Note To Michael Smith And The Sunday Times

On page 2 of the Sunday Times dated 3rd of October 2010 is an article by a journalist named Michael Smith.

In this article the following claim is made about the Royal Navy's new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers:

"The price of the two ships is put at nearly £6 billion,but their overall price over 10 years,with aircraft and running costs included,is about £35 billion."

This latter figure is repeated in an editorial on page 22 of the Sunday Times.

No source is given for these figures.

No breakdown of these figures is given.

Nor is it specified which 10 year period these figures refer to.


The costs of the new aircraft carriers are amortised over a project life which is likely to span 60 years from the signing of the production contract in 2008 to the expected Out of Service Date of the second carrier in 2068.

About half of the carrier's cost is incurred during the construction phase from 2008 to 2018.

To quote the cost of such a project "over ten years",including the construction phase, might be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to give a misleading impression of the project's cost.

We can come to a very rough estimate of the construction and operating costs of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers over the next 10 years by using publicly available figures.

The new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers cost £5,133 Million,according to the Ministry Of Defence Major Projects Report 2009.

This is less than the "nearly £6 billion" suggested by Michael Smith in his article.

It is not clear whether that figure of £5,133 Million includes the money spent during the assessment phase which ran up to and including 2008.

The manufacturing phase of the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers runs from 2008 to 2018.

It is not clear what the spending profile is over that period.

In Parliament on the 3rd of June 2010,Peter Luff,The Minister for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology said:

 "To the end of April 2010, around £1.2 billion has been spent on the Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carriers. Our current estimate of total programme cost is £5.25 billion."

Which suggests that a further £4,050 Million will be spent on procuring the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers between May 2010 and the commissioning of Her Majesty's Ship (H.M.S.) Prince of Wales in 2018.

That leaves us another £30,950 Million to account for in order to reach the "about £35 billion." mentioned by Michael Smith in his Sunday Times article.

In addition,there will be operating costs for H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth from her commissioning in 2016 and for H.M.S. Prince of Wales from 2018.

There are a variety of figures relating to the operating costs of the Queen Elizabeth class.

Figures of £44 Million a year and "£44 million per ship - considerably less than an Invincible at £60-70 million" have been mentioned.

The following was said in evidence to the Defence Committee in 2010:

"Chairman (James Arbuthnot):

 "But, presumably, the older carriers

are more expensive, in efficiency terms, to operate in

some respects?"

General Sir Kevin O’Donoghue:

 "Yes, but, depending

on how long you have to extend them, you might not

have to refit them.""

A parliamentary answer from 2008 gave the operating cost (including capital costs) of both HMS Illustrious and HMS Ark Royal as £138 Million in 2007-2008.

This would give an upper ceiling of £69 Million per ship per year which tallies with the figures of £44 Million given elsewhere.

Using this pessimistic upper figure gives us £414 Million for the 6 "ship years" between the commissioning of the two new carriers and 2020.

Adding the figure we came to earlier for constuction costs over the 10 years to 2020,we get a total of £4,464 Million.

Which is still £30,536 Million short of the "about £35 billion." mentioned by Michael Smith in his Sunday Times article.


The question of the cost of the air wing is rather more complex than the cost of the ships.

Often the cost of the entire buy of F35 fighter aircraft is attributed to the carrier project.

However,most of those aircraft are intended to be land based and are not needed for the Royal Navy's carrier wing.

The Sunday Times also neglected to mention that the carrier air wing will be replacing at least twice it's number of largely land based aircraft - it is not an "additional" cost to the defence budget.


It is known that the carrier wing will need 36 aircraft for major warfighting operations.

However,there will be a need for additional aircraft to cover training,trials,maintenance and attrition.

During the Falklands War in 1982,28 of the Royal Navy's 34 Sea Harrier aircraft flew in combat from Her Majesty's Ships Invincible and Hermes.

That is 82% of the total fleet surged for war fighting operations.

If the Royal Navy were to surge the same percentage of it's F35 fleet for major war fighting operations,it would require a total fleet of 44 F35s.

On the other hand,for every 4 aircraft sustained in frontline service with the Royal Air Force,there is typically 1 aircraft with a training unit and 2 more in maintenance or reserve.

Which suggests that 63 F35s would be required to sustain 36 aircraft in fhe frontline squadrons of the carrier wing.

Both of these figures are a small proportion of the planned total buy of F35s.


Officially the United Kingdom is planning to buy 150 F35s,as was made clear in evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee in 2010:

"Chairman (James Arbuthnot):

 "I have said this before, and it is

perhaps a bit mean, but we all know what “up to

150” means—it means fewer than 150, particularly

nowadays with the pressure that there is on defence

budgets. Do you have any sort of rough ballpark

figure? If you were putting this “up to” figure into

ministerial speeches now, what would be it be?"

Mr Guy Lester (Director Capability Resources and Scrutiny):

"It would be up to 150, I think. One thing

I can say is there has been some speculation that we

have cut the number of JSF we are planning on

buying, but we have not, so up to 150 is still right.

There has not been a cut which is somehow buried

within that figure."

"Chairman (James Arbuthnot):

"But you know what you are
planning on buying, do you?"

General Sir Kevin O’Donoghue:

"Up to 150.""

However,the Americans seem to think the United Kingdom is buying 138 F35s,according to Page 88 of the current Joint Strike Fighter (J.S.F.) Memorandum Of Understanding (M.O.U.).

The discrepancy between these two figures is perhaps something which the Defence Committee might like to ask the Ministry of Defence about.


The Memorandum of Understanding sets out the current procurement schedule for the British F35s.

It lists 60 British aircraft being procured in the 10 years between 2011 and 2020,and 3 more in prior years - enough to sustain 36 frontline aircraft.

It is difficult to find reliable figures for the procurement cost of the F35.

Australian Dr.Steve Gumley,in October 2007,said:

"There are 108 different cost figures for the JSF that I am working with and each of them is correct."

However,for current purposes we will use figures from the FY 2011 United States Navy budget for the F35B Unit cost (Item Number 7 Page 1 of 8) and combine those with the procurement schedule set out in the December 2009 edition of the Joint Strike Fighter (J.S.F.) Memorandum Of Understanding (M.O.U.).


This gives us a total F35B procurement cost of $7,536.619 Million or £4,760.100 Million at today's exchange rate ($1.58329:£1) between 2011 and 2020.


This is an average of £79.3 Million per aircraft for the 60 aircraft procured over the 10 years in question.

If we add the £4,760 Million cost of procuring the aircraft to the £4,464 Million spent on building and operating the aircraft carriers we get a total of £9,224 Million spent over the ten years to 2020.

Which is still £25,776 Million short of the "about £35 billion." mentioned by Michael Smith in his Sunday Times article.


The 60 aircraft procured between 2011 and 2020 will be in service for 173 operating years over that period.

In addition,the 3 aircraft procured in earlier years will be in service for a further 30 aircraft years over the same period.

We have then to account for the cost of 203 F35B operating years over the 10 years in question.

This report gives the cost per flying hour (apparently excluding procurement costs) of the F35 as approximately £19,000.

If we assume a British F35 will fly 20 hours per month this gives us an operating cost of £926 Million for 203 F35 operating years.

Added to the costs we have already calculated for the procurement and operation of the carriers and the procurement of the F35s we get a grand total of £10,150 Million spread over the 10 years in question.

Which is still £24,850 Million short of the "about £35 billion." mentioned by Michael Smith in his Sunday Times article.


The magnitude of this difference is of such scale that it cannot be explained by the roughness of the above calculations.

This begs the question of where Michael Smith and the Sunday Times got that figure of "about £35 billion." from.



Can they explain how this figure was calculated?


Did they just make it up?


Did someone spoon feed it to them?


If so,whom?


Do they stand by this figure?


Will they retract this figure?



That said,let us consider the case for the aircraft carriers.

All figures are approximations but all can be backed up.

The lifecycle cost of both Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers annualised over their 50 year service life is likely to be about £200 Million.

The annualised lifecycle cost of their F35 carrier wing is likely to be about £500 Million.

Giving a total of about £700 Million a year over the next 50 years.


The alternative to the above carrier based air power system is to use land based aircraft.

However,land based aircraft have generated lower sortie rates than carrier based aircraft in every major air war the United Kingdom has been involved in since 1945.

Which means we would need far more land based aircraft to have the same effect on the enemy.

The figures vary from war to war but range from 40% more sorties per aircraft per day for the carrier aircraft during the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 to about 30 times more during the Falklands War of 1982.

Most often carrier based aircraft have generated twice as many sorties per aircraft per day as the land based aircraft of the Royal Air Force (Suez 1956,Kosovo 1999,Iraq 2003).

If we need twice as many land based aircraft to generate the same number of daily sorties our air fleet will cost twice as much.

It would have required a £1,000 Million a year fleet of land based F35s to match a £500 Million a year fleet of carrier based F35s in the Suez,Kosovo and Iraq conflicts for example.

During the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan it would have required a £2,000 Million a year fleet of F35s to match the sortie generation of a £500 Million a year carrier based F35 wing.

It is this cost effectiveness of the carrier wing which allows it to replace 2-3 times as many land based aircraft saving approximately £1,500 Million a year.


In addition the land based aircraft have to fly farther on each sortie and consequently they require more aerial refuelling.

The new Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft will cost about £600 Million for every year of full capability it provides.

Which is about 3 times the cost of the aircraft carriers.

A full capability carrier wing allows that cost to be cut by at least half.

The savings on tanker aircraft alone more than pay for the cost of the aircraft carriers.

On top of that,force protection and logistics costs are usually cheaper for warships than for land bases.


Given the massive annual savings which the carriers will permit,they must be George Osbourne's favourite weapon system,or does he prefer the axe?


The United Kingdom has been involved in 7 major air wars since 1945.

In every case a large aircraft carrier was demonstrably the cheapest way to deliver air power.

The United Kingdom has three options for supporting expeditionary warfighting in future:

1.No air power.

2.Low cost carrier air power

3.Expensive land based air power.

Financial considerations dictate that option 3 is not viable.

Aerial Refuelling Demand

The United Kingdom is currently replacing it's ageing aerial refuelling fleet.

The new aircraft will be operated under a Private Finance Initiative (P.F.I.) called Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (F.S.T.A.).

This entails the replacement of 15 VC10 and 9 Tristar aircraft with 14 A330 aircraft.

Of these 14 A330s,only 9 will be in Royal Air Force service,the remainder being leased out to other users but available to the Royal Air Force as required at significant additional cost.

It is expected that of the 9 aircraft routinely in Royal Air Force service,normally 5 will be in daily use.

These aircraft will cost a minimum of £455 Million a year over the contract's 27 year life,over £512 Million for each of the 24 years the new tankers will be in service or £647 Million for each of the 19 years of full operating capability.

There are significant extra costs if the Royal Air Force makes use of the spare capacity in the contract.

Details can be found in this report by the National Audit Office:

"Across the term of the contract,the Department will pay on average £390 million per annum for the baseline FSTA service,which includes the cost of related services and infrastructure.

Of this amount,AirTanker expects the cost of operating the service to be £80 million,leaving £310 million to cover financing,profit and the capital cost of the project,including aircraft and infrastructure.

In addition,the Department expects to spend a further £60 million per annum on personnel,fuel and other related costs,resulting in a total estimated spend over the life of the project of £12.3 billion."

The demand for aerial refuelling is declining.

Between 2002-03 and 2008-09, the number of hours flown by the Tristar and VC10 fleets fell by 21 per cent.

This decline will continue in future years.

 

There are a number of reasons for this.

The number of aircraft in British military service is declining.

New aircraft are more fuel efficient.

New aircraft have longer unrefuelled range.

Some new aircraft cannot be refuelled by Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft.

Some new aircraft cannot be refuelled in the air at all.

Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers allow aircraft to fly shorter distances.

An overview of the future aircraft fleet explains the decline in tanker demand in more detail.

In 1990 the Royal Air Force had 842 combat aircraft.

That number is likely to decline to about 210 by 2020.

Newer combat aircraft like the F35C Lightning II have more than double the unrefuelled combat radius of the Harrier G.R.9s which they are replacing.

The new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers will allow these aircraft to be based closer to their operational areas,further reducing demand for aerial refuelling.

The fleet of over 20 Nimrod M.R.2s is being replaced by just 9 Nimrod M.R.A.4s each of which has about 50% greater unrefuelled endurance.

The 3 Nimrod R.1s are being replaced with refuelling boom/receptacle equipped R.C.135 Rivet Joints which cannot be refuelled by the new probe/drogue equipped British A330 tankers.

The C17 Globemaster III can carry as much as four Hercules' over greater unrefuelled range.

These aircraft can also not be refuelled by the new British probe/drogue equipped A330 tankers.

The future A400M has greater unrefuelled range and nearly double the payload of the Hercules C.1/3 (C130K) it will replace,significantly reducing the refuelling needed for a given mission.

The new Hercules C.4/5 (C130J) has 40% greater unrefuelled range than the Hercules C.1/3 (C130K) it replaced,again significantly reducing the refuelling needed for a given mission.

The current fleet of 7 E3D Sentry A.E.W.1 and 13 Seaking A.S.a.C.7s is likely to be replaced by 10 E2D Hawkeyes.

With their very low fuel consumption,short runway requirements and carrier capability these aircraft will require little if any aerial refuelling,unlike the thirsty Sentrys.

The new Sentinel R.1 cannot be refuelled in the air at all.

Unlike the Tristars and VC10s they are replacing,the new A330 tankers cannot be refuelled in the air at all.

In 1990 there were around 1,000 aircraft in British service capable of receiving aerial refuelling from British tanker aircraft.

In 2010 there were around 430 aircraft in British service capable of receiving aerial refuelling from British tanker aircraft.

By 2020 there will be around 270 aircraft in British service capable of receiving aerial refueling from British tanker aircraft.

That equates to a 40% reduction in the number of aircraft being supported by British tanker aircraft between 2010 and 2020.

Each of these aircraft will require aerial refuelling less often than those they replaced due to more fuel efficient engines,greater unrefuelled range and endurance and also due to the shorter distances which carrier capable aircraft will need to fly.

For many of these new aircraft,the new aircraft carriers will also eliminate the need for long tanker-supported ferry flights to the Falklands,the United States or to operational areas.

Clearly there has been,and continues to be a dramatic reduction in demand for aerial refuelling for British air forces.

There is likely to be a 73% reduction in the number of aircraft receiving tanker support over the 30 years between 1990 and 2020.

It is not yet clear by how much aerial refuelling tanker demand will reduce in the 27 years between signing the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft contract in 2008 and the ending of the contract in 2035.

It is open to question whether it is wise to make a long term commitment to a high cost,high capacity inflight refuelling capability when tanker demand is declining so rapidly and unpredictably.

A smaller and more flexible aerial refuelling capability in line with reduced future demand will offer financial savings in the order of hundreds of millions of pounds per year.

British Combat Aircraft Procurement

The British Royal Air Force may be dramatically reduced in size as it cannot afford to buy and operate all the aircraft it had been planning to acquire.

The problems the Royal Air Force is having are nothing to do with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.



Funding for those conflicts is in addition to the rest of the defence budget.



The Royal Air Force’s problems have been caused by the Royal Air Force itself and it’s incompetent aircraft procurement dating back many decades (and that does not just apply to fast jets either).



Twenty years ago when the Royal Air Force began planning the current aircraft procurements,British fast jet strength was over 800 aircraft.



A number more than sufficient to justify the rapid and cost effective domestic development and manufacture of a new combat aircraft type to replace the whole fast jet fleet.



However,as usual the paroquial interests of elements of the armed forces got in the way of what was best for the armed forces and the nation as a whole.



The result being that the Royal Air Force decided to replace it’s fast jet fleet with three seperate aircraft types:Agile Combat Aircraft (now the Typhoon);what eventually became Future Joint Combat Aircraft (now the F-35 Lightning II) and what was to have been Future Offensive Air System (F.O.A.S.).



Future Offensive Air Systems was likely to be a bomber,now cancelled due to cost growth on the other two aircraft projects.



Note how those three aircraft types mirror the old Bomber Command,Fighter Command,Tactical Air Force structure of the Second World War.



This structure of the Royal Air Force was perpetuated till recent times through Strike Command,Royal Air Force Germany and Number 1 Group,Number 2 Group and Number 11 Group.



The decision to buy three different fast jet aircraft meant that domestic design and manufacture was not economically viable due to the small numbers of each type required.



Agile Combat Aircraft became the multinational European Combat Aircraft,later Typhoon,resulting in massive time delays and cost increases.



Future Joint Combat Aircraft became the F-35,a cheap mass produced American aircraft,expected to cost half as much as the Typhoon.



Which due to being one of the worst thought out aircraft programmes in history and due to exchange rate fluctuations may cost twice as much as the “expensive” Typhoon.



With all the money wasted on those two (at least £5,000 Million wasted),the third aircraft had to be cancelled.



The many thousands of millions of pounds poured down the drain due to the Royal Air Force’s complete disregard of the basic industrial factors inherent in designing and manufacturing aircraft are the real reason the Royal Air Force cannot now afford to buy the aircraft it wants.



One of the great ironies of this sorry saga is that at the time the Royal Air Force decided it needed seperate fast jet fleets for use on land and sea,it was operating three carrier capable aircraft (Harrier,Phantom and Buccaneer) and a fourth (Jaguar) which was originally intended for carrier use but was not up to the task (you will never guess whose fault that was!).



Lest the above be seen as an anti Royal Air Force rant,I should point out that the British Army (note not the Royal Army!) and the Royal Navy are also afflicted by the “Why buy one platform when you can buy three?” attitude.



Both also suffer the consequences of that appproach.

Strategic Bombing,Operation Allied Force

During Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil,the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999,American B2 Spirit strategic bombers flew from Whiteman Air Force Base,Missouri in the United States of America.

19 B2 bombers were based at Whiteman.

Of these,10 were being upgraded to Block 30 standard and 9 were available for operations.

Of the 9 operational aircraft,1 was used for training,1 was receiving it's final Block 30 upgrades and 1 was undergoing extensive maintenance,leaving 6 aircraft available for combat.

During the 78 day bombing campaign,these 6 aircraft flew 49 sorties,45 of which reached their targets and released ordnance.

A sortie typically lasted 28-32 hours,required 4 in flight refuellings and delivered 16 guided 2,000 pound bombs.

B2 Spirits flew less than 1% of the sorties in Operation Allied Force yet they dropped 11% of all bombs.

See here: www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1999_hr/has181200_0.htm

Furthermore,while other aircraft were often unable to drop bombs due to bad weather,the B2s flew above the clouds using radar and inertial/Global Positioning System (G.P.S.) guided bombs regardless of the weather conditions.

On a per sortie basis the B2's bombing performance was far better than most other aircraft used in this conflict.

It has been said that "The B–2 was the star of the air campaign over Kosovo".

The total purchase cost of 21 B2 Spirits was $44,754 Million.

See here: www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad97181.htm

Just 6 of these were used in Operation Allied Force due to the upgrades already mentioned.

However,the difficulty in maintaining the low radar signature of these aircraft is such that they can require 124 hours of maintenance for each hour of flight.

Consequently they have mission capable rates as low as 26% and rarely more than 50%.

This means that typically only 5-10 aircraft are available for use at any one time anyway.

See here: www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b-2-ops.htm and here: www.fas.org/man/gao/nsiad97181.htm

It had then actually cost $7,459 Million to field each of the six Spirits used in Operation Allied Force.

Approximately 700 bombs were dropped by B2s during the 78 day campaign with a hit rate of around 87%.

That is a rate of 1.5 bombs dropped per aircraft per day or 1.3 bomb hits per aircraft per day at a cost of $7,459 Million per aircraft.

That does not include the cost,approximately $800 Million,of the four tankers required to get the strategic bombers to their targets in the first place.

The total capital cost of around $8,300 Million for the B2 bomber and it's supporting tankers is similar to the cost of a British Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier and it's airwing.

Yet the aircraft carrier,operating from the Adriatic Sea,could deliver at least 100 times as many bombs on target per day as the bomber and do so without any aerial refuelling support as all targets would be within the unrefuelled tactical radius of it's aircraft.

Whether the carrier is equipped with Super Hornets,Rafales,Typhoons or Lightning IIs (F35 B or F35 C),all targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would lie within the unrefuelled tactical radius of it's aircraft when carrying 4 2,000 pound bombs.

No target being more than 300 miles from potential operating locations of the carrier.

If each of the 36 aircraft onboard such a carrier flew just one strike mission per day they would between them deliver 144 2,000 pound bombs in a day.

It is possible for a carrier to generate far more sorties than that.

British carrier aircraft were flying as many as 4 sorties per aircraft per day during the Falklands war in 1982.

The American aircraft carrier U.S.S Nimitz has demonstrated the ability to fly 200 strike sorties per day,4 sorties flown per fighter per day for 4 days,her captain thought she could have kept that rate up for a week.

The next generation American carrier U.S.S.Gerald R. Ford is designed to generate up to 5 strike sorties per aircraft per day.

Given the short distances involved,each sortie from a carrier in the Adriatic would take about one hour.

Under combat conditions carriers can turn aircraft around between sorties in under an hour,giving a total cycle time of about two hours per sortie over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

There is then the time for the carrier to generate as many as many as 5 sorties per aircraft in a single day while still leaving plenty of time for rest and maintenance.

Such a sortie rate would deliver 720 2,000 pound bombs in one day.

That is as many bombs delivered in a single day as the entire B2 bomber fleet dropped in 78 days of Operation Allied Force.

Which is rather impressive when one considers that the bombers and their tanker support cost 5 times as much as the carrier and it's air wing.

It is also 480 times as many bombs dropped per day as could be delivered by a single B2 Spirit and it's tankers at the same capital cost as the carrier and it's air wing.

In terms of bombs per day per dollar,even when one allows for the cost of the aircraft carrier's escort support ships and availability of ships and aircraft,the B2 Spirit still appears to offer exceedingly poor value for money.