Why Catapults Are Cheaper

There has been considerable recent speculation about the new British Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers being fitted with catapults so that they might operate the conventional F35C fighter rather than the vertical landing F35B.

Some have asked how this would save money.

The cost of a British electromagnetic catapult system from Converteam is not public knowledge so we can but mention it but prices for the American system are known.

Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System (E.M.A.L.S.) and Advanced Arresting Gear (A.A.G.) have been developed for the latest class of American aircraft carriers.

The U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford (C.V.N.78) is due to enter service in 2015,a year before H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth.

Thus the technology will be well proven before H.M.S.Queen Elizabeth is outfitted with it.

The cost of the new American Advanced Arresting Gear (A.A.G.) for the Gerald R. Ford class aircraft carrier is $102 Million (£66 Million) for one ship set,or two sets for £132 Million for both Queen Elizabeth class ships.

The cost of the Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System (E.M.A.L.S.) ship set for the same vessel is up to $573 Million (£370 Million).

That is for a set of four catapults,enough for both new British aircraft carriers.

Which suggests a total cost of £502 Million for two complete ship sets of catapults and arrester gear for the two new carriers.

There would also be some minimal redesign costs but as the upper works of the ships have not been built yet and the vessels were designed from the start to accommodate catapults,this should be a small expense.

It should also be noted that the Queen Elizabeth class will almost certainly have to be fitted with catapults at some point in their lives anyway.

The additional operating costs would also be small,probably adding no more than a small percentage to the ship's annual operating costs.

In contrast,comparing the costs of the F35B and F35C is far more difficult as officially published figures for FY 2010 (Item No 6 Page 1) lump both types together.

There are many unofficial sources which claim the F35C costs far less than the F35B,which is as one would expect given the added complexity of the latter.

The current production schedule for British F35s can be seen on Page 88 of this document.

It suggests British procurement will be largely concentrated in two batches,the first procured between 2015 and 2020 and the second batch from 2023 and 2027.

The United States Navy's FY 2011 budget does give discrete price estimates for the two variants from 2011 onwards.


The FY 2011 United States Navy budget suggets the F35C will have a unit cost of about $155 Million in 2015 (Item No 5 Page 1) with later aircraft costing $108 Million each.

The same document suggests the F35B will cost $157 Million in 2015 (Item No 7 Page 1) with later aircraft costing $111 Million each.

This suggests that a fleet of 138 F35C would cost approximately £250 Million less than a fleet of F35Bs.

It is particularly interesting that the cost of the engine for the F35B is over $25 Million in 2015 while the engine for the F35C is less than $12 Million in the same year.

As both aircraft use the same engine,the difference is presumably due to the cost of the vertical lift systems on the F35B.

The lift fan,drive shaft,clutch,rotating nozzle and hover control systems on the F35B will certainly require far more parts and man hours to maintain over the aircraft's lifespan.

The F35B engine may also experience greater wear in the hover.

This source suggests the total life cycle cost of the F35C will be about £4,760 Million less than that of the vertical landing F35B,it is not clear where their figures come from.

If their numbers are correct then that saving far exceeds the previously mentioned £502 Million cost of two ship sets of catapults and arrestor gear.

If we deduct the cost of the catapults from the savings they suggest will be made from buying the F35C,we get a net saving of about £4,267 Million over the aircraft's lifecycle or £85 Million for each of the fifty years the new carriers will be in service.

That is many times the small additional operating costs of a catapult equipped ship - E.M.A.L.s has been designed to be far cheaper to operate than traditional catapults.

There are other potential savings from operating the F35C rather than the F35B.

The F35C has a significantly longer tactical radius than the F35B.

This has been an important factor in every air war the United Kingdom has been involved in since 1945.

The F35C also carries a greater weapon load than the F35B which is very important for close air support.

The importance of long range,endurance and high weapon load was highlighted during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 when naval aircraft were providing close air support to ground troops up to 800 miles from their carrier.

A longer tactical radius also directly reduces demand for aerial refuelling.

As Britain's new A330 tanker fleet is costing around £600 Million a year,three times the cost of the two new carriers,a reduction in tanker demand  translates into substantial financial savings.

Having catapult equipped carriers also allows a small fleet of fixed wing aircraft like the E2D Hawkeye to replace a much larger fleet of E3D Sentrys and SeaKing A.S.a.C. 7s. - which in turn reduces aerial tanker demand even further.

A minimum of 7 E2D Hawkeye's would be required to provide a 4 strong ship's flight capable of sustaining a single continuous orbit in combat,replacing the current fleet of 7 E3D Sentry's and 13 SeaKing Mk.7s.

With higher speed,longer radar horizon and far more advanced systems,the E2D is far superior to helicopter based surveillance assets and in many respects superior to the E3D Sentry.

The minimal in flight refuelling requirements and much smaller operating costs of a smaller,all E2D fleet would result in substantial cost savings.

The latest ministry of defence accounts do not detail the annual cost of the 7 E3D Sentrys (cost per flight hour is £33,000) but they are part of the approximately 30 aircraft in the  Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (I.S.T.A.R.) fleet which cost £1,584 Million in 2009/2010 (Page 96).

That is in addition to the operating cost of the 13 Seaking A.S.a.C.7s.

In addition to the savings on tanker aircraft,a smaller I.S.T.A.R. fleet could quite easily save hundreds of million pounds a year in operating costs.

The Out of Service Date (O.S.D.) for the E3D Sentry is 2025,just 3 years after the expected In Service Date of the Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (M.A.S.C.) carrier based Airborne Early Warning system.

A fixed wing,catapult launched M.A.S.C. solution would not only dramatically reduce operating costs compared to the current two,larger fleets but would also eliminate the need to spend approximately £3,000 Million (based on the cost of Project Wedgetail) on land based replacements for the 7 Sentrys in service at present. 

This potential saving alone is 6 times the cost of buying catapults and arrester gear for the Queen Elizabeth class carriers. 

A catapult equipped ship would also be able to operate long range surveillance aircraft such as the General Atomics Sea Avenger.

Without catapults the carriers would be unable to operate any I.S.T.A.R. aircraft,severely limiting their utility as strike carriers.

They would also be dependent on a larger fleet of land based support aircraft with all the attendant logistic,engineering and force protection costs and political difficulties which that entails.

But the author raises a point about carrier qualifications.

The United States Navy's (LSO NATOPS MANUAL Chapter 6-1 to 6-3) carrier qualification demands are known.

A student pilot must perform 14 carrier day landings in a Goshawk during his training.

Followed by 12 day landings and 8 night landings in a combat aircraft.

Thereafter,if a pilot does not fly from a carrier for a period of time or if he transitions from one aircraft type to another he must requalify.

A pilot who has not flown from a carrier for several months may need to make just 2 arrested landings to be requalified.

Pilots of military aircraft spend much of their time maintaining their skills by practicing their various tasks,including landing.

This will be the case for pilots of the F35B as well as pilots of the F35C.

It may be that F35C pilots have to spend a little longer practicing carrier landings to stay qualified but this simply means that they will be spending less time practicing other things.

The number of hours they fly each year is likely to differ little whether they fly F35Bs or F35Cs.

If the American standards are adopted a pilot will spend very little time qualifying or requalifying if he flies from carriers regularly.

Consequently,it is difficult to see any significant additional cost attached to keeping pilots qualified on the F35C.

This is particularly the case as the F35C is likely to be flown by Royal Navy pilots who will spend much of their time operating from carriers anyway.

However,the F35C may be more of an inconvenience for land based Royal Air Force pilots who may not regularly fly from ships and consequently would need some time to become deck qualified if deployed to a carrier.

This is unlikely to be a problem however,as there is little requirement for the F35 force to do anything other than ship based operations.

Lastly,why would the three F35 development aircraft the United Kingdom is buying have to be scrapped if Britain buys the F35C as the author of that piece suggests?

These are instrumented test aircraft,an important part of the F35's development program and never meant for service.

There is no reason to scrap them whatever aircraft the United Kingdom chooses to operate.

The suggestion that they should be scrapped is all the more odd as these aircraft have not even been delivered yet.

There may be a significant financial case for buying the F35C rather than the F35B.

Though it is difficult to quantify potential savings without knowing details of operating costs.

The savings could amount to hundreds of millions of pounds a year,particularly in terms of tanker and support aircraft.

Such savings are desperately needed at present.

In addition the F35C offers significantly more capability than the F35B.

The F35C/catapult option for the Queen Elizabeth class carriers certainly warrants further investigation.

Strategic Bombing,Operation Allied Force

During Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil,the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999,American B2 Spirit strategic bombers flew from Whiteman Air Force Base,Missouri in the United States of America.

19 B2 bombers were based at Whiteman.

Of these,10 were being upgraded to Block 30 standard and 9 were available for operations.

Of the 9 operational aircraft,1 was used for training,1 was receiving it's final Block 30 upgrades and 1 was undergoing extensive maintenance,leaving 6 aircraft available for combat.

During the 78 day bombing campaign,these 6 aircraft flew 49 sorties,45 of which reached their targets and released ordnance.

A sortie typically lasted 28-32 hours,required 4 in flight refuellings and delivered 16 guided 2,000 pound bombs.

B2 Spirits flew less than 1% of the sorties in Operation Allied Force yet they dropped 11% of all bombs.

See here: www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1999_hr/has181200_0.htm

Furthermore,while other aircraft were often unable to drop bombs due to bad weather,the B2s flew above the clouds using radar and inertial/Global Positioning System (G.P.S.) guided bombs regardless of the weather conditions.

On a per sortie basis the B2's bombing performance was far better than most other aircraft used in this conflict.

It has been said that "The B–2 was the star of the air campaign over Kosovo".

The total purchase cost of 21 B2 Spirits was $44,754 Million.

See here: www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad97181.htm

Just 6 of these were used in Operation Allied Force due to the upgrades already mentioned.

However,the difficulty in maintaining the low radar signature of these aircraft is such that they can require 124 hours of maintenance for each hour of flight.

Consequently they have mission capable rates as low as 26% and rarely more than 50%.

This means that typically only 5-10 aircraft are available for use at any one time anyway.

See here: www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b-2-ops.htm and here: www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad97181.htm

It had then actually cost $7,459 Million to field each of the six Spirits used in Operation Allied Force.

Approximately 700 bombs were dropped by B2s during the 78 day campaign with a hit rate of around 87%.

That is a rate of 1.5 bombs dropped per aircraft per day or 1.3 bomb hits per aircraft per day at a cost of $7,459 Million per aircraft.

That does not include the cost,approximately $800 Million,of the four tankers required to get the strategic bombers to their targets in the first place.

The total capital cost of around $8,300 Million for the B2 bomber and it's supporting tankers is similar to the cost of a British Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier and it's airwing.

Yet the aircraft carrier,operating from the Adriatic Sea,could deliver at least 100 times as many bombs on target per day as the bomber and do so without any aerial refuelling support as all targets would be within the unrefuelled tactical radius of it's aircraft.

Whether the carrier is equipped with Super Hornets,Rafales,Typhoons or Lightning IIs (F35 B or F35 C),all targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would lie within the unrefuelled tactical radius of it's aircraft when carrying 4 2,000 pound bombs.

No target being more than 300 miles from potential operating locations of the carrier.

If each of the 36 aircraft onboard such a carrier flew just one strike mission per day they would between them deliver 144 2,000 pound bombs in a day.

It is possible for a carrier to generate far more sorties than that.

British carrier aircraft were flying as many as 4 sorties per aircraft per day during the Falklands war in 1982.

The American aircraft carrier U.S.S Nimitz has demonstrated the ability to fly 200 strike sorties per day,4 sorties flown per fighter per day for 4 days,her captain thought she could have kept that rate up for a week.

The next generation American carrier U.S.S.Gerald R. Ford is designed to generate up to 5 strike sorties per aircraft per day.

Given the short distances involved,each sortie from a carrier in the Adriatic would take about one hour.

Under combat conditions carriers can turn aircraft around between sorties in under an hour,giving a total cycle time of about two hours per sortie over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

There is then the time for the carrier to generate as many as many as 5 sorties per aircraft in a single day while still leaving plenty of time for rest and maintenance.

Such a sortie rate would deliver 720 2,000 pound bombs in one day.

That is as many bombs delivered in a single day as the entire B2 bomber fleet dropped in 78 days of Operation Allied Force.

Which is rather impressive when one considers that the bombers and their tanker support cost 5 times as much as the carrier and it's air wing.

It is also 480 times as many bombs dropped per day as could be delivered by a single B2 Spirit and it's tankers at the same capital cost as the carrier and it's air wing.

In terms of bombs per day per dollar,even when one allows for the cost of the aircraft carrier's escort support ships and availability of ships and aircraft,the B2 Spirit still appears to offer exceedingly poor value for money.