Some Statistics On Royal Air Force Operations In Libya

Statistics on Royal Air Force operations over Libya have been rather scant and incomplete.

This has made it rather difficult to judge the performance of British combat aircraft in Operation Ellamy.

However,there are now some useful pieces of information available.

On the 19th of May 2011,Scottish Member of Parliament (M.P.) Angus Robertson asked the following question in the House Of Commons:

"To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many missions the (a) Nimrod R1, (b) Sentinel R1, (c) VC-10 and (d) C-130 have flown in Operation Ellamy."

He received the following answer from the Secretary of State for Defence Dr.Liam Fox:

"Up to 8 May 2011 the UK has flown the following sorties in support of Operation Ellamy:

                                                           

Aircraft type	Number of sorties (1)
VC10	110
C130	15
Nimrod	20
Sentinel	50
(1) Numbers are rounded to the nearest five."

Mr.Robertson went on to ask the following:

"To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) how many sorties the (a) GR4 Tornado and (b) Typhoon has flown in Operation Ellamy;what type of mission was flown in each case;and how many weapons of each type were released; 

(2) how many dual mode Brimstone missiles have been used by UK forces in Operation Ellamy to date."

Dr.Fox replied: 

"Up to 8 May 2011 the UK has flown about 300 GR4 Tornado and 140 Typhoon sorties as part of Operation Ellamy.

Both aircraft types have conducted missions to protect civilians in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1973,and the Typhoons have also conducted missions in support of no-fly zone enforcement.

In all,approximately 240 weapons have been fired by these aircraft during these missions.

These were a combination of Dual Mode Seeker Brimstone and Storm Shadow missiles,Enhanced Paveway II and Paveway IV Precision Guided Munitions.

I am unable to provide a breakdown of these figures for reasons of operational security."

Operation Ellamy began on the 19th of March 2011,which means these figures cover the 50 days between then and the 8th of May.

Over that period V.C.10 tanker aircraft have flown 110 sorties or about 2.2 sorties per day.


It is difficult to calculate a sortie generation figure for these aircraft as numbers involved in this operation appear to vary over time,most recently the International Institute for Strategic Studies said that 6 V.C.10s were involved in Operation Ellamy,other sources often put the figure at 3 V.C.10s.


These numbers would give us a best case of 0.73 sorties per aircraft per day and a worst case of 0.37 sorties per aircraft per day.


Both of these figures are well below the 1 sortie per aircraft per day which the Royal Air Force tanker fleet often generates in combat.

The C130 Hercules transports flew 15 sorties or about 0.3 sorties per day ,1 sortie every 3 days on average.

Nimrod R.1 electronic reconnaissance aircraft flew 20 sorties or about 0.4 sorties per day,2 sorties every 5 days on average.

As there is only 1 Nimrod based at Akrotiri,this gives 0.4 sorties per aircraft per day. 

The Sentinel R.1 radar reconnaissance aircraft flew 50 sorties or about 1 sortie per day.


With 2 Sentinels based at Akrotiri,this equates to 0.5 sorties per aircraft per day.


It is likely to take about 4 hours for the Sentinel to transit to and from Cyrus to Tripoli on each sortie.

Tornado bombers flew 300 sorties or about 6 sorties per day.


As there have been 12 Tornados involved for most of Operation Ellamy,this equates to just over 0.5 sorties per aircraft per day,well below the 0.8 sorties per aircraft per day which Canadian Hornets are generating.


Flying sorties of 5.5 hours duration on average,the 12 British Tornados are generating 19 hours on station over Libya each day,an average of 1 hour and 35 minutes on station per Tornado per day (assuming an average transit speed of 500 miles per hour over the 580 miles between Gioia Del Colle and Tripoli).


This compares poorly with the 3 hours on station which each Canadian Hornet generates per day.


Each Canadian Hornet is generating 89% more time on station over Libya per day than each British Tornado.

Typhoon fighters flew 140 sorties or about 2.8 sorties per day.

A total of 240 weapons were released,an average of 4.8 weapons per day or 0.55 weapons per fast jet sortie.

It is interesting to note that,other than a handful of Storm Shadow missiles,these weapons range from the 1,000 pound (450kg) bomb based Enhanced Paveway II down to the 110 pound (50kg) Brimstone.

Thus weapon expenditure in 50 days of combat over Libya probably totals less than about 120 tonnes of ordnance and could be as little as 12 tonnes.

By way of comparison,a large aircraft carrier like the Nimitz class carries about 3,200 tonnes of ordnance,with the replenishment vessel which accompanies it carrying a similar amount.

The French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle carries 600 tonnes of ordnance (other sources say 2,100 tons) and 3,200 tonnes of aviation fuel.


It would be interesting to know how much ordnance is carried by the Royal Navy's Invincible class ships and also by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary's replenishment vessels,unfortunately we do not know the answer to that but it is likely to be far higher than 120 tonnes.

The only figures we have for the ordnance capacity of the forthcoming Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers are unfortunately expressed in cubic metres rather than tonnes which is less than helpful.

Royal Air Force Tornados Bomb Libya From Norfolk

Reports are coming in that Royal Air Force Tornados have launched Storm Shadow missiles against targets in Libya.

The Tornados are said to have made 3,000 mile round trips to launch the missiles against targets in Libya.

If this is true (we await confirmation) it will be the longest British bombing mission since the ineffectual Black Buck bombing raids in the Falklands War of 1982.

The United States Air Force has flown far longer missions in numerous conflicts in recent years,including in Kosovo,Iraq and Afghanistan.

Unlike the Black Buck raids,Storm Shadow attacks are at least likely to have hit their targets.

Applying air power at such long ranges when closer bases are available is an example of grotesque military inefficiency.

War is not about setting records,it is about doing damage to the enemy.

Very long range sorties result in very low sortie rates.

Low sortie rates mean less damage is done to the enemy.

The resources required are out of all proportion to the effect on the enemy.

There is no military advantage to bombing Libya from Norfolk rather than Cyprus or Sicily when closer bases are available.

A 3,000 mile sortie from Norfolk to Libya is likely to have taken at least 6 hours and to have required substantial aerial refuelling support.


Historic trends suggest that these Tornados will generate around 0.6 sorties per aircraft per day.

Time will tell if the Royal Air Force Tornados can match that number.

In contrast a Harrier on an aircraft carrier off the coast of Libya could have flown up to 4 sorties in a single day with no tanker support.

Royal Navy Sea Harriers did just that during the Falklands War.

All at ranges similar to those which they would have faced flying from an aircraft carrier off the coast of Libya.

That is more than 6 times our estimate of what Tornados will manage attacking Libya from Norfolk.

The Defence Secretary should compare these figures with the sortie rates acheived by Tornados during the current operation.

British and American warships have launched 112 cruise missiles against Libya in a single night.

Had Storm Shadow been integrated on to Harrier as was planned,an Invincible class aircraft carrier with 18 Harriers could easily have delivered up to 144 such missiles in a single day with no aerial refuelling.

We will see how many Storm Shadows the Royal Air Force managed to deliver at vast expense with this long range Tornado raid.

Aerial Refuelling Demand:By The Numbers

We have discussed the over capacity if the Royal Air Force's Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (F.S.T.A) project in an earlier post.

We pointed out that demand for tanker aircraft was declining significantly while F.S.T.A. was committing the British taxpayer to fund massive overcapacity at vast expense until 2035.

We suggested that Britain needed only 6 or 7 A330 tanker transport aircraft.

We also suggested that these should have been bought outright.

We did not go into detail about that number.

We shall do so here.

The cost to the taxpayer of the air refuelling fleet is defined by the capacity which must be maintained in peacetime.

The air refuelling capacity must satisfy peak air refuelling demand.

Peak air refuelling demand occurs during major war fighting operations.

The last time Britain was engaged in a major war fighting operation was during the 2003 invasion of Iraq,known as Operation Telic or Iraqi Freedom.

Developments in weapons and sensors,the Royal Navy's new aircraft carriers,reductions in the size of British military aircraft fleet and longer ranged aircraft entering service all suggest that future peak air refuelling demand will be significantly less than it was in 2003.


Let us look at what was needed in 2003.

The United States Air Force (U.S.A.F.) publication "Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – By The Numbers" gives statistics for the 31 days of the air war during the Iraq invasion.

It says that the Royal Air Force deployed 12 air refuelling tankers for Operation Telic/Iraqi Freedom,these flew 359 sorties and offloaded  18,884,000 pounds of fuel.

The latter figure is listed under the phrase "coalition" but as no other coalition country is listed as providing aerial refuelling aircraft this must presumably have been delivered by the Royal Air Force.

In Chapter 6 of a "Short History of the Royal Air Force","RETURN TO EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE",the following figures were given for the British aerial refuelling effort during the Iraq invasion:

"The AAR (Air to Air Refuelling) capability contributed by the RAF was highly valued,particularly by the

Americans.

VC10s and Tristars flew 355 sorties dispensing nearly 19 million lbs of fuel.

Over 40% of this was given to US Navy and Marine Corps aircraft.*"

*Aircraft of the United States Air Force are unable to receive fuel from the "hose and drogue" equipped British tanker aircraft.

These numbers are almost identical to those given by the United States Air Force.

The Royal Air Force contribution amounted to about 4.5% of the coalition aerial refuelling effort which offloaded a total of 417,137,233 pounds of fuel.

A summary of the relevant figures is as follows:

Number of refuelling aircraft.

                    United States Air Force                          182                   

                        United States Marine Corps                     22                       

                         United States Navy                                   52                        

            Royal Air Force                                        12 (4.5%)

Total                                                         268

Number of Refuelling Sorties Flown.

United States Air Force                        6,193 

United States Marine Corps                    454
 United States Navy                              2,058 

         Royal Air Force                                       359 (4%)

Total                                                     9,064

Pounds of fuel offloaded.

  

United States Air Force        376,391,000 
United States Marine Corps   12,545,786

United States Navy                   9,316,447

            Coalition  (Royal Air Force)     18,884,000 (4.5%)

Total                                         417,137,233

Using the more precise American figures we get a total of 8,584 tonnes of fuel offloaded by British tanker aircraft in 359 sorties during 31 days of combat operations.

An average of 277 tonnes offloaded per day by an average of 11.6 daily tanker sorties.

This is an average of 0.97 sorties per tanker aircraft per day*.

An average of 23.9 tonnes of fuel was offloaded per sortie.

An average of 23.1 tonnes of fuel was offloaded per aircraft per day.

Only 60% of the above was offloaded to British military aircraft.

*This figure is higher than that achieved by Royal Air Force combat aircraft during operation Telic.

The Royal Air Force often generates far lower sortie rates than other air arms and air forces.

However,Royal Air Force tanker aircraft often generate far higher sortie rates than other elements of the Royal Air Force.

Unfortunately none of the above figures gives any indication of where the fuel was offloaded.


For the receiving aircraft,the important metric in aerial refuelling is the weight of fuel received and the distance from the operating area at which it is received.


Fuel received close to the operating area is of more benefit than fuel received far from the combat area.


It is important to note that the range from the tanker aircraft's base is of no relevance at all to this.


This gives us a problem when comparing the performance of aerial refuelling aircraft.


The most obvious and easily compared metric is the fuel the tanker aircraft can offload at a given range from it's base.


But as it is the distance from the combat aircraft's operating area at which the fuel is transferred which is important,this figure is of no benefit.


A smaller tanker aircraft which can generate a large number of daily sorties from an aircraft carrier or shorter runway on a base closer to where the fuel offload is needed may be of more benefit than a large tanker aircraft which can fly fewer sorties from a more distant base with a long runway.


It is essential to consider where the tanker aircraft can operate from and where the fuel offload is needed.


This dictates how far the tanker aircraft must fly on each sortie and thus how many sorties it can generate in a day,how much fuel it will burn on each sortie and how much it will have left to transfer to the receiving aircraft.

For example,an A400M tanker may carry only half as much fuel as an A330 tanker (58 tonnes versus 111 tonnes) but it might be based much closer to it's tanker track as it does not require a 10,000 foot runway.

This reduces fuel burn in transit,and fuel burn on station for the smaller A400M is also less  leaving more fuel for offloading.

With each sortie taking less time,more sorties can be flown in a day,off setting the capacity deficit of the smaller aircraft.

The lower overall fuel consumption also reduces the logistical burden on the ground.

Thus a small carrier based tanker aircraft or a rough field capable tanker convertible A400M might be more cost effective options than a large long runway A330 tanker aircraft - depending on the basing options available.

However,as the A330 tankers are already in production,we shall consider only them here.


During the Iraq invasion,British tanker aircraft (probably 4 Tristars and 8 VC10s) operated from Al Udeid in Qatar,as did most British military aircraft.


Al Udeid is about 400 miles from the border of Iraq.


As orbiting tanker aircraft are highly vulnerable we may assume that the tanker orbits (an image of a tanker orbit can be seen here) were some distance South of the Iraqi border during initial combat operations at least.


They later moved further North as the threat declined later on.


This would place the tanker orbits perhaps about 350 nautical miles North of Al Udeid initially,distances increasing later in the conflict.


An A330 tanker can deliver 60 tonnes of fuel at 500 nautical miles from base with 5 hours on station.


At shorter ranges it can offload far more fuel than that.

The average of 277 tonnes offloaded per day by the Royal Air Force Tristars and VC10s could probably be delivered by about 4 daily A330 tanker sorties.


Assuming the A330 generates the same sortie rates as the Tristars and VC10s managed,we would probably require only 4 A330 tanker aircraft to generate the offload capacity delivered by 12 tanker aircraft in 2003.


Assuming 80% availability of the A330 fleet,we would require a fleet of just 5 A330s to satisfy peak tanker demand during major war fighting operations.


If we were to exclude the 40% of the British tanker capacity which was not offloaded to British aircraft in 2003,the requirement would be for about 2.5 A330 tanker sorties per day.


This could be provided by a total fleet of just 3 A330 tankers.


As we said earlier,future tanker demand is likely to be far lower than it was in 2003,with longer ranged aircraft like F35C replacing the short ranged Harrier and new aircraft carriers usually allowing them to be based closer to the combat area.


Buying tanker conversion kits for A400Ms and F35Cs would reduce demand for dedicated tanker aircraft still further.


Even allowing for aircraft undergoing maintenance,and on transport tasks,there appears to be no need for more than half the 14 A330 tankers which will be provided under the F.S.T.A. contract.