If it is not possible to prevent the enemy laying naval mines by destroying their mines and mine layers before they can be used then it becomes necessary to determine where mines have been laid by means of a survey and effective use of time and resources dictates doing this ahead of friendly vessels,consequently the speed of advance of those vessels shall be constrained by the speed of the mine survey.
A mining sloop locates mined areas by deploying it’s Mine Hunting Launches which survey a lane at a speed of up to fifteen nautical miles per hour,advancing up to three hundred and sixty nautical miles per day whilst relaying contacts in real time and when a mined area is detected clearing a lane at a rate of advance of up to fifteen knots (depending on the width of the lane,the density of contacts and the number of launches available for the task).
If deployed from theRoyal Fleet AuxiliaryMotor VesselIsland Crown a REMUS 620 would take fifty hours to survey sixty-six nautical miles ahead and then return,due to the limits of submarine communication only after resurfacing may sonar images be analysed,assuming a clearance speed of fifteen knots it would take over fifty-four hours to survey and clear a sixty-six nautical mile lane,fifty hours longer than it would take a mining sloop which could survey and clear up toeight hundred and sixteen nautical miles in the same time (because it's Mine Hunting Launches have air breathing diesel engines and can analyse sonar imagery and relay contacts by radio in real time) and yet some think using toysubmarines to hunt mines would be transformational.
There are many ways in which a miningsloop may be designed but above BAE Systems'Adaptable Strike Frigate concept is used as a template to illustrate the salient features of such a vessel.
Picture: Grand Logistics
Above is shown one of the ways in which a mining sloop may operate.
Our proposed Independent Navy For An Independent Nation does not at present exist but here we shall provide a brief overview of it and illustrate how this navy shall operate.
Firstly,we should point out that this is not what we consider to be an ideal Royal Navy for the purposes of the United Kingdom but rather the navy which the nation could have afforded within the available budget,had it been spent wisely,which it was not.
Picture: Grand Logistics
For example,we consider thirty two frigates to be the most appropriate number to meet the United Kingdom's needs outside of a major conflict,but the budget available following David Cameron's transfer of funding from the defence budget to the aid budget was sufficient to procure and operate only twenty four multirole frigates of a single class.
While our proposed frigate fleet shall be funded from within the existing surface combatant budget,funding for other assets shall depend on the reallocation of resources from other areas.
Picture: Corporal Lee Matthews,Royal Air Force,Crown Copyright For example,the replacement of about one hundred and thirty transport and support aircraft of various types with about sixty five Centaurus cargo and Perseus patrol aircraft,the replacement of Typhoon and Lightning combat aircraft with about one hundred and fifty Furious aircraft,the replacement of around three hundred helicopters of various types with about two hundred Hermes (Ultra Merlin) helicopters and consequent reductions in training aircraft of various types shall dramatically reduce the number of peace time budgeted flying hours consumed annually,whilst also increasing capability,resulting in long term savings which far exceed the cost of developing new aircraft types.
Those who think our plan unaffordable should do well to educate themselves on just how much money shall be saved each year by cutting roughly two hundred aircraft,each of which flies hundreds of hours per year at a cost of tens of thousands of pounds per hour.
Picture: Paul Kemp,Crown Copyright The creation of the Waterguard Service,an armed and uniformed service funded from within existing budgets but without the Navy Vote,shall replace various civilian organisations currently performing law enforcement,life saving,range safety and research tasks in times of peace and shall also provide a reserve of vessels and crews for naval service in times of war.
The most significant changes to the fleet's assets shall include the expansion of the Royal Marines to a full,first ordinal,division consisting of two reinforced front line brigades and divisional assets including helicopters,allowing one brigade headquarters to be deployed,or ready to deploy,continuously,and the procurement of four large catapult equipped flying ships each with a half sized,post Cameron,peace time,air wing including two dozen Furious fighter aircraft and half a dozen Perseus patrol aircraft (out of combined Royal Naval Air Service and Royal Flying Corps fleets of about one hundred and fifty and forty aircraft respectively).
Furious being a fifty long ton class,manned,supersonic,multirole,combat aircraft with an unrefuelled,subsonic,combat radius of about fifteen hundred miles,a maximum combat radius of around thirty-five hundred miles,with two refuellings from a Perseus patrol aircraft,and a ferry range of over four thousand miles.
Picture: Adrian Pingstone Perseus being a fifty long ton class,subsonic,manned,multirole,attack,patrol and logistical support aircraft with an unrefuelled combat patrol endurance of about twelve hours.
Picture: Andrew Linnett,Crown Copyright The combined cost of both ships later increased to about six thousand and two hundred million pounds of which about fifteen hundred million pounds (enough to fit catapults and arresting gear to both ships) was due to the Ministry of Defence's deliberate decision to slow production.
Even that report deceitfully claimed that steam catapults were obsolescent (even though the United States Navy was planning to use them for another fifty years on the United States' Ship George H.W.Bush) and conspicuously ignored the single most pertinent cost factor in the decision to fit catapults,or not,the tens of thousands of millions of pounds which would have been saved,without any loss in capability,by reductions in the size of the combat and support aircraft fleets enabled by the installation of catapults and arresting gear on the Queen Elizabeth class. It is not clear if this omission was due to misfeasance or incompetence.
It should be noted that according to the National Audit Office: "The cost of conversion is the cost of installing catapults and arrestor gear on to one aircraft carrier so that it can operate the carrier variant aircraft."
Picture: Unknown photographer,unknown copyright In other words each of the figures quoted includes the cost of design work,which need only be done once as both aircraft carriers are the same,and therefore,the cost of converting the second ship should be significantly less than the cost of converting the first.
Picture: Harland Quarrington,Crown Copyright If the National Audit Office figures are correct then the three thousand million pound figure Philip Hammond gave for the conversion of Her Majesty's Ship Queen Elizabeth to electromagnetic catapults would have been similar to the gross cost of building two additional aircraft carriers,both fitted with steam catapults,even before deducting the proceeds from the sale of the first two ships which would then be surplus to requirements. Were these options deliberately omitted from the choices presented to Cabinet in order to predetermine the outcome,and if so,should there be both a public and a criminal inquiry in to the matter?
Our other proposed changes to the current fleet structure shall include reductions in the numbers of replenishing and landing ships and increases in the numbers of depot and patrol vessels.
Picture: C.P.O.A. (Phot.) Tam McDonald,Crown Copyright The man power requirement for the Independent Navy For An Independent Nation shall be similar to that of the existing fleet,as,although our proposed warships are generally larger and better equipped than the elderly vessels they are intended to replace,they shall also be more automated and there shall be only a small increase in the overall number of hulls.
Our proposed terms of service for the Naval Services are slightly more generous,and more rigid,than the current Royal Navy Harmony Guidelines: in any forty-eight month period a sailor or marine shall be on leave for not less than twelve months,at his home base for eight months,at sea trialling,training or transiting for four months and deployed on operations,or standing ready to deploy,for not more than twenty-four months.
Consequently commanders shall use their sea days wisely,giving sailors extra time at home during quiet periods in order to keep sea days in hand for periods of intense operational activity.
Every day a sailor shall spend on leave while his ship undergoes assisted maintenance in it's home port shall be another sea day the fleet commander shall have in the bank for a rainy day,such rewards shall encourage good behaviour amongst those whose heads grow weary from the weight of gold braid on their hats.
Although the readiness cycle based on these terms of service shall,at a maximum,permit all of the navy to be deployed half of the time or half of the navy to be deployed all of the time,typical operations shall see up to a quarter of the fleet in refit at any time,at least a quarter deployed on routine standing tasks and up to three quarters deployed on operations when necessary.
The warships themselves shall be in commission for three years in every four,having one quadrennial refit followed by sea trials,basic and then advanced sea training before becoming ready for deployment and undergoing assisted maintenance when putting to the Naval Dockyards at Portsmouth,Devonport,Rosyth and Clyde or coming alongside an Assistance class icebreaker,either at sea or more usually at one of the forward support locations: Gibraltar,Bermuda,the Falklands and Diego Garcia.
In the course of it's commission,the vessel shall be deployed operationally or be ready to deploy for no more than twenty-four months,alongside in it's home base for eight months and at sea on trials,training or transiting for four months,deployment lengths shall be flexible and different types of vessels shall deploy for different time periods. Picture: P.O.A. (Phot.) Julian Merrill,Crown Copyright A large depot ship might conduct two,twelve month deployments to a forward support location during it's commission,a submarine armed with nuclear weapons might deploy from it's home base eight times on three month long patrols,an eighty foot launch might conduct hundreds of short patrols from it's home base.
Picture: A.B. (A.W.T.) Bill Spurr,Crown Copyright In extremis a Royal Naval Sea Service,Royal NavalSubmarine Service,Royal NavalHarbour Service or Waterguard Service vessel,Royal Naval Air Service air wing or Royal Marine brigade may conduct a single twenty-four month deployment during it's commission.
In order to retain freedom of action,the standard routine shall be for all vessels to return to a naval dockyard or depot ship for replenishment with bunkers half full,except for vessels attached to battle divisions which shall be replenished at sea by a replenishing ship,which it's self shall take on fuel and other supplies from a large depot ship or shore facility.
Picture: Unknown photographer,unknown copyright The need to conduct patrols of a useful length whilst using only half of the ships bunkers being one of the reasons for the big hulls of ocean going vessels such as the Falklands class destroying frigates and Africa class flying ships.
Whilst our proposed readiness cycle shall increase the number of assets available for operations at any time,the termination of Royal Navy participation in European Union and Anglo-French operations shall also allow the available resources to be concentrated on more important national tasks which are unlikely to be performed by other nations,as recent events have,predictably,demonstrated.
Our proposed naval structure shall consist of two sea going fleets commanded by full admirals,a fleet being whatever assets an admiral commands,each divided in to two flotillas commanded by vice admirals,subordinate to whom shall be divisions commanded by rear admirals which in turn shall consist of squadrons commanded by commodores,the organisation being entirely flexible.
It should be noted that there is no historical consistency in the Royal Navy's use of the terms "flotilla","division" and "squadron",there have been squadrons made up of divisions,flotillas made up of squadrons,squadrons made up of flotillas and even divisions made up of both squadrons and flotillas. However,it shall be convenient to have a division commanded by an officer of equivalent rank to those who command Royal Marine and British Army divisions.
The admirals commanding the fleets;the Royal Marine brigadiers commanding the fleet's marines;the Royal Naval Air Service captains commanding the fleets' naval air groups,and their deputies,shall fly their flags in the Africa class flying ships (which shall also provide air combat,amphibious assault and third echelon medical capabilities),there being a deputy commander on a separate vessel with similar command facilities at every level and for every element of the command structure. Other ships,frigates,sloops,brigs and cutters shall be designed to be fitted out as flotilla,division and squadron flag ships as and when required,an exception to this being submarines which have limited potential as command vessels and are unlikely to require high level command facilities.
Command of individual ships shall be a captain's post,frigates shall be commanded by a full commander,sloops by a lieutenant commander,brigs by a lieutenantand a sub-lieutenant shall command the cutters which shall be chartered to the Waterguard Service and other government departments.
The command structure shall be entirely flexible and may be arranged in various ways as required,for example,there might be a home fleet and an away fleet or a battle fleet and a patrol fleet,in each case with the fleet commanders and their deputies alternating time at sea. However,for planning purposes it shall be assumed herein that one of the two fleet commands shall be operational at all times,in line with the terms of service,this fleet having command of assets which are deployed or ready to deploy,the other fleet commanding assets which are resting or regenerating.
These flotillas being divided in to a number of operational divisions of two general types: patrol divisions which shall be spread thinly over a large area;and battle divisions,which shall be concentrated in a small area.
A battle division shall consist,at a minimum,of: a battle squadron composed of a flying and a replenishing ship;an escorting squadron of the most capable destroying frigates;a Royal Naval Air Service air wing;and a Royal Marines battalion group.
A patrol division shall consist of a number of mixed operational squadrons each composed of different ship types,typically,a patrolling brig,a mining sloop and a destroying frigate in each squadron,often reinforced by more specialist types such as submarines,icebreakers and survey sloops,each vessel being allocated it's own operating station within the squadron's area of responsibility.
Picture: Grand Logistics
In the event of a contingency arising a vessel shall be reinforced by it's squadron,a squadron shall be reinforced by it's division,a division shall be reinforced by it's flotilla and a flotilla shall be reinforced by it's fleet.
Picture: L.A. (Phot.) Luron Wright,Crown Copyright This process being facilitated by the rapid decision making of the robust,at sea,command structure,not hobbled by political dithering and meddling from London,and the range,endurance and speed of vessels such as the big hulled Falklands class frigates.
Picture: L. (Phot.) Kyle Heller,Crown Copyright Without replenishment,a battle division dispatched from Portsmouth shall be able to reach: Gibraltar within two days;Bermuda within four days;the Falklands within ten days;Oman within eight days;Singapore within twelve days;and Pitcairn within thirteen days.
An officer in administrative command of a type specific flotilla,division or squadron,for example,a commodore commanding a squadron of mining sloops,subordinate to a patrol division,shall find himself in routine operational command of a mixed squadron of patrolling brigs,mining sloops and destroying frigates whilst retaining administrative command of his mining squadron.
Picture: L. (Phot.) Paul Hall,Crown Copyright However,if the patrol division is concentrated to deal with a contingency it's mixed squadrons shall exchange their subordinate vessels such that the mining commodore shall find himself in both administrative and operational control of his homogeneous mining squadron.
Whereas,an officer in administrative command of a squadron of destroying frigates subordinate to a battle division shall routinely retain both administrative and operational control of his homogeneous destroying squadron.
The senior officer on any patrol station shall be appointed as the station commander such that the lieutenant commanding a patrolling brig shall find himself holding the post of Officer Commanding Pacific Station if there is no superior officer on that station,alternatively,the full admiral commanding a battle fleet shall find himself holding the post of Commander In Chief Jamaica Station if his fleet should be concentrated there.
The patrol stations themselves shall vary in size,shape and number as required,for example,for planning purposes it has been assumed that the squadron on the West Indies Station,operating out of Bermuda,shall patrol seas west of a line running from Greenland down to Brazil,within which area it shall post it's vessels to subordinate patrol areas such as the Jamaica Station,North America Station and Leeward Islands Station but should the squadron be required to concentrate to deal with a contingency on the Jamaica Station then the other parts of the West Indies Station shall be absorbed by the adjacent squadrons on the South Atlantic,Channel and Western Stations.
Under our planning assumptions,the away flotilla's western division shall cover the West Indies and South Atlantic Stations whilst it's eastern division shall cover the Pacific and Indian Oceans with a subordinate squadron on the East Indies Station logistically supported by Royal Naval Harbour Service assets at Diego Garcia and a squadron on the Pacific Station supported by Royal Naval Harbour Service assets shared with the South Atlantic squadron of the flotilla's western division at the Falkland Islands.
The patrol squadron on the East Indies Station shall routinely consist of a patrolling brig,a mining sloop and a destroying frigate,often supplemented by other transient vessels and supported by Royal Naval Harbour Service assets,including a large depot ship with enough supplies to support a division for a year,with a Waterguard Service cutter and eighty foot launch also operating around the British Indian Ocean Territories performing law enforcement,life saving and research on behalf of,and at the expense of,other government departments.
In addition to performing national tasks,the patrolling brig shall provide the United Kingdom's contribution to the Combined Maritime Forces Combined Task Force 151,the mining sloop shall provide the United Kingdom's contribution to Combined Task Force 150,the destroying frigate shall provide the United Kingdom's contribution to Combined Task Force 152 on the Persian Gulf Station.
The away flotilla's battle division,including a flying ship,a replenishing ship and a squadron of destroying frigates,shall be committed as and when required and,for the last thirty years this is likely to have been routinely committed to the Arabian Sea or The Gulf supporting operations in Kuwait,Afghanistan and Iraq.
In addition to it's peace time naval air wing (half it's designed air wing due to the Cameron cuts) of twenty four Furious fighter aircraft and six Perseus patrol aircraft,each of the large Africa class flying ships shall routinely carry a Royal Marines Light Infantry battalion group of around fifteen hundred men,consisting of an infantry battalion reinforced with divisional assets such as artillery and a squadron of Royal Marines Hermes helicopters.
Whilst two of the Royal Marines Light Infantry battalions in each reinforced brigade shall be embarked aboard the flying ships along with their share of divisional assets and combat supplies,the third battalion and the remainder of the divisional headquarters and train elements shall be distributed about the fleet in smaller ship detachments.
Picture: L.A. (Phot.) Angie Pearce,Crown Copyright The remainder of the divisional heavy equipment shall be carried by the replenishing ships,alongside the rest of the reinforced brigade's combat supplies.
The Iranian response to the Gibraltarian seizure of the Grace 1 tanker was entirely predictable,although the British establishment has a long history of failing to predict the entirely predictable,there were two weeks to reinforce East Indies Station before the Iranian seizure of the United Kingdom flagged product tanker Stena Impero,indeed as events in the Gulf had begun in May,more than two months earlier,there was no shortage of time to prepare.
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