A New American Destroyer : Part 2

Despite the confusing changes of nomenclature over the years,it seems likely that a replacement for the Burke class destroyers shall be called a "destroyer",even if it is as big as many "cruisers".

We shall therefore use this term to describe a future replacement for today's Burke class destroyers and Ticonderoga class cruisers.

It also seems likely that any "New American Destroyer" will be expected to perform all the roles of the Ticonderoga class cruisers,Burke class destroyers and Zumwalt class destroyers.

We shall therefore consider an American style surface combatant with anti-ballistic missile and area air defence capabilities.

The single most important quality which such a ship must posess is a significantly lower cost than ships currently planned.

This is essential to ensure that ships can be purchased in adequate numbers and that their cost is in proportion to the limited utility of a surface combatant.

There are a number of ways to reduce the cost of a surface combatant and we shall consider some of these before going any further.

Reducing the size of the ship should cut the amount of steel and welding required to build it and should also reduce the ship's fuel consumption and allow smaller engines to be fitted.

But these factors account for only a very small proportion of a warship's lifecycle costs so the potential savings are not great.

A ship which is too small may be significantly more expensive to design,build,maintain and upgrade as it is more cramped.

The cost of building a ship which is too big is likely to be far less than the cost of building a ship which is too small.

The greatest savings come from building a ship which is neither too big nor too small but the right size.

A "New American Destroyer" can be smaller and cheaper to build than the Zumwalt class only if it has to accommodate less equipment.

Reducing the range of capabilities on board the ship,for example by eliminating anti-submarine weapons and sensors,should significantly reduce the cost of designing,building and operating the vessel.

But if the "New American Destroyer" is not capable of performing a particular task then it may be necessary to have another ship to perform that role.

The cost of designing,building and operating those additional vessels is likely to be significantly greater than the cost of fitting the "New American Destroyer" with the full range of war fighting capabilities.

Reducing the quality of equipment carried by the "New American Destroyer" should significantly reduce it's procurement costs but may have little effect on it's operating costs.

However,as the quality of threat systems is constantly improving,less capable weapons and sensors quickly become obsolete rendering the ship unfit for purpose or forcing significant expenditure on upgrades.

The cost of fitting the "New American Destroyer" with lower quality weapons and sensors is likely to have a negative impact on long term costs.

Reducing the quantity of equipment carried by the "New American Destroyer" should reduce it's procurement and operating costs.

But if there are too few systems carried by the "New American Destroyer" then failures due to enemy action,human error and technical issues may render the vessel combat ineffective.
 
A "New American Destroyer" can be cheaper to procure and operate whilst remaining combat effective if the number of systems on board is reduced to the practical minimum,not the absolute minimum.

Reducing the amount of research,development and design work required to build the "New American Destroyer" should significantly reduce it's procurement costs.

But it is not possible to avoid development costs completely,most of the weapons,sensors,engines and other systems on the "New American Destroyer" can be items which are already in service or under development for other warships but there is still a need to develop a hull on which to carry those systems.

A "New American Destroyer" can have very low development costs if it uses non-developmental systems and a conventional hull design which may even be based on that of another warship if there is one suitable,for example it may be possible to add new upperworks to fit the lower hull design of the Zumwalt class destroyer.

Reducing the complexity of construction the the "New American Destroyer" should significantly reduce it's design,manufacturing and maintainance costs.

But warships are mostly constructed using simple well proven methods and low cost materials.

To minimise the cost of construction of a "New American Destroyer" it is necessary to avoid using complex hull forms,expensive materials and labour intensive construction methods as far as is practical.

We shall consider how to balance cost and capability in more detail in future parts of "New American Destroyer".

A New American Destroyer : Part 1

As we mentioned in earlier posts,words like "destroyer","cruiser" and "frigate" can mean different things to different navies.

The meaning of these words has also changed over time.

No where is this more the case than in the United States' Navy.

To take just one example,the Leahy class,these ships were considered to be frigates but were commissioned as Guided missile Destroyer Leaders (D.L.G.) until being reclassified as Guided missile Cruisers (C.G.).

Originally,a frigate was a cruising ship,or cruiser.

Today the United States' Navy considers frigates,cruisers and destroyers to be different kinds of ships.

A modern American "frigate" is an escort ship with far more basic weapons,sensors and machinery than it's equivalents in other navies.

A modern American "destroyer" is a fleet escort equivalent to the most powerful surface combatants in other navies.

A modern American "cruiser" is a fleet escort with more weapons,sensors and command facilities than a destroyer.



 The relationship between the Ticonderoga class cruisers and the Burke class destroyers is such that in the past the cruisers might have been classed as "destroyer leaders" - more powerful ships which led flotillas of destroyers.

Today the United States' Navy is yet again redefining the word "destroyer" with the (Destroyer,Destroyer,Guided missile) D.D.G. 1,000 Zumwalt class.

These ships are far larger than current American destroyers and cruisers,and larger than most Second World War era light and heavy cruisers.

They have an emphasis on land attack which during two world wars was the job of vessels known as "monitors".

A term which was in it's self a perversion of the name of a vessel designed specifically to attack ships during the American Civil War and subsequent eponymic type of low freeboard turreted warship.

The Zumwalt class has a number of problems,the most serious of which is their huge cost which has seen a class of 32 ships cut to just 3.

This class of just 3 vessels is expected to cost $11,894.8 Million,or $3,964.9 Million per ship.

There also appear to be numerous design problems on the Zumwalt class beyond those responsible for it's enormous cost.



 Main guns conflict with each other and with forward missile launch silos.

Aft missile launch silos conflict with helicopter operations and the 57mm guns.

Short range guns conflict with each other,helicopter operations (this is practically unavoidable),the aft missile silos and with the superstructure.

The cost of the Zumwalt class has resulted in the United States' Navy planning to succeed them with updated "Flight III" versions of the now 22 year old Burke class destroyers.

This was considered to be a cheaper option but some now suggest that these ships could cost $3,000 - $4,000 Million each (even the current Burke Flight IIA ships cost twice as much as the British Daring class destroyers).

The cost of both the Zumwalt class and the Burke Flight III ships far exceeds their utility.

The United States' Navy needs is a surface combatant which is both capable and affordable (in United States' Navy terms).

We shall have a look at such a ship in future parts of "A New American Destroyer".