Saturday, 30 October 2010

Logistics:Land Versus Sea


Some people believe that moving things by ship is expensive.


But this single ship transports 237,766 barrels of fuel.


 To move that same amount would take 2,000 of these trucks,which would cost a lot more than a single ship.


This ship can be operated around the clock by just 24 men.


 To operate 2,000 of these trucks around the clock would take at least 4,000 men who would cost a lot more to employ than the 24 men on the ship.

Consequently moving things by land is far more expensive than moving things by sea.

Which is why "stuff" is moved by sea whenever it is practical to do so.


It is also the reason why logistics costs for a sea based expeditionary force are far lower than those of a land based expeditionary force.
                                                             

Friday, 29 October 2010

Herve Morin On Anglo French Joint Forces


The following extracts from an interview with the French Defence Minister Herve Morin were published on the website of the French embassy in the United Kingdom.


Herve Morin said: 

"Because of their meagre defence budgets, the Europeans are sliding gently and comfortably towards an eventual Sino-American condominium.
We are in the process of giving up being a player on the international stage where we will carry less and less weight without a European political construction.
The absence of will and so of efforts in defence, inadequate cooperation and lack of ambition are creating all the conditions for a weakening of Europe."

This appears to be the motive behind the drive for European political and military integration.
European politicians can not play an important part in World events as their countries are no longer economically or militarily dominant.
Their solution is to merge their nations into a larger "super nation" which allows them to play a major part on the global stage.
Unfortunately the global insignificance of European nations owes more to their economic inefficiency rather than their small size.
This inefficiency is in large part due to European integration.

Herve Morin said: 

"And yet the strengthening of our bilateral relationship with the British, which is the fruit of a genuine political will,shows what we should be capable of doing on a European scale!"

The question must be asked whether this approach is supported by the will of the people of the countries of Europe rather than just the will of the politicians of Europe.
After all,the people are the ones who pay the bill.

Herve Morin said: 

 "In the naval sphere we are thinking about how to make our aircraft carriers more interoperable.
 Going beyond joint exercises,we are in favour of sharing the escort of aircraft carriers in naval strike groups.
A British frigate could perfectly well help protect the Charles-de-Gaulle just as a French frigate could help protect a British aircraft carrier.
Since the British have announced their wish to equip their operational aircraft carrier with catapults I’ve asked the armed forces staff to think about the feasibility of using British planes on our own aircraft carrier and vice-versa: except, obviously in the event of conflict or crisis where our respective interests were different.
This would allow us to ensure a continuous at-sea presence."

The obvious problem is that if both nations lack the resources to maintain a carrier group then neither nation can use that force in the national interest.
This is not a problem for those who wish for greater European political integration.

Herve Morin said:

"We are in the process of assessing these areas:it would be a major strong symbol."

This certainly would be a major symbol of the current British government's desire for European integration.

Herve Morin said:

"Maritime patrol aircraft and oil tankers can also be pooled."

We assume the minister is referring to tanker ships here.
French capacity in this regard is limited and consequently this is likely to have limited impact on the need for new British replenishment ships.
The French Atlantique patrol aircraft are presumably part of the French contribution to the joint force which would explain the cancellation of the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft.

Herve Morin said: 

"Maintenance in operational condition (MOC) and training of A400M crews could be pooled as could the launch in the medium term of a joint “future UAV programme”."

This appears to suggest that training of Royal Air Force crews as well as maintenance of British A400Ms will in future take place on the continent.
The Unmanned Air Vehicle mentioned may refer to an Anglo French development of the B.A.E.Systems Taranis.
Unfortunately joint European aircraft development has little history of success.
Such development often leads to aircraft delivered late and over budget,one would have hoped that lessons would have been learnt from past mistakes.

Herve Morin said:

"We are also thinking about other areas such as that of tanker aircraft.
We could take advantage of British overcapacity once a way of fairly sharing costs has been found."

It was very interesting that the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft project was not reduced in scale during the recent Strategic Defence and Security Review despite it's cost and obvious over capacity.
It appears to have been retained to form part of the British contribution to future Anglo French joint forces.

Herve Morin said:

"Finally, there’s the whole question of streamlining the construction of the European missile system in a single ONE-MBDA.
Budgetary constraints are forcing us today to take joint decisions particularly on cruise missiles and the light anti-ship missile."

This will have unfortunate effects on the British armed forces.
In recent years frontline units have been cut while large sums of money have been spent on development of an unnecessarily large number of missile projects.
These include Meteor,Storm Shadow,Brimstone,Aster,C.A.A.M.M. and F.A.S.G.W.(H).
These projects have cost approximately £8,000 Million.
In the past funding for national missile projects was justified on the basis of security of supply and economic claw back.
Yet the above projects involve British taxpayers funding the product development for foreign owned missile manufacturers with little tax claw back and no security of supply.
There is no military or economic justification for such expenditure.
It can be explained only in the context of European integration.

This appears to be the main theme of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.
Not one of the major European defence projects was cut despite financial difficulties.


F.S.T.A.,ASCOD,F.A.S.G.W.(H),C.A.A.M.M.,A400M and Eurofighter Typhoon all emerged unscathed.


National and Anglo American projects such as Harrier,F35, and Nimrod were all cut while the Anglo American Trident replacement was delayed.


Given discussion of British warheads being serviced in France it seems likely that a joint Anglo French strategic nuclear deterrent based on French M51 missiles is in prospect.




This is all in line with provisions of the Lisbon Treaty which all major British political parties have refused to hold a referendum on.


The following is taken from Article 2 of the Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation established by Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union:


"Article 2

To achieve the objectives laid down in Article 1, Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation shall undertake to:

(a) cooperate, as from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a view to achieving approved objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment, and regularly review these objectives, in the light of the security environment and of the Union’s international responsibilities;

(b) bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, particularly by harmonising the identification of their military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, specialising their defence means and capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation in the fields of training and logistics;

(c) take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common objectives regarding the commitment of forces, including possibly reviewing their national decision-making procedures;

(d) work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good, including through multinational approaches, and without prejudice to undertakings in this regard within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the shortfalls perceived in the framework of the ’Capability Development Mechanism’;

(e) take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency."

Why Nimrod Was Cancelled?


In Parliament on the 28th of October the reasons for cancelling the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft were yesterday given by Peter Luff,Minister for Defence Equipment,Support and Technology:

"The decision not to bring the Nimrod MRA4 into service announced by the Prime Minister on 19 October was difficult,owing to the nature of the military tasks to which it was designed to contribute,the amount of public money that had been spent on it,and the impact of such a decision on the people who have dedicated their careers to delivering this capability,or who depend on it for their livelihoods.
However,the severe financial pressures faced by the nation and the urgent need to bring the defence programme into balance meant that we could not retain all our existing programmes,and that we had to prioritise those capabilities that we could continue to maintain.
 This project has suffered from repeated delays and cost overruns.
 But it is the aircraft's future support costs that contributed to the decision not to bring it into service,despite its advanced state.
The Nimrod MRA4's role as an Intelligence,Surveillance,Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance platform was to contribute to a wide range of military tasks.
 These included the protection of the nuclear deterrent and deployed Maritime Task Groups,surveillance and tracking of surface shipping,and a number of other operations relevant to the security of the UK and its overseas territories.


The aircraft also fulfilled a secondary role in support of Long Range Search and Rescue.
Since the withdrawal of the Nimrod MR2 in March this year,the Ministry of Defence has sought to mitigate the gap in capability through the use of other military assets,including Type 23 Frigates,Merlin Anti Submarine Warfare helicopters and Hercules C-130 aircraft,and by relying,where appropriate,on assistance from allies and partners.
 Although it was originally assumed that such measures would only be required for a limited period of time,we are now developing a longer-term plan to mitigate the impact of cancellation on our continuing military tasks and capabilities.
 In view of the sensitive and classified nature of some of these military tasks,and the implications for the protection of our armed forces,including the nuclear deterrent,it is not possible for us to comment on these measures in detail.
Following last week's announcement we have also begun discussing with BAE Systems arrangements to terminate the contracts for production and support of the aircraft.
 Until these negotiations are complete it would be inappropriate for me to comment on the likely costs or the impact on personnel employed on the Nimrod MRA4 programme."




Unfortunately this statement does not help to answer many of the questions surrounding the Nimrod cancellation and the Strategic Defence and Security Review as a whole.


It would be helpful if we knew how much the operating costs of Nimrod were expected to be and what would have been cut in it's place if it had been retained.


In particular,it would be interesting to know if Raptor pod equipped Nimrods could have cost effectively replaced Tornados on operations in Afghanistan.


It must also be asked why the £600 Million a year Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (F.S.T.A.) project was not cancelled or at least significantly reduced in scale.


It could be argued that the retention of Nimrod and carrier capable Harriers would have dramatically reduced the need for tanker aircraft.


A public statement on the costs of retaining Nimrod,Harrier,F.S.T.A. and Tornado would perhaps explain the governments decisions.


At present there is a great deal of confusion over the rationale behind many decisions which have been taken.


There is also the question of whether Nirmrod was cancelled as part of an Anglo French agreement on military cooperation.

Thursday, 28 October 2010

How To Invade The Falkland Islands Again

Work in progress.


Some time ago we posted this guide to invading the Falkland Islands.

It was intended to demonstrate that 4 Typhoons cannot protect the Falklands from invasion.

Recently this subject has been raised in a number of places.



The Raging Tory gives his opinion on the subject here.




The same subject is going to be covered on The Phoenix Think Tank.




There may be an interesting debate on this subject.

We shall go into it in more depth here when time permits.


Hence this post will be updated at random intervals.



Until then we will just mention that it would take,at the very least,24 hours for the British to fly in reinforcements to their single infantry company on the islands.



Argentina's small fleet of Hercules aircraft could deliver about 2,400 parachutists to the islands in that time.




Those troops only need to cover the runway with fire to prevent reinforcements from landing.







It is interesting to note that it would take about 25 minutes for a Typhoon on 15 minute Quick Reaction Alert (Q.R.A.) at Mount Pleasant to get to the radar station at Mount Alice.


Which means it would arrive about 20 minutes after the station had been bombed when the Argentine aircraft would be half way home.


This time to intercept problem is one reason why land based fighters cannot protect warships at sea.




The Royal Air Force Typhoons would have to be held at less than 4 minutes Q.R.A. just to intercept an attack on their own runway.




This emphasises just how much the Falklands defence depends on the ground based Rapier missiles rather than the Typhoon fighters.


The Falkland Islands is defended by a single Rapier battery,presumably with just 6 mobile fire units.


The coverage of those units is illustrated above.


In reality the effective radius of a Rapier fire unit can be significantly reduced by target kinematics and terrain masking.


Rapier is clearly only capable of providing local defence to high value areas.














Satellite Imagery of the Falkland Islands is very interesting.




On Google Earth many areas have been patched from images taken at different times.




Some interesting things can be seen.


It is interesting to speculate on the location of "surface wave" radars on the islands.


Marconi built such a system many years ago,there may also be a more recent system by Insyte.


There is a civilian "sky wave" Over the Horizon Radar at Goose Green.


With no Airborne Early Warning aircraft in the Falklands and only 4 Typhoons,air defence is not practicable without an Over The Horizon radar.


Even with such a system there remain major vulnerabilities.



Tuesday, 26 October 2010

Inter Service Rivalry

The Phoenix Think Tank has published a new article on inter service rivalry.

This article includes some very interesting information about British combat aircraft.

Much of which will be unfamiliar to even a long term student of air power.

Thursday, 21 October 2010

Why The Government Only Wanted One Carrier?


The following quotes are extracts from page 23 of the Strategic Defence and Security Review:

"A single carrier needs to be fully effective.

As currently designed, the Queen Elizabeth will not be fully interoperable with key allies, since their naval jets could not land on it.

Pursuit of closer partnership is a core strategic principle for the Strategic Defence and Security Review because it is clear that the UK will in most circumstances act militarily as part of a wider coalition.

We will therefore install catapult and arrestor gear.

 This will delay the in-service date of the new carrier from 2016 to around 2020.

But it will allow greater interoperability with US and French carriers and naval jets.

It provides the basis for developing joint Maritime Task Groups in the future.

This should both ensure continuous carrier-strike availability,and reduce the overall carrier protection requirements on the rest of the fleet,releasing ships for other naval tasks such as protection of key sea-lanes, or conducting counter- piracy and narcotics operations."


 "To provide further insurance against unpredictable changes in that strategic environment, our current plan is to hold one of the two new carriers at extended readiness.

 That leaves open options to rotate them, to ensure a continuous UK carrier-strike capability; or to re-generate more quickly a two-carrier strike capability.

Alternatively, we might sell one of the carriers, relying on cooperation with a close ally to provide continuous carrier-strike capability."


These statements clearly raise some interesting questions about the government's defence policy.

They indicate that the defence of British interests,including the defence of overseas territories,may in future be at the indulgence of the French government.

Members of Parliament may wish to discuss this with the Prime Minister.

They might also like to ask him if he has had any discussions with the French government about the future of the independent British nuclear deterrent.

Why Catapults Are Cheaper,By David Cameron




For a long time this blog has promoted the idea that the Royal Navy's new aircraft carriers should be fitted with catapults and arrestor wires.

This allows these ships to carry the cheaper and more capable F35C version of the Lightning II instead of the more expensive and less capable vertical landing F35B variant.

It also allows significant savings to be made in aerial refuelling aircraft and other support aircraft.

The most well known proponent of "stopping and then landing",Commander Sharkey Ward,also recently recommended that the "cat and trap" F35C be purchased instead of the less capable F35B.


Many people have argued against this idea.

They claimed that the F35C would cost more to operate than the F35C.

That argument has now been settled.

Yesterday in Parliament the British Prime Minister David Cameron made the following statement :


"We will build both carriers,but hold one in extended readiness.

We will fit the "cats and traps"-the catapults and arrester gear-to the operational carrier.

This will allow our allies to operate from our operational carrier, and it will allow us to buy the carrier version of the joint strike fighter, which is more capable, less expensive, has a longer range and carries more weapons.

We will also aim to bring the planes and the carriers in at the same time."


We agree wholeheartedly with the Prime Minister on this matter.

As there is some confusion surrounding the governments plans it is worth quoting the Prime Minister further:


"The Queen Elizabeth is not being "put back" in terms of its manufacture.

 Once it has been manufactured, we will fit the "cats and traps"-the catapults and arrester gear-to the operational carrier,so that it can then work with the carrier version of the joint strike fighter, which is a better aircraft than the one that the last Government ordered.



That will make it fully interoperable with our closest allies, the Americans and the French.

So there is not a delay in the production of the carriers, as the hon. Gentleman says.

Some extra equipment needs to be added."


The Prime Minister continues:


"On the carriers, it will not delay their manufacture and production.

What it means is that as the first is produced, the most logical step would be to fit the "cat and trap" to that carrier,which will therefore come fully into service when the carrier version of the joint strike fighter arrives at the same time.

We will have solved one of the inherited problems of bringing the two things 
together.

Clearly, an alternative would be to fit the "cat and trap" to the second carrier, but the most logical way ahead is the one that I have set out."


Her Majesty's Ship Queen Elizabeth then will not be delayed and will be fitted with catapults and arrestor wires.

Further detail can be found on Page 23 of the Strategic Defence and Security Review:


"The strike needs to be made more capable.

Installing the catapult and arrestor will allow the UK to acquire the carrier-variant of Joint Strike Fighter ready to deploy on the converted carrier instead of the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant.

This version of the jet has a longer range and greater payload: this, not large numbers of aircraft, is the critical requirement for precision strike operations in the future.

The UK plans to operate a single model of JSF, instead of different land and naval variants.

Overall, the carrier-variant of the JSF will be cheaper, reducing through-life costs by around 25%."


That last line raises the question of why British forces ever wanted the vertical landing F35B in the first place.