To a traditionalist the purpose of a screwdriver is to insert a screw,but to the transformationalist the purpose of a screw is to justify procurement of the very latest in screwdriver fashion.
Showing posts with label procurement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label procurement. Show all posts
Thursday, 9 December 2021
Sunday, 23 May 2021
The Transformational Approach To Defence Procurement
Herein we shall outline the approach to defence procurement used by transformationalists to acquire shiny new toys.
Firstly the transformationalist sees a shiny new toy in a powerpoint presentation or computer generated image.
Next the transformationalist declares that the shiny new toy is "transformational",a "revolution in military affairs" and "a game changer".
Then the transformationalist condemns combat proven military,or naval,capabilities as obsolete (by which he means unfashionable) to justify discarding them in order to liberate funds to procure the shiny new toy.
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The transformationalist then writes a requirement to justify the procurement of the shiny new toy,being careful to include provisions that no other system may satisfy,such as an incredibly short procurement schedule which eliminates any possibility of developing alternatives.
Having officially selected the shiny new toy,the transformationalist then scrupulously avoids having it subjected to extensive testing in order to eliminate any possibility that unforeseen problems may impede it's rapid procurement.
Having procured the shiny new toy,the transformationalist next attempts to conceive a concept of operations to justify it's procurement and failing to do that,invents a brand name instead.
If anyone asks about the concept of operation of the shiny new toy the transformationalist bombards them with vague phrases,buzzwords and acronyms (not forgetting to frequently insert the brand name) until they look bemused or,if that does not work,tells them it's secret.
Following years of successful obfuscation,the transformationalist may now retire to take up a well paid directorship with the defence contractor which builds the shiny new toy.
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With the transformationalist now retired his successors are finally able to prematurely retire the useless shiny new toy he procured,thereby freeing up funds to procure the very latest in military,or naval,fashions.
Friday, 22 July 2011
Member Of Parliament Opens His Eyes
This blog is not about politics.
But as European integration is the driving force behind the British Government's defence policy it is difficult to ignore it.
It is also difficult to ignore the fact that many in the British political and military establishment seem to have little idea that British defence policy is largely driven by the European Union.
Conservative Member of Parliament Douglas Carswell has been mentioned on this blog in an earlier post.
Mr.Carswell appears to be under the misapprehension that the British government follows a "buy British" defence procurement policy.
Even though it has for many years been following an avowedly "buy European" policy in line with European Union policy and at the cost of thousands of British jobs.
He also seems to think that the planned sharing of British and French aircraft carriers is the result of this "buy British" policy rather than a deliberate decision by the British government to participate in the creation of a pan-European naval force.
Military independence and political independence are indivisible.
Which is why independent nations try to buy domestically wherever it is practical.
Having surrendered the largest empire the World had ever seen as a result of inadequate security of supply,the British government should understand this better than most.
Without security of supply Britain does not have military independence.
Without military independence Britain does not have political independence.
Without political independence the British government cannot further the interests of the British people.
Without political independence the British government cannot further the interests of the British people.
Which is why the European Union wants to replace national security of supply with European security of supply.
Even if Douglass Carswell does not understand the political importance of security of supply,the European Union certainly does.
However,if Mr.Carswell is not up to speed on defence procurement he does seem to have finally realised that the British government is following a policy of European integration.
Which he should have been able to work out from the tacit support of the Lisbon Treaty from Britain's Europeanist Prime Minister David Cameron.
The leader of Douglas Carswell's own Conservative party.
The leader of Douglas Carswell's own Conservative party.
Saturday, 9 October 2010
The Cost Of A Westland Wildcat
The Agusta Westland Lynx Wildcat helicopter is surrounded by a number of myths and controversies.
The most common of these is that the helicopter is excessively expensive.
It can be seen from this that the Wildcat is not particularly expensive when it's price is compared to that of a popular competitor,the Sikorsky BlackHawk / SeaHawk family.
However,this does not tell the whole story.
Details of the Wildcat's project's cost can be found on Part 2,Page 14 of 34 of Ministry Of Defence : Major Projects Report 2009 Appendices and Project Summary Sheets.
By taking the £1,669 Million program cost of the Wildcat project and dividing by the 62 helicopters which are being purchased we get the £27 Million unit program cost which is often quoted.
However,the major projects report says that the original project was for £1,966 Million for 80 helicopters which comes to £24.5 Million each.
The report states that £297 Million was saved by reducing the number of helicopters purchased by 18.
This suggests that the production cost of a Lynx Wildcat is just £16.5 Million.
The differences between these three figures,£27 Million,£24.5 Million and £16.5 Million are the result of the basic economics of design and manufacture.
Designing,developing and setting up production facilities for a helicopter costs much the same regardless of how many are produced.
But if the number of aircraft produced doubles,those one off costs are spread over twice as many airframes and consequently add half as much overhead to the unit program cost of each.
Higher volume production also saves on the direct manufacturing costs.
Every sailor,soldier and airman understands that the more you do something,the better you get at it.
The same applies to design and manufacturing.
The more helicopters you build,the better you get at it and the cheaper those helicopters become.
For both of these reasons,increasing production numbers reduces unit cost.
Conversely reducing production numbers increases unit costs.
Unfortunately,that is exactly what the Ministry of Defence did to the Westland Wildcat.
In fact,that is what the Ministry of Defence does to many projects.
The Ministry of Defence decided to develop a new helicopter on the back of an initial order for just 80.
This meant that the one off costs were spread thickly over a small production quantity and consequently resulted in a relatively high initial unit program cost.
Procurement of helicopters in such small quantities is the consequence of the Ministry of Defence's failure to rationalise it's helicopter fleet.
A rational helicopter procurement strategy might,for example,have examined whether or not it was practical to replace helicopters such as the Griffin,Bell 212,Dauphin and some Gazelles with the same helicopter which replaced the Lynx.
The lack of rationalisation of the helicopter fleet is at least partly attributable to interservice rivalries and in particular the artificial weight limits on the size of helicopters which may be operated by the British Army.
These limits serve no military purpose and could be removed by the Secretary of State for Defence.
The second mistake by the Ministry of Defence was to cut the order from 80 helicopters to just 62.
This pushed unit program costs up by £2.5 Million per helicopter.
This 10% increase in unit program cost is directly attributable to the poor management of the Ministry of Defence.
The manufacturer can in no way be held accountable for this increase.
Agusta Westland has delivered the Wildcat on time and on budget.
However,as always,it's reputation will be sullied by the cost increases imposed by bad management at the Ministry of Defence.
Many other defence manufacturers often have to take the blame for delays and cost increases imposed by bad management at the Ministry of Defence.
These problems were highlighted by the Grey Report on defence procurement.
Another often neglected aspect of the Wildcat is it's equipment fit.
Often the cost of the Wildcat is inappropriately compared to that of "vanilla" transport helicopters.
However,the Wildcat is not a "vanilla" transport helicopter.
It comes in two variants,a reconnaissance helicopter for the army and a maritime attack helicopter for the navy.
Both of these aircraft carry equipment which is not found on basic transport helicopters.
Both variants carry an electro-optical/Forward Looking Infra-Red (F.L.I.R.) turret in the nose.
The naval version also carries a radar and dipping sonar.
The dipping sonar for the Wildcat has not been selected but such sensors can cost about £2 Million each.
A SeaSpray radar will also add more than £300,000 to the cost of each naval helicopter.
While a recent Canadian order suggests the Wescam MX-15Di electro-optical sensor turrets to be fitted to every Wildcat may cost £847,000 each.
These items add significant cost which makes a cost comparison with a "vanilla" transport helicopter somewhat inappropriate.
An often heard criticism of the Lynx Wildcat is that it makes a poor utility helicopter.
However,it was never intended as a utility helicopter.
According to the Ministry of Defence:
"The AAC's (Army Air Corps) helicopter capabilities are concentrated on delivering the Find and Attack functions, although they also provide limited troop transportation and command support roles."
The British Army wanted a Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter (B.R.H.) for the "Find" role.
Agusta Westland developed a Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter.
It is rather odd that the Wildcat reconnaissance helicopter should be criticised for not being a good utility helicopter.
If the British Army wanted a utility helicopter it should not have ordered a reconnaissance helicopter.
Criticism for this decision should be directed at the British Army's chain of command and not at Agusta Westland.
Designing,developing and setting up production facilities for a helicopter costs much the same regardless of how many are produced.
But if the number of aircraft produced doubles,those one off costs are spread over twice as many airframes and consequently add half as much overhead to the unit program cost of each.
Higher volume production also saves on the direct manufacturing costs.
Every sailor,soldier and airman understands that the more you do something,the better you get at it.
The same applies to design and manufacturing.
The more helicopters you build,the better you get at it and the cheaper those helicopters become.
For both of these reasons,increasing production numbers reduces unit cost.
Conversely reducing production numbers increases unit costs.
Unfortunately,that is exactly what the Ministry of Defence did to the Westland Wildcat.
In fact,that is what the Ministry of Defence does to many projects.
The Ministry of Defence decided to develop a new helicopter on the back of an initial order for just 80.
This meant that the one off costs were spread thickly over a small production quantity and consequently resulted in a relatively high initial unit program cost.
Procurement of helicopters in such small quantities is the consequence of the Ministry of Defence's failure to rationalise it's helicopter fleet.
A rational helicopter procurement strategy might,for example,have examined whether or not it was practical to replace helicopters such as the Griffin,Bell 212,Dauphin and some Gazelles with the same helicopter which replaced the Lynx.
The lack of rationalisation of the helicopter fleet is at least partly attributable to interservice rivalries and in particular the artificial weight limits on the size of helicopters which may be operated by the British Army.
These limits serve no military purpose and could be removed by the Secretary of State for Defence.
The second mistake by the Ministry of Defence was to cut the order from 80 helicopters to just 62.
This pushed unit program costs up by £2.5 Million per helicopter.
This 10% increase in unit program cost is directly attributable to the poor management of the Ministry of Defence.
The manufacturer can in no way be held accountable for this increase.
Agusta Westland has delivered the Wildcat on time and on budget.
However,as always,it's reputation will be sullied by the cost increases imposed by bad management at the Ministry of Defence.
Many other defence manufacturers often have to take the blame for delays and cost increases imposed by bad management at the Ministry of Defence.
These problems were highlighted by the Grey Report on defence procurement.
Another often neglected aspect of the Wildcat is it's equipment fit.
Often the cost of the Wildcat is inappropriately compared to that of "vanilla" transport helicopters.
However,the Wildcat is not a "vanilla" transport helicopter.
It comes in two variants,a reconnaissance helicopter for the army and a maritime attack helicopter for the navy.
Both of these aircraft carry equipment which is not found on basic transport helicopters.
Both variants carry an electro-optical/Forward Looking Infra-Red (F.L.I.R.) turret in the nose.
The naval version also carries a radar and dipping sonar.
The dipping sonar for the Wildcat has not been selected but such sensors can cost about £2 Million each.
A SeaSpray radar will also add more than £300,000 to the cost of each naval helicopter.
While a recent Canadian order suggests the Wescam MX-15Di electro-optical sensor turrets to be fitted to every Wildcat may cost £847,000 each.
These items add significant cost which makes a cost comparison with a "vanilla" transport helicopter somewhat inappropriate.
An often heard criticism of the Lynx Wildcat is that it makes a poor utility helicopter.
However,it was never intended as a utility helicopter.
According to the Ministry of Defence:
"The AAC's (Army Air Corps) helicopter capabilities are concentrated on delivering the Find and Attack functions, although they also provide limited troop transportation and command support roles."
The British Army wanted a Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter (B.R.H.) for the "Find" role.
Agusta Westland developed a Battlefield Reconnaissance Helicopter.
It is rather odd that the Wildcat reconnaissance helicopter should be criticised for not being a good utility helicopter.
If the British Army wanted a utility helicopter it should not have ordered a reconnaissance helicopter.
Criticism for this decision should be directed at the British Army's chain of command and not at Agusta Westland.
Saturday, 21 November 2009
British Combat Aircraft Procurement
The British Royal Air Force may be dramatically reduced in size as it cannot afford to buy and operate all the aircraft it had been planning to acquire.
Funding for those conflicts is in addition to the rest of the defence budget.
The Royal Air Force’s problems have been caused by the Royal Air Force itself and it’s incompetent aircraft procurement dating back many decades (and that does not just apply to fast jets either).
Twenty years ago when the Royal Air Force began planning the current aircraft procurements,British fast jet strength was over 800 aircraft.
A number more than sufficient to justify the rapid and cost effective domestic development and manufacture of a new combat aircraft type to replace the whole fast jet fleet.
However,as usual the paroquial interests of elements of the armed forces got in the way of what was best for the armed forces and the nation as a whole.
The result being that the Royal Air Force decided to replace it’s fast jet fleet with three seperate aircraft types:Agile Combat Aircraft (now the Typhoon);what eventually became Future Joint Combat Aircraft (now the F-35 Lightning II) and what was to have been Future Offensive Air System (F.O.A.S.).
Future Offensive Air Systems was likely to be a bomber,now cancelled due to cost growth on the other two aircraft projects.
Note how those three aircraft types mirror the old Bomber Command,Fighter Command,Tactical Air Force structure of the Second World War.
This structure of the Royal Air Force was perpetuated till recent times through Strike Command,Royal Air Force Germany and Number 1 Group,Number 2 Group and Number 11 Group.
The decision to buy three different fast jet aircraft meant that domestic design and manufacture was not economically viable due to the small numbers of each type required.
Agile Combat Aircraft became the multinational European Combat Aircraft,later Typhoon,resulting in massive time delays and cost increases.
Future Joint Combat Aircraft became the F-35,a cheap mass produced American aircraft,expected to cost half as much as the Typhoon.
Which due to being one of the worst thought out aircraft programmes in history and due to exchange rate fluctuations may cost twice as much as the “expensive” Typhoon.
With all the money wasted on those two (at least £5,000 Million wasted),the third aircraft had to be cancelled.
The many thousands of millions of pounds poured down the drain due to the Royal Air Force’s complete disregard of the basic industrial factors inherent in designing and manufacturing aircraft are the real reason the Royal Air Force cannot now afford to buy the aircraft it wants.
One of the great ironies of this sorry saga is that at the time the Royal Air Force decided it needed seperate fast jet fleets for use on land and sea,it was operating three carrier capable aircraft (Harrier,Phantom and Buccaneer) and a fourth (Jaguar) which was originally intended for carrier use but was not up to the task (you will never guess whose fault that was!).
Lest the above be seen as an anti Royal Air Force rant,I should point out that the British Army (note not the Royal Army!) and the Royal Navy are also afflicted by the “Why buy one platform when you can buy three?” attitude.
Both also suffer the consequences of that appproach.
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