Independently And In Our National Interest

During the recent Anglo French summit in London,British Prime Minister David Cameron said the following:

"Britain and France are,and will always remain,sovereign nations,able to deploy our armed forces independently and in our national interest when we choose to do so."

We must question whether this statement is true.

As recent operations in Afghanistan have demonstrated,the British Army is dependent on air support even when fighting third World peasants.

As operations in the Falklands demonstrated,the Royal Navy is dependent on air support even when fighting a poorly equipped developing nation.

Without an independent means to deliver air power,British land and sea forces are not capable of conducting independent war fighting operations in the interests of a sovereign United Kingdom.

Air power can be delivered from a land base by the Royal Air Force or from the deck of an aircraft carrier by the Royal Navy.

Unfortunately the Royal Air Force lost it's ability to conduct independent warfighting operations in the national interest when Britain lost it's global network of air bases generations ago.

Since then it has been dependent on foreign countries to provide it with air bases and logistical infrastructure (the ports,roads,refineries and pipelines which supply the fuel,ordnance and other items to the air base).

In recent years the Royal Air Force has also become dependent on allies for fighter protection and ground based air defence.

With just 3 frontline fighter squadrons,at least 2 of which are dedicated to domestic defence,the Royal Air Force is not capable of defending the bases it operates from during expeditionary warfighting.

It can only conduct expeditionary combat operations with the support of an ally whose fighters are needed to protect the air bases and supporting infrastructure which the Royal Air Force is reliant on.

Nor is the Royal Air Force capable of providing fighter cover to it's overly large fleet of ground attack aircraft.

In addition,Britain now has just 24 frontline  Rapier fire units,all operated by 4 batteries of 16 Regiment Royal Artillery.

With one battery permanently stationed in the Falkland Islands there are unlikely to be enough deployable short ranged Rapier fire units to protect even a single expeditionary air base and the infrastructure which it depends on let alone to protect the British Army's assets as well.

The Royal Air Force usually requires several air bases for even small scale expeditionary war fighting operations.

Even those Rapiers which are available are considerably out ranged by common precision ground attack weapons such as AGM65 Maverick.

Most second tier air forces are capable of destroying Rapier fire units without even entering Rapier's engagement envelope.

Consequently the Royal Air Force is also dependent on allies to provide ground based air defence for the air bases and infrastructure which it relies on for expeditionary warfighting operations.

There is also a need for ground forces to defend this air power infrastructure.

Even in a low threat environment like Afghanistan the ground forces required for this task may far exceed the brigade sized force which the British Army will be able to sustain in future.

A force which can do no more than defend it's self is "a self licking lollipop".

It is of great expense but no military use.

Clearly Britain cannot conduct independent war fighting operations as a sovereign nation if it's land and sea forces are dependent on air support from the land based Royal Air Force.

The alternative means of providing air support to British land and sea forces is from the deck of a Royal Navy aircraft carrier.

British aircraft carriers have freedom of navigation across most of the World's surface without the need for "Host Nation Support" (H.N.S.).

Unlike land bases the Royal Navy's aircraft carriers have little need for local logistical infrastructure as they can stay at sea for 6 months at a time supported by at sea replinshment from Royal Fleet Auxiliaries.

Sea based logistics have the additional benefit of being far cheaper than land based logistics.

The Royal Navy is also capable of defending it's aircraft carriers from land sea and air threats without needing help from allies.

It also requires no ground forces to defend it,allowing the British Army to concentrate on doing useful things rather than defending air power infrastructure.

Britain can independently deploy air power from it's aircraft carriers.

Only with carrier based aircraft can the United Kingdom independently conduct combat operations as a sovereign nation.

Prime Minister David Cameron personally took the decision to eliminate that capability.

David Cameron's claim that Britain will be "able to deploy our armed forces independently and in our national interest" is simply not credible.

David Cameron eliminated Britain's ability to conduct independent combat operations when he decided to eliminate British carrier capable combat aircraft.

David Cameron personally ensured that Britain will never again be able to conduct independent combat operations when he decided that the Royal Navy would have only one aircraft carrier. 

Politicians Do Not Understand The Armed Forces?

There is a great deal of debate following the British Strategic Defence and Security Review.

One view point which often crops up whenever defence cuts are in the offing is that "Politicians don't understand the armed forces".

Perhaps politicians do understand the armed forces.

Perhaps politicians understand the armed forces better than the armed forces understand themselves.

Maintaining armed forces is a tremendous drain on a nation's economy.

That drain is justified if those armed forces are needed.

But if they are not needed then it is difficult to justify maintaining high levels of defence expenditure.

British armed forces have long been wasteful with taxpayers money.

Vast sums have been wasted every year for generations on poorly conceived and badly managed projects.

In recent years the economic damage caused by the armed forces has been compounded by their increasing appetite for imported equipment.

Not only does this have a negative economic impact but it also undermines the armed force's ability perform their primary task,upholding the best interests of those who pay for them.

In the case of the United Kingdom,for the last 300 years that primary task has involved defending the political independence of the British from European threats.

Recently the United Kingdom has integrated it's self into the European Union.

It no longer has any independence to defend from European threats.

Consequently it no longer has any reason to maintain armed forces to protect it from such threats.

Protecting the interests of those who paid for the British armed forces also involved expanding and protecting the British Empire.

The armed forces in this case were a money making venture.

Unfortunately they turned in substantial losses in 1899-1902,1914-1918 and 1939-1945 which resulted in the eventual closure of the Empire business.

With no threat from Europe and no Empire to defend,the armed force's primary role is limited to defending British territories such as Northern Ireland,the Falklands and Gibraltar which may be subject to territorial claims by others.

Only a small proportion of the current British forces is required for that purpose.

What is the justification for the rest of the armed forces?

If the United Kingdom's armed forces can operate independently they can be used to further British interests overseas.

But if they do not have that ability to operate independently then that is not a justification for spending money on them.

Even if British forces do retain the ability to operate independently,the costs of such capability must be outweighed by the benefits if they are to be justified.

Without the ability to operate independently British armed forces may contribute to other nation's military operations.

This "contributary doctrine" is a means by which the British taxpayer subsidises another country's foreign policy in the hope of some political benefit.

Recent operations have demonstrated that the benefits from this doctrine may be negligible or even negative while the costs can be high.

It is therefore difficult to justify any expenditure on "contributary" military capabilities.

In summary,if the British armed forces reduce the burden they impose on the taxpayer by generating military capability in a more cost effective manner and retain the ability to operate independently then there may be some justification for maintaining armed forces of a significant size to support British interests overseas.

If the armed forces cannot operate independently in the interests of those who pay for them or if the financial burden imposed on the taxpayer outweighs the benefits then there is no reason to maintain anything more than small forces capable of defending British territories.

This defensive option is also the logical approach if European integration commits Britain to a common foreign policy.

In that case the nation which contributes the least militarily gains the most benefit.

The nation which spends most on it's armed forces gains nothing from that additional expenditure.


The logical course of action in such circumstances is to reduce British defence spending to below the European average.


To quote the European Commission:


"The Member states have committed themselves to a Common Foreign Security Policy for the European Union.


The European Security and Defence Policy aims to strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management."


Armed forces have no right to exist.

They have no right to taxpayer's money.


They do have a reason to exist.


They exist to provide a service to the taxpayer.


If they cannot provide that service then there is no reason for them to exist.


What service does the taxpayer require?


What service can the armed forces provide?

Is this service worth the expense?


These are the questions which are rarely mentioned in discussions on defence cuts.


If the British people want armed forces which can conduct independent operations in support of their political and economic interests then the British armed forces must have the force size and the range of capabilities needed for that purpose.


But if British politicians decide that the armed forces will in future only conduct collaborative operations then there is no need for large armed forces with the full range of military capabilities.


Politicians understand this even if the armed forces do not.


Recent decisions to eliminate aircraft carrier capability for 10 years and reduce the British army to sustaining only a single brigade on operations suggest that the politicians have chosen the latter,collaborative option.


This is disappointing but hardly surprising.


British military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan is hardly likely to generate a political desire for conducting independent warfighting operations.


While the armed force's desire for imported equipment has undermined Britain's ability to sustain independent operations economically and politically.


The armed forces did have the resources to succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan.


Vast sums of money were wasted while young men have lost their lives through a lack of equipment.


Ground control was lost due not to a lack of units but due to poor force generation.


Had the armed forces gone about their business in an efficient and economically sustainable manner there would now be far more political support for maintaining them at their current size.


Perhaps it is the armed forces which don't understand the politicians?