This Is What A Bottleneck Looks Like

The above picture was taken aboard the United States Ship Mesa Verde,another author gives his opinions on it on the informationdissemination blog.

Two CH53 Super Stallions,two AH1 Sea Cobras and two UH1 Hueys can be seen parked on deck in addition to the V22 Osprey landing on.

Note that while the Osprey is landing,none of the other aircraft can operate,infact there is not even enough space for them to spread their rotors.

This lack of space has a negative impact on air assault operations.

It takes time to move a helicopter onto the landing spot,open it's rotors,load and launch it.

That aircraft can then conduct an air assault on it's own,delivering a small force which will be vulnerable until reinforcements arrive.

Alternatively it can orbit the ship burning fuel whilst waiting for the other aircraft to be launched and thus limiting the range at which the assault may be conducted.

Both of these options are inefficient and tactically highly undesirable.

Flightdeck space is very cheap,aircraft are very expensive.

The lack of low cost flightdeck space on the San Antonio class precludes the efficient use of  high cost,high value aviation assets.

This flightdeck bottleneck makes the San Antonio class poor ships from which to launch an air assault.

Interactive Aircraft Carrier

The Royal Navy has often been criticised for being less "media savvy" than the Royal Air Force.

Recently it has been attempting to improve the way it gets it's message across.

This interactive guide to the Invincible class aircraft carrier could be quite interesting with some improvements.

High quality video clips in place of the linked images would generate a lot more interest.

The Royal Navy is uniquely able to generate such footage.

This guided tour of the United States Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf is both interesting and educational.

Aerial Refuelling Demand

The United Kingdom is currently replacing it's ageing aerial refuelling fleet.

The new aircraft will be operated under a Private Finance Initiative (P.F.I.) called Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (F.S.T.A.).

This entails the replacement of 15 VC10 and 9 Tristar aircraft with 14 A330 aircraft.

Of these 14 A330s,only 9 will be in Royal Air Force service,the remainder being leased out to other users but available to the Royal Air Force as required at significant additional cost.

It is expected that of the 9 aircraft routinely in Royal Air Force service,normally 5 will be in daily use.

These aircraft will cost a minimum of £455 Million a year over the contract's 27 year life,over £512 Million for each of the 24 years the new tankers will be in service or £647 Million for each of the 19 years of full operating capability.

There are significant extra costs if the Royal Air Force makes use of the spare capacity in the contract.

Details can be found in this report by the National Audit Office:

"Across the term of the contract,the Department will pay on average £390 million per annum for the baseline FSTA service,which includes the cost of related services and infrastructure.

Of this amount,AirTanker expects the cost of operating the service to be £80 million,leaving £310 million to cover financing,profit and the capital cost of the project,including aircraft and infrastructure.

In addition,the Department expects to spend a further £60 million per annum on personnel,fuel and other related costs,resulting in a total estimated spend over the life of the project of £12.3 billion."

The demand for aerial refuelling is declining.

Between 2002-03 and 2008-09, the number of hours flown by the Tristar and VC10 fleets fell by 21 per cent.

This decline will continue in future years.

 

There are a number of reasons for this.

The number of aircraft in British military service is declining.

New aircraft are more fuel efficient.

New aircraft have longer unrefuelled range.

Some new aircraft cannot be refuelled by Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft.

Some new aircraft cannot be refuelled in the air at all.

Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers allow aircraft to fly shorter distances.

An overview of the future aircraft fleet explains the decline in tanker demand in more detail.

In 1990 the Royal Air Force had 842 combat aircraft.

That number is likely to decline to about 210 by 2020.

Newer combat aircraft like the F35C Lightning II have more than double the unrefuelled combat radius of the Harrier G.R.9s which they are replacing.

The new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers will allow these aircraft to be based closer to their operational areas,further reducing demand for aerial refuelling.

The fleet of over 20 Nimrod M.R.2s is being replaced by just 9 Nimrod M.R.A.4s each of which has about 50% greater unrefuelled endurance.

The 3 Nimrod R.1s are being replaced with refuelling boom/receptacle equipped R.C.135 Rivet Joints which cannot be refuelled by the new probe/drogue equipped British A330 tankers.

The C17 Globemaster III can carry as much as four Hercules' over greater unrefuelled range.

These aircraft can also not be refuelled by the new British probe/drogue equipped A330 tankers.

The future A400M has greater unrefuelled range and nearly double the payload of the Hercules C.1/3 (C130K) it will replace,significantly reducing the refuelling needed for a given mission.

The new Hercules C.4/5 (C130J) has 40% greater unrefuelled range than the Hercules C.1/3 (C130K) it replaced,again significantly reducing the refuelling needed for a given mission.

The current fleet of 7 E3D Sentry A.E.W.1 and 13 Seaking A.S.a.C.7s is likely to be replaced by 10 E2D Hawkeyes.

With their very low fuel consumption,short runway requirements and carrier capability these aircraft will require little if any aerial refuelling,unlike the thirsty Sentrys.

The new Sentinel R.1 cannot be refuelled in the air at all.

Unlike the Tristars and VC10s they are replacing,the new A330 tankers cannot be refuelled in the air at all.

In 1990 there were around 1,000 aircraft in British service capable of receiving aerial refuelling from British tanker aircraft.

In 2010 there were around 430 aircraft in British service capable of receiving aerial refuelling from British tanker aircraft.

By 2020 there will be around 270 aircraft in British service capable of receiving aerial refueling from British tanker aircraft.

That equates to a 40% reduction in the number of aircraft being supported by British tanker aircraft between 2010 and 2020.

Each of these aircraft will require aerial refuelling less often than those they replaced due to more fuel efficient engines,greater unrefuelled range and endurance and also due to the shorter distances which carrier capable aircraft will need to fly.

For many of these new aircraft,the new aircraft carriers will also eliminate the need for long tanker-supported ferry flights to the Falklands,the United States or to operational areas.

Clearly there has been,and continues to be a dramatic reduction in demand for aerial refuelling for British air forces.

There is likely to be a 73% reduction in the number of aircraft receiving tanker support over the 30 years between 1990 and 2020.

It is not yet clear by how much aerial refuelling tanker demand will reduce in the 27 years between signing the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft contract in 2008 and the ending of the contract in 2035.

It is open to question whether it is wise to make a long term commitment to a high cost,high capacity inflight refuelling capability when tanker demand is declining so rapidly and unpredictably.

A smaller and more flexible aerial refuelling capability in line with reduced future demand will offer financial savings in the order of hundreds of millions of pounds per year.

How It Used To Be.

A beautiful film of Royal Navy aircraft carriers in the 1960s.

Clicking on full screen mode is highly recommended.

Click on the 480p option for higher quality 480 pixel video.

Click the video to play and then click the pause button and wait a few minutes for it to buffer.

Turn up the volume.

Then click play and enjoy the full quality of this excellent video.

Falkland Islands Invade South America.

It is often erroneously stated that the four Typhoon fighers based in the Falklands can defend those islands from attacks.

There are a number of reasons why this is not the case.

One of those reasons is weather.

The Typhoons have only a single runway to operate from in the Falkland Islands.

That runway is sometimes closed by the often atrocious weather.

Usually the Typhoons manage to land before this happens.

But sometimes they do not.

In those cases the Typhoons must divert to an airbase on the South American mainland.

This requires a great deal of fuel and it is the reason there is a VC10 tanker aircraft in the Falklands to support fighter operations.

When the runway is closed the tanker has enough fuel to get the fighters to the nearest mainland base.

More accurately,to the nearest friendly mainland base.

Landing in Argentina would cause an international incident.

This is why two Typhoons and a VC10 recently found themselves in Punta Arenas,Chile.

To get to Punta Arenas they had to fly through Argentinian airspace.

This article about this incident was published by MercoPress.

Survivability: Sea Basing Versus Land Basing

Analysis of warfare is a bit like mathematics.

You have to treat both sides of the equation equally or your conclusions will not make sense.

Such unbalanced nonsensical analysis is often used to claim that aircraft carriers are not capable of surviving in the modern battlespace.

An aircraft carrier can be attacked by an aircraft (if it can get past all the aircraft in the carrier's air wing) but that aircraft has to come from somewhere.

It may come from a sea base,another aircraft carrier,which is just as vulnerable to being attacked.

It may come from a land base which is far more vulnerable to being attacked than any aircraft carrier.

In the 65 years since the Second World War over a hundred air bases on land have been attacked,damaged,put out of action or even overrun in various conflicts.

In the 65 years since the Second World War not one aircraft carrier has ever been damaged by enemy fire let alone put out of action.

Why are air bases so much more vulnerable than aircraft carriers?

There is an oft repeated saying in the military.

"If you can find it, you can hit it. If you can hit it, you can kill it."

To find an aircraft carrier one must use submarines,surface ships or aircraft,all of which can be destroyed before they locate the carrier.

To find an air base one need only buy a map.

To attack an aircraft carrier one needs submarines,surface ships or aircraft to overcome it's air wing and escorts.



To attack an air base and the lines of communication it relies on one needs a road side bomb or a mortar;a rocket propelled grenade;a sniper rifle;a heavy machine gun or a ballistic missile based on Second World War era technology.

It is inherently easier to find and kill an airbase than to find and kill an aircraft carrier.

Which is why air bases have been destroyed so frequently both during and since the Second World War.

Not one aircraft carrier has been damaged by enemy fire in sixty five years because attacking an aircraft carrier is exceedingly difficult to do.

Particularly for a land based air force whose fixed air bases are subject to attack by the air wing of the aircraft carrier it has not located yet.

F35C Versus F35B Combat Radii Applied To Historic Air Wars

The United Kingdom is currently committed to buying the F35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter for the Royal Air Force and Royal Naval Air Service.

This gives British forces four options for applying  air power in future wars:F35B from land bases;F35B from sea bases (aircraft carriers);F35C from land bases or F35C from sea bases.

We can examine the implications of these options by applying the combat radii of these aircraft types to base locations used in the seven major air wars in which the United Kingdom has participated in the 65 years since 1945.

In the following illustrations red flames indicate the area which is the main focus of combat operations.

A navy blue anchor indicates an aircraft carrier.

A light blue aeroplane indicates an air base on land.

A navy blue circle indicates the unrefueled combat radius of a sea based F35.

A red circle indicates the unrefueled combat radius of a land based F35.

Solid arrows indicate which radius is centred on each base.

Dashed arrows indicate the need for aerial refueling in order to reach the area which is the main focus of combat operations.

Click on each image to see it full size.

The Korean War 1950 to 1953.

The Suez Crisis 1956.

The Falklands War 1982.

The Guf War 1990 to 1991.

The Kosovo Conflict 1999.

The Invasion of Afghanistan 2001.

The Invasion of Iraq 2003.

The closer the operational area is to the centre of the tactical radius the better.

This permits aircraft to generate more sorties,spend more time on station or have more fuel margin for manoeuvre.

Thus allowing combat power to be delivered at a lower cost by a smaller number of combat aircraft.

Beyond the aircraft's tactical radius aerial refueling becomes essential.

Within the tactical radius the need for aerial refueling diminishes if the operational area is closer to the base area.

The cost of aerial refueling is substantial and money spent on tankers is money which cannot be spent on combat assets.

The vertical landing capability of the F35B gives it more basing options within the area of it's tactical radius.

However,the greater tactical radius of the F35C gives it a 60% greater area in which it may find basing options.

For the sea base,greater tactical radius increases the sea area in which the aircraft carrier may conceal itself.

It can be seen from these illustrations that the sea base,the aircraft carrier,is almost always closer to the operational area than the land base.

This permits significant financial savings by allowing substantial reductions in the number of combat aircraft and tanker aircraft required to generate a given level of combat power.

The longer combat radius of the F35C permits a further substantial reduction in the aerial refueling requirement.

This will more than pay for the additional cost of equipping aircraft carriers with catapults and arrestor wires.

The F35C is also said to be considerably cheaper than the F35B,one recent article claimed the F35C cost £15 Million less than the F35B which,if true,would equate to a saving of £945 Million on the 63 aircraft required to field a 36 strong carrier wing.

The F35B has advantages over the F35C in terms of being able to disperse away from airfields known to the enemy and being able to operate from a wider range of ships.

However these advantages come at a high cost both financially and operationally.

The F35B will cost more to buy and will require more expensive aerial refueling support.

In addition,it is less capable than the F35C in terms of range,payload and endurance.

There is an additional advantage which comes from using catapult equipped aircraft carriers as a sea base.

Helicopter based Airborne Early Warning (A.E.W.) aircraft are limited in terms of range,endurance,speed and altitude (and hence radar horizon).

They are incapable of supporting combat aircraft operating far from the sea base.

Consequently they must be supplemented by land based fixed wing A.E.W. aircraft.

These large aircraft operating far from their land bases have a substantial requirement for aerial refueling.

The cost of operating two A.E.W. fleets and providing the additional air tanker support for the land based aircraft is significant.

However,a carrier equipped with catapults would permit both of these fleets to be replaced with a smaller number of carrier capable fixed wing A.E.W. aircraft at a far lower cost.

In conclusion,the sea based F35C appears to be the most cost effective means for the United Kingdom to deliver air power.

Combined with fixed wing carrier capable A.E.W. aircraft,this option may offer cost savings of close to £2,000 Million a year combined with an enhanced ability to deploy air power globally.

These cost savings would derive from the following:

The ability to reduce the combat aircraft fleet from 330 aircraft at present to around 210 aircraft needed to maintain a front line strength of 124 aircraft with no loss of combat power due to the aircraft carrier's higher sortie generating capability.

The replacement of the Future Strategic Tanker Private Finance Initiative with a more economical outright purchase of 6 tanker aircraft with no lack of tanker capacity due to the much reduced aerial refueling demand.

The replacement of 7 Sentry and 13 Seaking A.E.W. aircraft with 10 E2D Hawkeye A.E.W. aircraft.