaccuracy on defence matters.

However,if they are correct,there will need to be substantial cuts.

David Cameron personally took the decision to eliminate the United Kingdom's ability to independently conduct combat operations when he chose to cut the Harrier fleet and retain the Tornados.

However,cutting the entire Tornado fleet would have saved a great deal more than cutting the Harriers,according to Lord West of Spithead:

"In terms of cost, if we remove the Tornado force, we would be looking at (saving) about £7.5 billion by 2018.

With the Harriers, we are looking at less than £1 billion."

That additional saving of £6,500 Million over the 7 years to 2018 equates to an average saving of £928 Million a year.

David Cameron's personal decision to retain the Tornado fleet appears to be the direct cause of the latest financial crisis at the Ministry Of Defence.


At least,if there is another financial crisis.

Reversing that decision is still possible.

Not only would that save a great deal of money but it would also restore the United Kingdom's ability to independently conduct war fighting operations.

Without that ability the British armed forces cannot serve the interests of the British taxpayer.

Making them little more than an expensive vanity project.

Another of the Strategic Defence and Security Review's strange omissions was the decision not to cut the obvious overcapacity in the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft project.

These aircraft will cost a minimum of £441 Million a year over the contract's 27 year life from 2008 to 2035,over £497 Million for each of the 24 years the new tankers will be in service from 2011 to 2035 or £627 Million for each of the 19 years of full operating capability from 2016 to 2035.

It is difficult to see any need for more than half of the 14 A330 aircraft provided under this contract.

Had Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft been cut to an appropriate size in October hundreds of millions of pounds a year would have been saved.

Another obvious saving would be to cancel the badly thought out Future Rapid Effects System (F.R.E.S.),or what remains of it.

Not only would this save the British Army from being lumbered with an unsuitable vehicle for the next 50 years but it would also eliminate the damage to the economy caused by buying thousands of millions of pounds worth of foreign made ASCOD armoured vehicles.

A far cheaper option is upgrading the very similar and already in service Warrior vehicles (a direct equivalent of ASCOD).

The British Army could then get a more suitable,less economically damaging and more exportable,domestically designed and built modern armoured personnel carrier at a later date.

A type of vehicle which would be in high demand on the export market but which is not currently available anywhere.

The alternative is being stuck with a sexed up 1990s era infantry fighting vehicle with a flat bottom and hull penetrating torsion bar suspension until 2060.

A new armoured personnel carrier design with shallow vee hull and non hull penetrating suspension,capable of carrying 2 pallets or 8 infantrymen in addition to it's 2 man crew,would allow the British Army to reduce it's frontline vehicle fleet to just 3 major types (light,medium and heavy) in the medium term.

Most importantly,cancelling F.R.E.S. Scout/ASCOD would eliminate the threat to the British Army's security of supply caused by a reliance on foreign countries which are often opposed to British military operations.

Armed forces without security of supply cannot serve the interests of the people who pay for them.

There is no reason for the taxpayer to pay for armed forces which can not serve his best interests.

The Americans had the good sense to kill off the Future Combat Systems vehicles.

Perhaps the current financial situation will save the British Army from Future Rapid Effects System.

The Cost Of A Westland Wildcat

The Agusta Westland Lynx Wildcat helicopter is surrounded by a number of myths and controversies.

The most common of these is that the helicopter is excessively expensive.

An overview of the subject of helicopter costs has been given in another post.

It can be seen from this that the Wildcat is not particularly expensive when it's price is compared to that of a popular competitor,the Sikorsky BlackHawk / SeaHawk family. 

However,this does not tell the whole story.

Details of the Wildcat's project's cost can be found on Part 2,Page 14 of 34 of Ministry Of Defence : Major Projects Report 2009 Appendices and Project Summary Sheets.

By taking the £1,669 Million program cost of the Wildcat project and dividing by the 62 helicopters which are being purchased we get the £27 Million unit program cost which is often quoted.

However,the major projects report says that the original project was for £1,966 Million for 80 helicopters which comes to £24.5 Million each.

The report states that £297 Million was saved by reducing the number of helicopters purchased by 18.

This suggests that the production cost of a Lynx Wildcat is just £16.5 Million.

The differences between these three figures,£27 Million,£24.5 Million and £16.5 Million are the result of the basic economics of design and manufacture.

Designing,developing and setting up production facilities for a helicopter costs much the same regardless of how many are produced.

But if the number of aircraft produced doubles,those one off costs are spread over twice as many airframes and consequently add half as much overhead to the unit program cost of each.

Higher volume production also saves on the direct manufacturing costs.

Every sailor,soldier and airman understands that the more you do something,the better you get at it.

The same applies to design and manufacturing.

The more helicopters you build,the better you get at it and the cheaper those helicopters become.

For both of these reasons,increasing production numbers reduces unit cost.

Conversely reducing production numbers increases unit costs.

Unfortunately,that is exactly what the Ministry of Defence did to the Westland Wildcat.

In fact,that is what the Ministry of Defence does to many projects.

The Ministry of Defence decided to develop a new helicopter on the back of an initial order for just 80.

This meant that the one off costs were spread thickly over a small production quantity and consequently resulted in a relatively high initial unit program cost.

Procurement of helicopters in such small quantities is the consequence of the Ministry of Defence's failure to rationalise it's helicopter fleet.

A rational helicopter procurement strategy might,for example,have examined whether or not it was practical to replace helicopters such as the Griffin,Bell 212,Dauphin and some Gazelles with the same helicopter which replaced the Lynx.

The lack of rationalisation of the helicopter fleet is at least partly attributable to interservice rivalries and in particular the artificial weight limits on the size of helicopters which may be operated by the British Army.

These limits serve no military purpose and could be removed by the Secretary of State for Defence.

The second mistake by the Ministry of Defence was to cut the order from 80 helicopters to just 62.

This pushed unit program costs up by £2.5 Million per helicopter.

This 10% increase in unit program cost is directly attributable to the poor management of the Ministry of Defence.

The manufacturer can in no way be held accountable for this increase.

Agusta Westland has delivered the Wildcat on time and on budget.

However,as always,it's reputation will be sullied by the cost increases imposed by bad management at the Ministry of Defence.

Many other defence manufacturers often have to take the blame for delays and cost increases imposed by bad management at the Ministry of Defence.

These problems were highlighted by the Grey Report on defence procurement.

Another often neglected aspect of the Wildcat is it's equipment fit.

Often the cost of the Wildcat is inappropriately compared to that of "vanilla" transport helicopters.

However,the Wildcat is not a "vanilla" transport helicopter.

It comes in two variants,a reconnaissance helicopter for the army and a maritime attack helicopter for the navy.

Both of these aircraft carry equipment which is not found on basic transport helicopters.

Both variants carry an electro-optical/Forward Looking Infra-Red (F.L.I.R.) turret in the nose.

The naval version also carries a radar and dipping sonar.

The dipping sonar for the Wildcat has not been selected but such sensors can cost about £2 Million each.

A SeaSpray radar will also add more than £300,000 to the cost of each naval helicopter.

While a recent Canadian order suggests the Wescam MX-15Di electro-optical sensor turrets to be fitted to every Wildcat may cost £847,000 each.

 These items add significant cost which makes a cost comparison with a "vanilla" transport helicopter somewhat inappropriate.

An often heard criticism of the Lynx Wildcat is that it makes a poor utility helicopter.

However,it was never intended as a utility helicopter.

According to the Ministry of Defence:

"The AAC's (Army Air Corps) helicopter capabilities are concentrated on delivering the Find and Attack functions, although they also provide limited troop transportation and command support roles."

The British Army wanted a Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter (B.R.H.) for the "Find" role.

Agusta Westland developed a Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter.

It is rather odd that the Wildcat reconnaissance helicopter should be criticised for not being a good utility helicopter.

If the British Army wanted a utility helicopter it should not have ordered a reconnaissance helicopter.

Criticism for this decision should be directed at the British Army's chain of command and not at Agusta Westland.

Future British Army

The British Army currently has 36 "in role" infantry battalions and 9 "in role" armoured regiments.

These units are divided into a mixture of subtypes.

Armoured regiments can be either heavy tank units (effectively armoured horse artillery) or formation reconnaissance units (effectively light cavalry).

Infantry Battalions can be armoured infantry (effectively medium cavalry),mechanised infantry,light role infantry,air assault infantry.

As it takes 5 units to maintain 1 unit deployed it makes sense to have the army's units and formations to be divided into multiples of 5.

These 45 battalions and regiments can be formed into 5 divisions each of 9 infantry battalions or armoured regiments.

A division of 9 battalions can be organised into 2 brigades of 4 battalions with 1 battalion as the divisional reconnaissance unit.

Alternatively the division may have 3 brigades,each of 3 battalions with 1 battalion in each brigade being reconnaissance roled.

In either case the army will have 5 divisions each of 9 battlions and regiments.

An army of 5 divisions should be able to sustain 1 division on operations indefinitely or surge several divisions for short term major warfighting operations.

This supply profile is well matched to the historic demand for British ground forces in wars since 1945.

However,sustaining divisional deployments will require some changes to how overseas non combat postings are dealt with with regard to harmony guidelines.

Currently the British army has role specific brigades such as 16 Air Assault Brigade and 7th armoured Brigade but is lacking in role specific divisions.

This is despite having sufficient assets to maintain such formations.

Consequently the capabilities of the different types of unit within the army cannot be exploited to the full.

A particular situation might best be dealt with by the deployment of a light infantry/air assault division,for example:Kosovo 1999;Afghanistan 2001;Northern Iraq 2003.

The British Army has sufficient light infantry units to deploy such a division but it does not have suitable lightweight divisional support assets as its divisions are effectively general purpose structures.

Similarly there may be situations which require an all heavy armoured division,such as the liberation of Kuwait in 1991,or an all medium division.

This deficiency may be corrected by reorganising units into type specific divisions.

The 9 in role regular Royal Armoured Corps regiments may be formed into a single armoured heavy cavalry division.

A single light air assault division may be formed from 9 light infantry battalions.

The remainder of the infantry may be formed into 3 medium infantry divisions of 9 infantry battalions each.

These divisions may be mixed at all levels as the situation requires but their role specific divisional assets permit the deployment of homogenous formations when needed.

At present divisions are made up of 2 types of armoured regiments (tank and formation reconnaissance) and 4 types of infantry battalion (armoured,mechanised,light role,air assault).

The divisional reorganisation suggested above requires only 3 types of unit:armoured heavy cavalry;medium infantry and light air assault infantry.

With all armoured formation reconnaissance regiments being consolidated within the heavy cavalry division,there is a need to equip them with heavier vehicles more suitable for the higher threat density they will operate in,such as the Warrior.

Within the infantry division the formation reconnaissance role will be taken over by reconnaissance roled infantry battalions equipped with the same vehicles as the division they are supporting.

This completely eliminates the need for any role specific "reconnaissance vehicle",such as the Future Rapid Effects System Specialist Vehicle (F.R.E.S. S.V.).

It also ensures that each type of division has a reconnaissance capability best suited to the level of threat density and terrain density it is most likely to encounter which is not possible with the present homogenous light cavalry formation reconnaissance regiments.

The following new vehicles would be required in the long term to equip the three new division types:

A new heavy cavalry vehicle to replace Warrior and Challenger II in the heavy cavalry division.

A new medium armoured personnel carrier to replace the FV432 Bulldog (Nee Trojan),Scorpion series and others in the medium infantry divisions.

A helicopter portable,front engined 4 and 6 wheeled vehicle to replace Landrover,Pinzgauer,Supacat H.M.T.,Panther and M.A.N. HX within the light infantry division.

In the interim the armoured cavalry regiments in the heavy cavalry division would be equipped with Warrior and Challenger II vehicles pending development of a new heavy cavalry vehicle built around an internal footprint shared with the medium infantry carrier.

The medium infantry battalions in the medium division would be equipped with a mixture of FV432 Bulldog (Nee Trojan),Scorpion series,Mastiff and others pending the arrival of the new medium armoured personnel carrier with a shallow vee hull,non hull penetrating Horstman Hydrogas suspension and capacity for up to 2 pallets or 8 dismounts in addition to a 2 man crew.

The light infantry units in the air assault division would be equipped with Landrover,Pinzgauer and Supacat H.M.T. pending the arrival of new front engined 4 and 6 wheeled helicopter portable vehicles,the latter with the same internal capacity as the medium infantry's armoured personnel carrier.