The Cost Of A Catapult

Some time ago in our post titled "Why Catapults Are Cheaper",we said the following:

"The cost of a British electromagnetic catapult system from Converteam is not public knowledge so we can but mention it but prices for the American system are known."

We may now know how much Converteam's catapult costs.

According to this week's Sunday Times newspaper,Converteam have offered to build a land based full scale prototype electro magnetic catapult and a ship set (2 catapults) for a Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier at a cost of £140 Million.

This compares very well with the published cost of the American electro magnetic catapult system which we also covered in our earlier post:

"The cost of the Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System (E.M.A.L.S.) ship set for the same vessel is up to $573 Million (£370 Million*).

That is for a set of four catapults,enough for both new British aircraft carriers."

The American system comes in at an average of £92 Million per catapult (a more recent document suggests £105 Million per catapult) versus an average of £47 Million per catapult for the British system if the Sunday Times report is correct.

It would be interesting to know how the price of British arresting gear (made by MacTaggart Scott,inventors of the steam catapult) compares to that of the American Advanced Arresting Gear which costs £66 Million per set.

*Based on exchange rates on the 17th of September 2010 when the earlier post was written.

Independently And In Our National Interest

During the recent Anglo French summit in London,British Prime Minister David Cameron said the following:

"Britain and France are,and will always remain,sovereign nations,able to deploy our armed forces independently and in our national interest when we choose to do so."

We must question whether this statement is true.

As recent operations in Afghanistan have demonstrated,the British Army is dependent on air support even when fighting third World peasants.

As operations in the Falklands demonstrated,the Royal Navy is dependent on air support even when fighting a poorly equipped developing nation.

Without an independent means to deliver air power,British land and sea forces are not capable of conducting independent war fighting operations in the interests of a sovereign United Kingdom.

Air power can be delivered from a land base by the Royal Air Force or from the deck of an aircraft carrier by the Royal Navy.

Unfortunately the Royal Air Force lost it's ability to conduct independent warfighting operations in the national interest when Britain lost it's global network of air bases generations ago.

Since then it has been dependent on foreign countries to provide it with air bases and logistical infrastructure (the ports,roads,refineries and pipelines which supply the fuel,ordnance and other items to the air base).

In recent years the Royal Air Force has also become dependent on allies for fighter protection and ground based air defence.

With just 3 frontline fighter squadrons,at least 2 of which are dedicated to domestic defence,the Royal Air Force is not capable of defending the bases it operates from during expeditionary warfighting.

It can only conduct expeditionary combat operations with the support of an ally whose fighters are needed to protect the air bases and supporting infrastructure which the Royal Air Force is reliant on.

Nor is the Royal Air Force capable of providing fighter cover to it's overly large fleet of ground attack aircraft.

In addition,Britain now has just 24 frontline  Rapier fire units,all operated by 4 batteries of 16 Regiment Royal Artillery.

With one battery permanently stationed in the Falkland Islands there are unlikely to be enough deployable short ranged Rapier fire units to protect even a single expeditionary air base and the infrastructure which it depends on let alone to protect the British Army's assets as well.

The Royal Air Force usually requires several air bases for even small scale expeditionary war fighting operations.

Even those Rapiers which are available are considerably out ranged by common precision ground attack weapons such as AGM65 Maverick.

Most second tier air forces are capable of destroying Rapier fire units without even entering Rapier's engagement envelope.

Consequently the Royal Air Force is also dependent on allies to provide ground based air defence for the air bases and infrastructure which it relies on for expeditionary warfighting operations.

There is also a need for ground forces to defend this air power infrastructure.

Even in a low threat environment like Afghanistan the ground forces required for this task may far exceed the brigade sized force which the British Army will be able to sustain in future.

A force which can do no more than defend it's self is "a self licking lollipop".

It is of great expense but no military use.

Clearly Britain cannot conduct independent war fighting operations as a sovereign nation if it's land and sea forces are dependent on air support from the land based Royal Air Force.

The alternative means of providing air support to British land and sea forces is from the deck of a Royal Navy aircraft carrier.

British aircraft carriers have freedom of navigation across most of the World's surface without the need for "Host Nation Support" (H.N.S.).

Unlike land bases the Royal Navy's aircraft carriers have little need for local logistical infrastructure as they can stay at sea for 6 months at a time supported by at sea replinshment from Royal Fleet Auxiliaries.

Sea based logistics have the additional benefit of being far cheaper than land based logistics.

The Royal Navy is also capable of defending it's aircraft carriers from land sea and air threats without needing help from allies.

It also requires no ground forces to defend it,allowing the British Army to concentrate on doing useful things rather than defending air power infrastructure.

Britain can independently deploy air power from it's aircraft carriers.

Only with carrier based aircraft can the United Kingdom independently conduct combat operations as a sovereign nation.

Prime Minister David Cameron personally took the decision to eliminate that capability.

David Cameron's claim that Britain will be "able to deploy our armed forces independently and in our national interest" is simply not credible.

David Cameron eliminated Britain's ability to conduct independent combat operations when he decided to eliminate British carrier capable combat aircraft.

David Cameron personally ensured that Britain will never again be able to conduct independent combat operations when he decided that the Royal Navy would have only one aircraft carrier. 

Strategic Bombing,Operation Allied Force

During Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil,the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999,American B2 Spirit strategic bombers flew from Whiteman Air Force Base,Missouri in the United States of America.

19 B2 bombers were based at Whiteman.

Of these,10 were being upgraded to Block 30 standard and 9 were available for operations.

Of the 9 operational aircraft,1 was used for training,1 was receiving it's final Block 30 upgrades and 1 was undergoing extensive maintenance,leaving 6 aircraft available for combat.

During the 78 day bombing campaign,these 6 aircraft flew 49 sorties,45 of which reached their targets and released ordnance.

A sortie typically lasted 28-32 hours,required 4 in flight refuellings and delivered 16 guided 2,000 pound bombs.

B2 Spirits flew less than 1% of the sorties in Operation Allied Force yet they dropped 11% of all bombs.

See here: www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1999_hr/has181200_0.htm

Furthermore,while other aircraft were often unable to drop bombs due to bad weather,the B2s flew above the clouds using radar and inertial/Global Positioning System (G.P.S.) guided bombs regardless of the weather conditions.

On a per sortie basis the B2's bombing performance was far better than most other aircraft used in this conflict.

It has been said that "The B–2 was the star of the air campaign over Kosovo".

The total purchase cost of 21 B2 Spirits was $44,754 Million.

See here: www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad97181.htm

Just 6 of these were used in Operation Allied Force due to the upgrades already mentioned.

However,the difficulty in maintaining the low radar signature of these aircraft is such that they can require 124 hours of maintenance for each hour of flight.

Consequently they have mission capable rates as low as 26% and rarely more than 50%.

This means that typically only 5-10 aircraft are available for use at any one time anyway.

See here: www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b-2-ops.htm and here: www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad97181.htm

It had then actually cost $7,459 Million to field each of the six Spirits used in Operation Allied Force.

Approximately 700 bombs were dropped by B2s during the 78 day campaign with a hit rate of around 87%.

That is a rate of 1.5 bombs dropped per aircraft per day or 1.3 bomb hits per aircraft per day at a cost of $7,459 Million per aircraft.

That does not include the cost,approximately $800 Million,of the four tankers required to get the strategic bombers to their targets in the first place.

The total capital cost of around $8,300 Million for the B2 bomber and it's supporting tankers is similar to the cost of a British Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier and it's airwing.

Yet the aircraft carrier,operating from the Adriatic Sea,could deliver at least 100 times as many bombs on target per day as the bomber and do so without any aerial refuelling support as all targets would be within the unrefuelled tactical radius of it's aircraft.

Whether the carrier is equipped with Super Hornets,Rafales,Typhoons or Lightning IIs (F35 B or F35 C),all targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would lie within the unrefuelled tactical radius of it's aircraft when carrying 4 2,000 pound bombs.

No target being more than 300 miles from potential operating locations of the carrier.

If each of the 36 aircraft onboard such a carrier flew just one strike mission per day they would between them deliver 144 2,000 pound bombs in a day.

It is possible for a carrier to generate far more sorties than that.

British carrier aircraft were flying as many as 4 sorties per aircraft per day during the Falklands war in 1982.

The American aircraft carrier U.S.S Nimitz has demonstrated the ability to fly 200 strike sorties per day,4 sorties flown per fighter per day for 4 days,her captain thought she could have kept that rate up for a week.

The next generation American carrier U.S.S.Gerald R. Ford is designed to generate up to 5 strike sorties per aircraft per day.

Given the short distances involved,each sortie from a carrier in the Adriatic would take about one hour.

Under combat conditions carriers can turn aircraft around between sorties in under an hour,giving a total cycle time of about two hours per sortie over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

There is then the time for the carrier to generate as many as many as 5 sorties per aircraft in a single day while still leaving plenty of time for rest and maintenance.

Such a sortie rate would deliver 720 2,000 pound bombs in one day.

That is as many bombs delivered in a single day as the entire B2 bomber fleet dropped in 78 days of Operation Allied Force.

Which is rather impressive when one considers that the bombers and their tanker support cost 5 times as much as the carrier and it's air wing.

It is also 480 times as many bombs dropped per day as could be delivered by a single B2 Spirit and it's tankers at the same capital cost as the carrier and it's air wing.

In terms of bombs per day per dollar,even when one allows for the cost of the aircraft carrier's escort support ships and availability of ships and aircraft,the B2 Spirit still appears to offer exceedingly poor value for money.