Why Catapults Are Cheaper

There has been considerable recent speculation about the new British Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers being fitted with catapults so that they might operate the conventional F35C fighter rather than the vertical landing F35B.

Some have asked how this would save money.

The cost of a British electromagnetic catapult system from Converteam is not public knowledge so we can but mention it but prices for the American system are known.

Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System (E.M.A.L.S.) and Advanced Arresting Gear (A.A.G.) have been developed for the latest class of American aircraft carriers.

The U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford (C.V.N.78) is due to enter service in 2015,a year before H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth.

Thus the technology will be well proven before H.M.S.Queen Elizabeth is outfitted with it.

The cost of the new American Advanced Arresting Gear (A.A.G.) for the Gerald R. Ford class aircraft carrier is $102 Million (£66 Million) for one ship set,or two sets for £132 Million for both Queen Elizabeth class ships.

The cost of the Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System (E.M.A.L.S.) ship set for the same vessel is up to $573 Million (£370 Million).

That is for a set of four catapults,enough for both new British aircraft carriers.

Which suggests a total cost of £502 Million for two complete ship sets of catapults and arrester gear for the two new carriers.

There would also be some minimal redesign costs but as the upper works of the ships have not been built yet and the vessels were designed from the start to accommodate catapults,this should be a small expense.

It should also be noted that the Queen Elizabeth class will almost certainly have to be fitted with catapults at some point in their lives anyway.

The additional operating costs would also be small,probably adding no more than a small percentage to the ship's annual operating costs.

In contrast,comparing the costs of the F35B and F35C is far more difficult as officially published figures for FY 2010 (Item No 6 Page 1) lump both types together.

There are many unofficial sources which claim the F35C costs far less than the F35B,which is as one would expect given the added complexity of the latter.

The current production schedule for British F35s can be seen on Page 88 of this document.

It suggests British procurement will be largely concentrated in two batches,the first procured between 2015 and 2020 and the second batch from 2023 and 2027.

The United States Navy's FY 2011 budget does give discrete price estimates for the two variants from 2011 onwards.


The FY 2011 United States Navy budget suggets the F35C will have a unit cost of about $155 Million in 2015 (Item No 5 Page 1) with later aircraft costing $108 Million each.

The same document suggests the F35B will cost $157 Million in 2015 (Item No 7 Page 1) with later aircraft costing $111 Million each.

This suggests that a fleet of 138 F35C would cost approximately £250 Million less than a fleet of F35Bs.

It is particularly interesting that the cost of the engine for the F35B is over $25 Million in 2015 while the engine for the F35C is less than $12 Million in the same year.

As both aircraft use the same engine,the difference is presumably due to the cost of the vertical lift systems on the F35B.

The lift fan,drive shaft,clutch,rotating nozzle and hover control systems on the F35B will certainly require far more parts and man hours to maintain over the aircraft's lifespan.

The F35B engine may also experience greater wear in the hover.

This source suggests the total life cycle cost of the F35C will be about £4,760 Million less than that of the vertical landing F35B,it is not clear where their figures come from.

If their numbers are correct then that saving far exceeds the previously mentioned £502 Million cost of two ship sets of catapults and arrestor gear.

If we deduct the cost of the catapults from the savings they suggest will be made from buying the F35C,we get a net saving of about £4,267 Million over the aircraft's lifecycle or £85 Million for each of the fifty years the new carriers will be in service.

That is many times the small additional operating costs of a catapult equipped ship - E.M.A.L.s has been designed to be far cheaper to operate than traditional catapults.

There are other potential savings from operating the F35C rather than the F35B.

The F35C has a significantly longer tactical radius than the F35B.

This has been an important factor in every air war the United Kingdom has been involved in since 1945.

The F35C also carries a greater weapon load than the F35B which is very important for close air support.

The importance of long range,endurance and high weapon load was highlighted during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 when naval aircraft were providing close air support to ground troops up to 800 miles from their carrier.

A longer tactical radius also directly reduces demand for aerial refuelling.

As Britain's new A330 tanker fleet is costing around £600 Million a year,three times the cost of the two new carriers,a reduction in tanker demand  translates into substantial financial savings.

Having catapult equipped carriers also allows a small fleet of fixed wing aircraft like the E2D Hawkeye to replace a much larger fleet of E3D Sentrys and SeaKing A.S.a.C. 7s. - which in turn reduces aerial tanker demand even further.

A minimum of 7 E2D Hawkeye's would be required to provide a 4 strong ship's flight capable of sustaining a single continuous orbit in combat,replacing the current fleet of 7 E3D Sentry's and 13 SeaKing Mk.7s.

With higher speed,longer radar horizon and far more advanced systems,the E2D is far superior to helicopter based surveillance assets and in many respects superior to the E3D Sentry.

The minimal in flight refuelling requirements and much smaller operating costs of a smaller,all E2D fleet would result in substantial cost savings.

The latest ministry of defence accounts do not detail the annual cost of the 7 E3D Sentrys (cost per flight hour is £33,000) but they are part of the approximately 30 aircraft in the  Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (I.S.T.A.R.) fleet which cost £1,584 Million in 2009/2010 (Page 96).

That is in addition to the operating cost of the 13 Seaking A.S.a.C.7s.

In addition to the savings on tanker aircraft,a smaller I.S.T.A.R. fleet could quite easily save hundreds of million pounds a year in operating costs.

The Out of Service Date (O.S.D.) for the E3D Sentry is 2025,just 3 years after the expected In Service Date of the Maritime Airborne Surveillance and Control (M.A.S.C.) carrier based Airborne Early Warning system.

A fixed wing,catapult launched M.A.S.C. solution would not only dramatically reduce operating costs compared to the current two,larger fleets but would also eliminate the need to spend approximately £3,000 Million (based on the cost of Project Wedgetail) on land based replacements for the 7 Sentrys in service at present. 

This potential saving alone is 6 times the cost of buying catapults and arrester gear for the Queen Elizabeth class carriers. 

A catapult equipped ship would also be able to operate long range surveillance aircraft such as the General Atomics Sea Avenger.

Without catapults the carriers would be unable to operate any I.S.T.A.R. aircraft,severely limiting their utility as strike carriers.

They would also be dependent on a larger fleet of land based support aircraft with all the attendant logistic,engineering and force protection costs and political difficulties which that entails.

But the author raises a point about carrier qualifications.

The United States Navy's (LSO NATOPS MANUAL Chapter 6-1 to 6-3) carrier qualification demands are known.

A student pilot must perform 14 carrier day landings in a Goshawk during his training.

Followed by 12 day landings and 8 night landings in a combat aircraft.

Thereafter,if a pilot does not fly from a carrier for a period of time or if he transitions from one aircraft type to another he must requalify.

A pilot who has not flown from a carrier for several months may need to make just 2 arrested landings to be requalified.

Pilots of military aircraft spend much of their time maintaining their skills by practicing their various tasks,including landing.

This will be the case for pilots of the F35B as well as pilots of the F35C.

It may be that F35C pilots have to spend a little longer practicing carrier landings to stay qualified but this simply means that they will be spending less time practicing other things.

The number of hours they fly each year is likely to differ little whether they fly F35Bs or F35Cs.

If the American standards are adopted a pilot will spend very little time qualifying or requalifying if he flies from carriers regularly.

Consequently,it is difficult to see any significant additional cost attached to keeping pilots qualified on the F35C.

This is particularly the case as the F35C is likely to be flown by Royal Navy pilots who will spend much of their time operating from carriers anyway.

However,the F35C may be more of an inconvenience for land based Royal Air Force pilots who may not regularly fly from ships and consequently would need some time to become deck qualified if deployed to a carrier.

This is unlikely to be a problem however,as there is little requirement for the F35 force to do anything other than ship based operations.

Lastly,why would the three F35 development aircraft the United Kingdom is buying have to be scrapped if Britain buys the F35C as the author of that piece suggests?

These are instrumented test aircraft,an important part of the F35's development program and never meant for service.

There is no reason to scrap them whatever aircraft the United Kingdom chooses to operate.

The suggestion that they should be scrapped is all the more odd as these aircraft have not even been delivered yet.

There may be a significant financial case for buying the F35C rather than the F35B.

Though it is difficult to quantify potential savings without knowing details of operating costs.

The savings could amount to hundreds of millions of pounds a year,particularly in terms of tanker and support aircraft.

Such savings are desperately needed at present.

In addition the F35C offers significantly more capability than the F35B.

The F35C/catapult option for the Queen Elizabeth class carriers certainly warrants further investigation.

F35C Versus F35B Combat Radii Applied To Historic Air Wars

The United Kingdom is currently committed to buying the F35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter for the Royal Air Force and Royal Naval Air Service.

This gives British forces four options for applying  air power in future wars:F35B from land bases;F35B from sea bases (aircraft carriers);F35C from land bases or F35C from sea bases.

We can examine the implications of these options by applying the combat radii of these aircraft types to base locations used in the seven major air wars in which the United Kingdom has participated in the 65 years since 1945.

In the following illustrations red flames indicate the area which is the main focus of combat operations.

A navy blue anchor indicates an aircraft carrier.

A light blue aeroplane indicates an air base on land.

A navy blue circle indicates the unrefueled combat radius of a sea based F35.

A red circle indicates the unrefueled combat radius of a land based F35.

Solid arrows indicate which radius is centred on each base.

Dashed arrows indicate the need for aerial refueling in order to reach the area which is the main focus of combat operations.

Click on each image to see it full size.

The Korean War 1950 to 1953.

The Suez Crisis 1956.

The Falklands War 1982.

The Guf War 1990 to 1991.

The Kosovo Conflict 1999.

The Invasion of Afghanistan 2001.

The Invasion of Iraq 2003.

The closer the operational area is to the centre of the tactical radius the better.

This permits aircraft to generate more sorties,spend more time on station or have more fuel margin for manoeuvre.

Thus allowing combat power to be delivered at a lower cost by a smaller number of combat aircraft.

Beyond the aircraft's tactical radius aerial refueling becomes essential.

Within the tactical radius the need for aerial refueling diminishes if the operational area is closer to the base area.

The cost of aerial refueling is substantial and money spent on tankers is money which cannot be spent on combat assets.

The vertical landing capability of the F35B gives it more basing options within the area of it's tactical radius.

However,the greater tactical radius of the F35C gives it a 60% greater area in which it may find basing options.

For the sea base,greater tactical radius increases the sea area in which the aircraft carrier may conceal itself.

It can be seen from these illustrations that the sea base,the aircraft carrier,is almost always closer to the operational area than the land base.

This permits significant financial savings by allowing substantial reductions in the number of combat aircraft and tanker aircraft required to generate a given level of combat power.

The longer combat radius of the F35C permits a further substantial reduction in the aerial refueling requirement.

This will more than pay for the additional cost of equipping aircraft carriers with catapults and arrestor wires.

The F35C is also said to be considerably cheaper than the F35B,one recent article claimed the F35C cost £15 Million less than the F35B which,if true,would equate to a saving of £945 Million on the 63 aircraft required to field a 36 strong carrier wing.

The F35B has advantages over the F35C in terms of being able to disperse away from airfields known to the enemy and being able to operate from a wider range of ships.

However these advantages come at a high cost both financially and operationally.

The F35B will cost more to buy and will require more expensive aerial refueling support.

In addition,it is less capable than the F35C in terms of range,payload and endurance.

There is an additional advantage which comes from using catapult equipped aircraft carriers as a sea base.

Helicopter based Airborne Early Warning (A.E.W.) aircraft are limited in terms of range,endurance,speed and altitude (and hence radar horizon).

They are incapable of supporting combat aircraft operating far from the sea base.

Consequently they must be supplemented by land based fixed wing A.E.W. aircraft.

These large aircraft operating far from their land bases have a substantial requirement for aerial refueling.

The cost of operating two A.E.W. fleets and providing the additional air tanker support for the land based aircraft is significant.

However,a carrier equipped with catapults would permit both of these fleets to be replaced with a smaller number of carrier capable fixed wing A.E.W. aircraft at a far lower cost.

In conclusion,the sea based F35C appears to be the most cost effective means for the United Kingdom to deliver air power.

Combined with fixed wing carrier capable A.E.W. aircraft,this option may offer cost savings of close to £2,000 Million a year combined with an enhanced ability to deploy air power globally.

These cost savings would derive from the following:

The ability to reduce the combat aircraft fleet from 330 aircraft at present to around 210 aircraft needed to maintain a front line strength of 124 aircraft with no loss of combat power due to the aircraft carrier's higher sortie generating capability.

The replacement of the Future Strategic Tanker Private Finance Initiative with a more economical outright purchase of 6 tanker aircraft with no lack of tanker capacity due to the much reduced aerial refueling demand.

The replacement of 7 Sentry and 13 Seaking A.E.W. aircraft with 10 E2D Hawkeye A.E.W. aircraft.

British Combat Aircraft Procurement

The British Royal Air Force may be dramatically reduced in size as it cannot afford to buy and operate all the aircraft it had been planning to acquire.

The problems the Royal Air Force is having are nothing to do with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.



Funding for those conflicts is in addition to the rest of the defence budget.



The Royal Air Force’s problems have been caused by the Royal Air Force itself and it’s incompetent aircraft procurement dating back many decades (and that does not just apply to fast jets either).



Twenty years ago when the Royal Air Force began planning the current aircraft procurements,British fast jet strength was over 800 aircraft.



A number more than sufficient to justify the rapid and cost effective domestic development and manufacture of a new combat aircraft type to replace the whole fast jet fleet.



However,as usual the paroquial interests of elements of the armed forces got in the way of what was best for the armed forces and the nation as a whole.



The result being that the Royal Air Force decided to replace it’s fast jet fleet with three seperate aircraft types:Agile Combat Aircraft (now the Typhoon);what eventually became Future Joint Combat Aircraft (now the F-35 Lightning II) and what was to have been Future Offensive Air System (F.O.A.S.).



Future Offensive Air Systems was likely to be a bomber,now cancelled due to cost growth on the other two aircraft projects.



Note how those three aircraft types mirror the old Bomber Command,Fighter Command,Tactical Air Force structure of the Second World War.



This structure of the Royal Air Force was perpetuated till recent times through Strike Command,Royal Air Force Germany and Number 1 Group,Number 2 Group and Number 11 Group.



The decision to buy three different fast jet aircraft meant that domestic design and manufacture was not economically viable due to the small numbers of each type required.



Agile Combat Aircraft became the multinational European Combat Aircraft,later Typhoon,resulting in massive time delays and cost increases.



Future Joint Combat Aircraft became the F-35,a cheap mass produced American aircraft,expected to cost half as much as the Typhoon.



Which due to being one of the worst thought out aircraft programmes in history and due to exchange rate fluctuations may cost twice as much as the “expensive” Typhoon.



With all the money wasted on those two (at least £5,000 Million wasted),the third aircraft had to be cancelled.



The many thousands of millions of pounds poured down the drain due to the Royal Air Force’s complete disregard of the basic industrial factors inherent in designing and manufacturing aircraft are the real reason the Royal Air Force cannot now afford to buy the aircraft it wants.



One of the great ironies of this sorry saga is that at the time the Royal Air Force decided it needed seperate fast jet fleets for use on land and sea,it was operating three carrier capable aircraft (Harrier,Phantom and Buccaneer) and a fourth (Jaguar) which was originally intended for carrier use but was not up to the task (you will never guess whose fault that was!).



Lest the above be seen as an anti Royal Air Force rant,I should point out that the British Army (note not the Royal Army!) and the Royal Navy are also afflicted by the “Why buy one platform when you can buy three?” attitude.



Both also suffer the consequences of that appproach.