Showing posts with label Independent. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Independent. Show all posts

Thursday, 15 April 2021

An Independent Navy For An Independent Nation: Palma,Mozambique,Twenty-fourth of March,Twenty Twenty-one

 
On the Twenty-fourth of March,Twenty Twenty-one,insurgents of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant attacked the town of Palma in Mozambique killing civilians,includings citizens of the United Kingdom,herein we shall consider how the proposed Independent Navy For An Independent Nation might have responded to this event.
 
The town of Palma shall lie within the area of responsibility of the East Indies squadron,which shall be commanded by a commodore (who shall also be in administrative command of the Fourth Mining Squadron) who shall answer to the eastern patrolling division commander,a rear admiral (who shall also be the administrative commander of the Third Fisheries Protection Division).
 
The rear admiral in turn shall answer to the vice admiral commanding the away flotilla (who shall also be the administrative commander of the First Frigate Flotilla),who shall be subordinate to the full admiral in administrative and operational command of the active Second Fleet.
 
The East Indies patrolling squadron shall normally have a patrolling brig,a mining sloop and a destroying frigate at it's disposal which it shall commit to Combined Task Forces 151,150 and 152 as required.
 
The Persian Gulf shall lie within the area of responsibility of the East Indies squadron,however,for the last thirty years one of the four battle divisions shall have been operating in this area continually and,in this case,the Third Battle Division's operational commander,a rear admiral (who shall also be the administrative commander of the Flying Division) shall have been appointed Commander In Chief Persian Gulf,flying his flag in the Second Fleet's flagship Her Majesty's Ship Africa,alongside the full admiral commanding the fleet,the major general commanding the First Royal Marines division,the commodore commanding the fleet's air assets and their subordinates.
 
Also aboard Africa shall be her,half sized,peace time air wing of two dozen Furious fighting aircraft,half a dozen Perseus patrolling aircraft and a dozen Hermes helicopters along with fifteen hundred men of the Seventh Royal Marines Light Infantry Battalion Group (a battalion reinforced with divisional assets,including two troops of Royal Marines Artillery),and the flotilla's third echelon medical facilities.
 
Her Majesty's Ship Royal William,the Third Battle Division's replenisher and the other half of Africa's battle squadron,shall carry half of the combat supplies and headquarters and train elements of the fleet's Fifth Royal Marine Battalion Group,the rest of which shall be dispersed as ship detatchments on frigates and other vessels of the Second Fleet.
 
Each of the big Falkland class frigates (Falcon,Fearless,Formidable and Foudroyant of the battle division's destroying squadron and Her Majesty's Frigates Fiji and Furious of the eastern patrolling division) shall carry a troop of forty marines from the Fifth Royal Marine Battalion Group in addition to a flight of two Hermes Helicopters and various jollyboats,pinnaces,launches,lighters and vehicles.
 
Her Majesty's Submarine Courageous shall also be lurking somewhere in the vicinity of the East Indies station.
 
All of these vessels shall be logistically supported by a small Royal Naval Harbour Service squadron at Diego Garcia,one of four regional logistical support areas,the others being Bermuda,Gibraltar and the Falklands,and whilst each base area shall be unique,all may be categorised as either soft,firm or hard depending on their value and the cost of defending them.
 
For example,the proposed east coast base area shall include a wind farm,a biomass power plant,a blast furnace,a steel mill,a ship breaking yard,a ship building yard,refitting docks,a naval dockyard,an armaments depot,a fuel depot,a marine barracks and civilian housing,in an area with secure supply lines and defensive depth,surrounded by multi layered air,surface and submarine defences,all of which shall necessitate and facilitate it's hard defence.
 
On the other hand,the proposed Waterguard anchorage at Ducie shall offer only a small anchorage,little land,no industry,no population,no defensive depth and tenuous supply lines in an area of little strategic value,therefore,it shall be softly defended,permanent facilities being limited to a dredged channel,moorings,dolphins and navigation marks,Her Majesty's Waterguard Cutter Kingfisher (an Albatross class patrolling cutter,that is,an escorting sloop fitted for but not with it's fighting systems) and the Pegasus aircraft based there being supported by the medium sized depoting vessel Fort Detroit carrying thirty thousand long tons of fuel and armed only to repel pirates,smugglers,poachers,sabateurs and terrorists,but able to run away bravely when faced with more substantial threats.
 
Diego Garcia shall fall between these two extremes,with tenuous supply lines,little land and no industry or population but with a large anchorage and air base,in a strategic position,far from potential threats,with enough land to accommodate an army garrison and over the horizon radar systems,therefore,it shall be firmly defended by an infantry company,artillery battery and a flight of Royal Flying Corps' Furious aircraft.
 
Her Majesty's Ship Polyphemus,a large Antaeus class Royal Naval Harbour Service depoting vessel,shall deploy to Diego Garcia for a year at a time carrying three hundred thousand long tons of fuel and thousands of tons of ordnance and dry stores with a pair Royal Naval Harbour Service Aidful class tug boats and an eighty foot Albacore class patrolling launch on her deck and aircraft in her hangar along with the requisite command,logistic,medical,maintenance and hotel facilities,and supplies for the army garrison.
 
Civil Waterguard assets protecting the British Indian Ocean Territory from pirates,smugglers,polluters and invaders shall include a brace of Pegasii,Her Majesty's Waterguard Launch Flying Fish (of the Albacore class),Her Majesty's Waterguard Cutter Cormorant (of the Albatross class) and Her Majesty's Rescue Tug Rambler (of the Racer class),all supported by the giant Polyphemus.
 
Potential reinforcements for the East Indies station shall include naval vessels drawn off the Third Battle Division or the neighbouring Pacific,South Atlantic and Mediterranean stations and,from the United Kingdom,two battle divisions from the fleet's ready and standby groups and the ready brigade from the British Army's Light Infantry Division.
 
Diplomatic,signals,satellite,human and open source strategic intelligence shall be used to keep deployed commanders informed of events in their areas of responsibility and based on this intelligence the fleet,flotilla,division and squadron commanders shall be engaged in a continuous process of evaluating potential contingencies,planning potential responses and training to execute those plans such that they may have a relevant plan in place to modify as required when actual events occur.
 
It shall be reasonable for the East Indies squadron's commander to assume that his mining sloop shall be most useful in the Gulf of Oman,Gulf of Aden,Red Sea or Straits of Malacca,that his destroying frigate shall most likely be required anywhere from the Gulf of Oman to the Mozambique Channel and that his patrolling vessel,Her Majesty's Brig Folkestone,shall be best used to cover the rest of his vast area of responsibility but that he shall need another frigate for high noon at Whitsun Reef.
 
It shall be reasonable for the eastern patrolling division's commander to assume that Her Majesty's Frigate Fiji from the quiet Pacific station might be of more use to the East Indies squadron in the South China Sea. 
 
It shall be reasonable for the Third Battle Division's commander to assume that he shall be unable to disengage from combat operations in the Persian Gulf as his Furious aircraft shall likely be needed for bombing targets around Erbil but that his replenishing vessel,marines and some of his patrolling aircraft and destroying frigates may be released for use elsewhere if necessary (the large bunkers and magazines of the Africa class shall allow them to operate for long periods without replenishment) and that a flight of Hermes helicopters shall therefore be cross decked from Her Majesty's Ship Africa to Royal William.
 
It shall also be reasonable for the away flotilla commander to assume that two troops of his battle division's marines and two flights of it's Hermes helicopters may be of more use to the East Indies squadron whose mining sloop and patrolling brig shall have the spare capacity to accommodate them.
 
Thus on the Twenty-fourth of March,Twenty Twenty-one,the stage is set.
 

Thursday, 4 November 2010

Independently And In Our National Interest



During the recent Anglo French summit in London,British Prime Minister David Cameron said the following:

"Britain and France are,and will always remain,sovereign nations,able to deploy our armed forces independently and in our national interest when we choose to do so."

We must question whether this statement is true.



As recent operations in Afghanistan have demonstrated,the British Army is dependent on air support even when fighting third World peasants.

As operations in the Falklands demonstrated,the Royal Navy is dependent on air support even when fighting a poorly equipped developing nation.

Without an independent means to deliver air power,British land and sea forces are not capable of conducting independent war fighting operations in the interests of a sovereign United Kingdom.



Air power can be delivered from a land base by the Royal Air Force or from the deck of an aircraft carrier by the Royal Navy.

Unfortunately the Royal Air Force lost it's ability to conduct independent warfighting operations in the national interest when Britain lost it's global network of air bases generations ago.

Since then it has been dependent on foreign countries to provide it with air bases and logistical infrastructure (the ports,roads,refineries and pipelines which supply the fuel,ordnance and other items to the air base).




In recent years the Royal Air Force has also become dependent on allies for fighter protection and ground based air defence.

With just 3 frontline fighter squadrons,at least 2 of which are dedicated to domestic defence,the Royal Air Force is not capable of defending the bases it operates from during expeditionary warfighting.

It can only conduct expeditionary combat operations with the support of an ally whose fighters are needed to protect the air bases and supporting infrastructure which the Royal Air Force is reliant on.

Nor is the Royal Air Force capable of providing fighter cover to it's overly large fleet of ground attack aircraft.



In addition,Britain now has just 24 frontline  Rapier fire units,all operated by 4 batteries of 16 Regiment Royal Artillery.

With one battery permanently stationed in the Falkland Islands there are unlikely to be enough deployable short ranged Rapier fire units to protect even a single expeditionary air base and the infrastructure which it depends on let alone to protect the British Army's assets as well.

The Royal Air Force usually requires several air bases for even small scale expeditionary war fighting operations.

Even those Rapiers which are available are considerably out ranged by common precision ground attack weapons such as AGM65 Maverick.

Most second tier air forces are capable of destroying Rapier fire units without even entering Rapier's engagement envelope.

Consequently the Royal Air Force is also dependent on allies to provide ground based air defence for the air bases and infrastructure which it relies on for expeditionary warfighting operations.

There is also a need for ground forces to defend this air power infrastructure.

Even in a low threat environment like Afghanistan the ground forces required for this task may far exceed the brigade sized force which the British Army will be able to sustain in future.

A force which can do no more than defend it's self is "a self licking lollipop".

It is of great expense but no military use.

Clearly Britain cannot conduct independent war fighting operations as a sovereign nation if it's land and sea forces are dependent on air support from the land based Royal Air Force.



The alternative means of providing air support to British land and sea forces is from the deck of a Royal Navy aircraft carrier.

British aircraft carriers have freedom of navigation across most of the World's surface without the need for "Host Nation Support" (H.N.S.).

Unlike land bases the Royal Navy's aircraft carriers have little need for local logistical infrastructure as they can stay at sea for 6 months at a time supported by at sea replinshment from Royal Fleet Auxiliaries.



Sea based logistics have the additional benefit of being far cheaper than land based logistics.

The Royal Navy is also capable of defending it's aircraft carriers from land sea and air threats without needing help from allies.

It also requires no ground forces to defend it,allowing the British Army to concentrate on doing useful things rather than defending air power infrastructure.

Britain can independently deploy air power from it's aircraft carriers.

Only with carrier based aircraft can the United Kingdom independently conduct combat operations as a sovereign nation.



Prime Minister David Cameron personally took the decision to eliminate that capability.

David Cameron's claim that Britain will be "able to deploy our armed forces independently and in our national interest" is simply not credible.

David Cameron eliminated Britain's ability to conduct independent combat operations when he decided to eliminate British carrier capable combat aircraft.

David Cameron personally ensured that Britain will never again be able to conduct independent combat operations when he decided that the Royal Navy would have only one aircraft carrier. 

Wednesday, 20 October 2010

Politicians Do Not Understand The Armed Forces?

There is a great deal of debate following the British Strategic Defence and Security Review.

One view point which often crops up whenever defence cuts are in the offing is that "Politicians don't understand the armed forces".

Perhaps politicians do understand the armed forces.

Perhaps politicians understand the armed forces better than the armed forces understand themselves.



Maintaining armed forces is a tremendous drain on a nation's economy.

That drain is justified if those armed forces are needed.

But if they are not needed then it is difficult to justify maintaining high levels of defence expenditure.



British armed forces have long been wasteful with taxpayers money.

Vast sums have been wasted every year for generations on poorly conceived and badly managed projects.

In recent years the economic damage caused by the armed forces has been compounded by their increasing appetite for imported equipment.

Not only does this have a negative economic impact but it also undermines the armed force's ability perform their primary task,upholding the best interests of those who pay for them.



In the case of the United Kingdom,for the last 300 years that primary task has involved defending the political independence of the British from European threats.

Recently the United Kingdom has integrated it's self into the European Union.

It no longer has any independence to defend from European threats.

Consequently it no longer has any reason to maintain armed forces to protect it from such threats.



Protecting the interests of those who paid for the British armed forces also involved expanding and protecting the British Empire.

The armed forces in this case were a money making venture.

Unfortunately they turned in substantial losses in 1899-1902,1914-1918 and 1939-1945 which resulted in the eventual closure of the Empire business.



With no threat from Europe and no Empire to defend,the armed force's primary role is limited to defending British territories such as Northern Ireland,the Falklands and Gibraltar which may be subject to territorial claims by others.

Only a small proportion of the current British forces is required for that purpose.



What is the justification for the rest of the armed forces?

If the United Kingdom's armed forces can operate independently they can be used to further British interests overseas.

But if they do not have that ability to operate independently then that is not a justification for spending money on them.

Even if British forces do retain the ability to operate independently,the costs of such capability must be outweighed by the benefits if they are to be justified.



Without the ability to operate independently British armed forces may contribute to other nation's military operations.

This "contributary doctrine" is a means by which the British taxpayer subsidises another country's foreign policy in the hope of some political benefit.

Recent operations have demonstrated that the benefits from this doctrine may be negligible or even negative while the costs can be high.

It is therefore difficult to justify any expenditure on "contributary" military capabilities.



In summary,if the British armed forces reduce the burden they impose on the taxpayer by generating military capability in a more cost effective manner and retain the ability to operate independently then there may be some justification for maintaining armed forces of a significant size to support British interests overseas.

If the armed forces cannot operate independently in the interests of those who pay for them or if the financial burden imposed on the taxpayer outweighs the benefits then there is no reason to maintain anything more than small forces capable of defending British territories.



This defensive option is also the logical approach if European integration commits Britain to a common foreign policy.

In that case the nation which contributes the least militarily gains the most benefit.

The nation which spends most on it's armed forces gains nothing from that additional expenditure.


The logical course of action in such circumstances is to reduce British defence spending to below the European average.


To quote the European Commission:


"The Member states have committed themselves to a Common Foreign Security Policy for the European Union.


The European Security and Defence Policy aims to strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management."


Armed forces have no right to exist.


They have no right to taxpayer's money.


They do have a reason to exist.


They exist to provide a service to the taxpayer.


If they cannot provide that service then there is no reason for them to exist.


What service does the taxpayer require?


What service can the armed forces provide?


Is this service worth the expense?


These are the questions which are rarely mentioned in discussions on defence cuts.


If the British people want armed forces which can conduct independent operations in support of their political and economic interests then the British armed forces must have the force size and the range of capabilities needed for that purpose.


But if British politicians decide that the armed forces will in future only conduct collaborative operations then there is no need for large armed forces with the full range of military capabilities.


Politicians understand this even if the armed forces do not.


Recent decisions to eliminate aircraft carrier capability for 10 years and reduce the British army to sustaining only a single brigade on operations suggest that the politicians have chosen the latter,collaborative option.


This is disappointing but hardly surprising.


British military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan is hardly likely to generate a political desire for conducting independent warfighting operations.


While the armed force's desire for imported equipment has undermined Britain's ability to sustain independent operations economically and politically.


The armed forces did have the resources to succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan.


Vast sums of money were wasted while young men have lost their lives through a lack of equipment.


Ground control was lost due not to a lack of units but due to poor force generation.


Had the armed forces gone about their business in an efficient and economically sustainable manner there would now be far more political support for maintaining them at their current size.


Perhaps it is the armed forces which don't understand the politicians?