How To Tell If You Are A British General: Part Ten

  

 

Picture: L.A. (Phot.) Rhys O'Leary,Crown Copyright

 

You saw the American way of war fail in Korea and Vietnam,but you thought it might work in Afghanistan and Iraq.

 

F35C Versus F35B Combat Radii Applied To Historic Air Wars

The United Kingdom is currently committed to buying the F35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter for the Royal Air Force and Royal Naval Air Service.

This gives British forces four options for applying  air power in future wars:F35B from land bases;F35B from sea bases (aircraft carriers);F35C from land bases or F35C from sea bases.

We can examine the implications of these options by applying the combat radii of these aircraft types to base locations used in the seven major air wars in which the United Kingdom has participated in the 65 years since 1945.

In the following illustrations red flames indicate the area which is the main focus of combat operations.

A navy blue anchor indicates an aircraft carrier.

A light blue aeroplane indicates an air base on land.

A navy blue circle indicates the unrefueled combat radius of a sea based F35.

A red circle indicates the unrefueled combat radius of a land based F35.

Solid arrows indicate which radius is centred on each base.

Dashed arrows indicate the need for aerial refueling in order to reach the area which is the main focus of combat operations.

Click on each image to see it full size.

The Korean War 1950 to 1953.

The Suez Crisis 1956.

The Falklands War 1982.

The Guf War 1990 to 1991.

The Kosovo Conflict 1999.

The Invasion of Afghanistan 2001.

The Invasion of Iraq 2003.

The closer the operational area is to the centre of the tactical radius the better.

This permits aircraft to generate more sorties,spend more time on station or have more fuel margin for manoeuvre.

Thus allowing combat power to be delivered at a lower cost by a smaller number of combat aircraft.

Beyond the aircraft's tactical radius aerial refueling becomes essential.

Within the tactical radius the need for aerial refueling diminishes if the operational area is closer to the base area.

The cost of aerial refueling is substantial and money spent on tankers is money which cannot be spent on combat assets.

The vertical landing capability of the F35B gives it more basing options within the area of it's tactical radius.

However,the greater tactical radius of the F35C gives it a 60% greater area in which it may find basing options.

For the sea base,greater tactical radius increases the sea area in which the aircraft carrier may conceal itself.

It can be seen from these illustrations that the sea base,the aircraft carrier,is almost always closer to the operational area than the land base.

This permits significant financial savings by allowing substantial reductions in the number of combat aircraft and tanker aircraft required to generate a given level of combat power.

The longer combat radius of the F35C permits a further substantial reduction in the aerial refueling requirement.

This will more than pay for the additional cost of equipping aircraft carriers with catapults and arrestor wires.

The F35C is also said to be considerably cheaper than the F35B,one recent article claimed the F35C cost £15 Million less than the F35B which,if true,would equate to a saving of £945 Million on the 63 aircraft required to field a 36 strong carrier wing.

The F35B has advantages over the F35C in terms of being able to disperse away from airfields known to the enemy and being able to operate from a wider range of ships.

However these advantages come at a high cost both financially and operationally.

The F35B will cost more to buy and will require more expensive aerial refueling support.

In addition,it is less capable than the F35C in terms of range,payload and endurance.

There is an additional advantage which comes from using catapult equipped aircraft carriers as a sea base.

Helicopter based Airborne Early Warning (A.E.W.) aircraft are limited in terms of range,endurance,speed and altitude (and hence radar horizon).

They are incapable of supporting combat aircraft operating far from the sea base.

Consequently they must be supplemented by land based fixed wing A.E.W. aircraft.

These large aircraft operating far from their land bases have a substantial requirement for aerial refueling.

The cost of operating two A.E.W. fleets and providing the additional air tanker support for the land based aircraft is significant.

However,a carrier equipped with catapults would permit both of these fleets to be replaced with a smaller number of carrier capable fixed wing A.E.W. aircraft at a far lower cost.

In conclusion,the sea based F35C appears to be the most cost effective means for the United Kingdom to deliver air power.

Combined with fixed wing carrier capable A.E.W. aircraft,this option may offer cost savings of close to £2,000 Million a year combined with an enhanced ability to deploy air power globally.

These cost savings would derive from the following:

The ability to reduce the combat aircraft fleet from 330 aircraft at present to around 210 aircraft needed to maintain a front line strength of 124 aircraft with no loss of combat power due to the aircraft carrier's higher sortie generating capability.

The replacement of the Future Strategic Tanker Private Finance Initiative with a more economical outright purchase of 6 tanker aircraft with no lack of tanker capacity due to the much reduced aerial refueling demand.

The replacement of 7 Sentry and 13 Seaking A.E.W. aircraft with 10 E2D Hawkeye A.E.W. aircraft.

The Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carriers

The aircraft carrier is the last true capital ship of any navy's surface fleet.


While most of a navy's ships are primarily of use in war at sea,the aircraft carrier is equally powerful in air wars and land wars.


Although the aircraft carrier is the most expensive ship in any surface fleet,it is also the vessel which is most useful most often,and hence most resource effective.


While other ships may have a limited ability to attack land targets,the aircraft carrier can also find targets on land and conduct a sustained land attack campaign.

While other ships may have a limited ability to engage aircraft,in an air battle the aircraft carrier is limited only by the airgroup it can carry.



While other ships may have a limited ability to engage surface ships and submarines,the aircraft carrier can detect and engage those targets from hundreds of miles away.



In addition to it's more common air attack role,the aircraft carrier has been used extensively,especially by the Royal Navy,in the air assault role.

Indeed,the aircraft carrier in it's air assault or "Commando carrier" role is the only ship which can conduct an amphibious assault without exposing it's self to land based threats.



The aircraft carrier's large internal volume allows it to carry extensive medical facilities,it is the ideal "primary casualty reception ship",particularly during air assault operations.



The flexible nature of a large aircraft carrier allows it to economically replace a larger number of smaller,single role ships.



Most importantly,the large aircraft carrier is the most cost effective means of deploying expeditionary air power.



The cost savings inherent in using carrier aviation can exceed the cost of buying and operating an aircraft carrier by a factor of ten.



Whilst the aircraft carrier is essential to naval operations,it is these cost savings which make carrier aviation essential to air and land warfare.



A small number of large multirole air attack/air assault ships provides a highly capable and flexible core to a surface fleet.



For the British Royal Navy,four purpose designed large multirole aircraft carriers could replace Her Majesty's Ships:Invincible,Illustrious,Ark Royal,Ocean,Albion,Bulwark and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Argus.



Such a fleet would result in a robust and cost effective ability to conduct the whole spectrum of combat operations.



However,instead of designing a large multirole aircraft carrier the Royal Navy is currently procuring the much smaller Queen Elizabeth class.



While the Queen Elizabeth class has a secondary role as a "Commando carrier" it does not have sufficient capacity to replace the Royal Navy's three current assault ships.



Equally,the small air wing of the Queen Elizabeth class limits the cost savings which it can achieve in the application of expeditionary air power.



The current plan to purchase the vertical landing F35B for the Royal Navy's carrier wing will result in an air wing which is very limited in capability.



The F35B is less capable than the cheaper conventional landing F35C.



Fixed wing Airborne Early Warning (A.E.W.) and other support aircraft cannot operate from the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers unless the ships are configured for catapult operation.



The rotary wing alternatives are much less capable and are not able to support air combat operations far from the carrier.



This lack of fixed wing capability creates a dependence on expensive land based support aircraft and bases.



The current plan to build the Queen Elizabeth class as vertical landing carriers will result in higher overall costs,greater risk and lower return on investment.



The Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers also suffer from a number of deficiencies in their design.



Many of the negative features of the Queen Elizabeth class appear to be taken directly from the troubled French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle.



Both ships are too slow,too small and have inefficient deck layouts.



The flight deck layout of the two ships is identical apart from the second island on the conventionally powered Queen Elizabeth class.



Problems inherent in the deck layout of the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier when configured for catapults and arrestor wires are as follows:



1.The foremost island precludes mounting the forward catapult along the starboard side deck edge.



It also occupies high value/high utility deck space with access to catapults,aircraft lifts and the landing area.

The utility of flight deck areas adjacent to the foremost island is degraded by their small size,awkward shape and proximity to the superstructure.



The turbulent wake from the forward island affects both deck operations and flying operations as aircraft must pass behind the island as they approach to land on the carrier.



Corrosive exhaust gasses from the forward uptake also have negative effects on both deck and flying operations.



2.The starboard catapult cannot be used or prepared for use without interfering with the operation of both the landing area and the port catapult.



This problem can also been seen in this picture of HMS Hermes.



3.The Aft island occupies high value/high utility deck space with access to catapults,aircraft elevators and the landing area.



The utility of flight deck areas adjacent to the aft island is degraded by their small size,awkward shape and proximity to the superstructure.

The turbulent wake from the aft island affects both deck operations and flying operations as aircraft must pass behind the island as they approach to land on the carrier.

Corrosive exhaust gasses from the aft uptake also have negative effects on both deck and flying operations.



4.The port catapult cannot be used without interfering with the operation of both the landing area and the starboard catapult.



5.The proximity of the aft aircraft lift to the arrestor wires and landing area precludes aircraft movements from the starboard aftermost parking area,"Fly 3", when the aft lift is being used during landing operations.



6.The port aftermost parking area,"Fly 4",has very low utility/low value as during landing operations it is isolated from the aircraft lifts and other aircraft arming,fuelling and handling areas whilst the catapult it services cannot be used or prepared for use.



Note the way the landing area cuts the flightdeck in two on the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle.

Solutions to these problems shown on the "Improved Queen Elizabeth class" are as follows:

A.Mounting the starboard catapult along the deck edge allows the catapult to be used or prepared for use without interfering with the operation of either the landing area or the port catapult.



This also minimises the deck area swept by aircraft launching from the catapult and hence increases the parking space available in the forward,"Fly 1",parking area during single catapult operations whilst permitting unrestricted access to the main aircraft arming,fuelling and handling areas and aircraft lifts.



B.Mounting the port catapult forward,parallel to the starboard catapult and the landing area and with adequate separation from them,allows it to be used or prepared for use without interfering with the operation of either the landing area or the starboard catapult.

This large and regularly shaped,"Fly 1",parking area supports the starboard catapult during single catapult operations whilst also having unrestricted access to the main aircraft arming,fuelling and handling areas and aircraft lifts.

With both catapults and the landing area in parallel,all can be pointing into the wind at the same time.



Mounting both catapults alongside eachother on the fore deck allows this deck to be inclined up towards the bows.

This increases the safety and performance of the catapults whilst also permitting aircraft launches when the ship is pitching heavily.

In addition,the resulting higher bows will help to keep the deck dry in heavy weather.

The angle of incline of the foredeck must be sufficiently modest to permit this area to be used for aircraft parking.

C.The main aircraft arming,fuelling and handling area,"Fly 2",is large and unobstructed with unrestricted access to both catapults,both aircraft lifts and the landing area.

The future American aircraft carrier CVN 78 uses this layout.

D.The small and awkwardly shaped forward part of the port aft parking area,"Fly 4",can be used as a parking area for flightdeck tractors,cranes,fire tenders and other equipment which does not need to regularly cross the landing area.

Using low utility/low value deck space for low value purposes frees up high utility/high value deck space for high value uses.

E.Locating the island to port,aft of the landing area in "Fly 4",utilises low utility/low value deck space and hence frees up high utility/high value deckspace elsewhere.

A small narrow island takes up less deckspace and creates less air turbulence in it's wake.

Aircraft approaching to land from starboard do not have to fly through the turbulent wake and corrosive exhaust of an island on the port side whilst locating the island well aft also reduces the effects of turbulence and exhaust gasses on deck operations.

F.Moving the aft aircraft elevator further aft reduces the size of the isolated,limited utility "Fly 3" parking area whilst increasing the size of the high utility/high value "Fly 2" aircraft arming,fuelling and handling area.

G.The now smaller and still isolated,low utility/low value "Fly 4" area aft of the island allows helicopter operations to take place without interfering with fixed wing flying operations.

This area can also be used to park aircraft and equipment which would not routinely need to cross the landing area.

Carrying their heavy,armoured strength deck at hangar deck level,American aircraft carriers traditionally had narrow hangar decks but wide lightly built flight decks supported by sponsons,modern American carriers continue this trend even with their strength deck now at flight deck level.

With their heavy,armoured strength deck at flightdeck level,British carriers had narrower flight decks but hulls which flared out above the waterline to give a wide hangar deck.

The French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle has an American style narrow,vertical hull with wide sponsons. 

With no armoured decks,the Queen Elizabeth class could have had the advantages of both designs but instead they have an American style narrow hangar deck just like Charles de Gaulle.

The new Italian aircraft carrier Cavour has a British style flared hull,giving greater hull volume at the hanger deck level.

 

The main engines on the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers are,unusually,at hangar deck level.



This reduces the weight and internal volume required for ducting engine intake and exhaust gases,it also simplifies ship design.

The light weight of the gas turbines combined with the integrated full electric propulsion system permits the use of this unusual arrangement.

However,this location exposes the engines to increased risk of battle damage.

To mitigate this risk it is necessary to ensure a high degree of separation between the two engines.



On the Queen Elizabeth class the engines are located fore and aft of the forward aircraft elevator on the starboard side.

 This in turn results in the need for each engine to have it's own seperate uptake for exhaust gasses as the position of the aircraft elevator precludes ducting both engines to a single uptake.

Such an arrangement takes up a substantial area of high utility/high value deck space and reduces the utility of nearby open deck space whilst also afflicting flying and deck operations with the effects of air turbulence and exhaust gasses in the wake of the islands.

The designers of the Queen Elizabeth class claim to have made a virtue of this necessity by constructing two islands around these two uptakes.



However the advantage of having two islands is questionable at best.



Relocating the engines to the port side,allows an exhaust duct to be run below the outer edge of the flight deck,connecting multiple engines to a single uptake.



This arrangement takes up little usable volume.



Engines can intake air locally and laterally,it is only the exhaust gasses which need to go through the uptake duct.



Two of the biggest problems with the Queen Elizabeth class are the low speed and small size of these ships.



Ship speed is a critical factor in aircraft carrier operations as it allows the ship to generate "wind over deck",this being the sum of wind speed and ship speed.



As fixed wing aircraft must land and take off at a particular air speed,the relative speed between the aircraft and the ship is equal to airspeed minus speed of the "wind over deck".



Thus the higher the speed of the ship,the lower the relative speed between the ship and the aircraft on landing and takeoff.



Reducing this relative speed has two advantages.



Firstly it makes take offs and landings easier for the pilot as things happen more slowly.



Secondly it reduces the amount of energy which must be transferred from the aircraft on landing or given to the aircraft on takeoff.



As kinetic energy is proportional to the square of velocity,small reductions in relative speed result in large reductions in kinetic energy.



Reducing this energy transfer reduces demands on catapults,arrestor wires and airframes on a conventional aircraft carrier.



It is also very important in conducting flying operations by other means which do not involve catapults or arrestor wires.



Ship speed and flightdeck height are also critical safety factors in helicopter operations.



High ship speed also gives the aircraft carrier greater strategic mobility,allowing it to get to the operational area more quickly.



Tactically,speed is important with regards to the submarine threat.



Submerged conventional submarines have limited speed and endurance and can be outrun by most surface ships.



However,some nuclear powered boats are allegedly capable of very high speeds.



Some Russian submarines are credited with "quiet speeds" of 28 knots and maximum speeds of 35 knots.



An aircraft carrier which cannot match such speeds is vulnerable to being hunted by nuclear submarines.




Historically most aircraft carriers have made speeds in excess of 30 knots,with some making close to 35 knots.



As speed increases,so does the need for power to generate that speed and the need for fuel to generate power.



For a given size of ship,increased volume and weight dedicated to ship's fuel and power means less volume and weight for other things such as ammunition and aviation fuel.



Hence there are design incentives to restrain ship speed just as there are incentives to increase ship speed.



The question is at what speeds do these conflicts balance out?



Historically,most large aircraft carriers have been capable of speeds of 32-35 knots.



The Queen Elizabeth class are said to be capable of 25-28 knots.



These speeds are well below what is generally regarded as practical.



A longer hull is more hydrodynamic and requires less power to generate a given speed or generates a greater speed for a given power.



A longer ship also offers more deck space,internal volume and payload,all of which are of great benefit to aircraft carrier operations.



Increased flight deck length is of particular benefit to flying operations.



On a conventionally equipped ship,increasing flight deck length also increases the flightdeck width available for catapults ahead of the angled landing area.



Additional length is also of great benefit for ships which utilise rolling landings and/or rolling take offs.



A longer ship will pitch less in a given sea state.



As angle of pitch is a limiting factor on flying operations,so the longer ship will permit flying in worse weather conditions.

The modular nature of the Queen Elizabeth class makes it a simple matter to increase the ship's length by adding a hull plug at an early stage in the build.

A 30 metre hull plug would add enough space for a third gas turbine and the fuel it requires.

It would also increase hangar space sufficiently to accomodate 6 additional fighter aircraft while adding enough deck space for an additional 12 aircraft in the deck park.

With space for an airgroup of 58 aircraft the ship will be able to carry a full range of large support aircraft and a larger fighter wing.

The increase in hull length combined with the power of a third turbine will increase ship speed to around 30 knots.

It would be neccessary to make changes to the propulsion (screws,shafts and motors) to match the increased power output but again such changes are easily accommodated at this very early stage in the ship's build.

One of the main rasons for a nation to buy an aircraft carrier is it's cost effectiveness when compared to land based aviation.

Aircraft carriers are often located closer to areas of conflict than air bases.

This reduction in the distance between the aircraft's base and it's area of operation (and the great speed with which the sortie generating factory that is an aircraft carrier turns aircraft around between sorties) allows each aircraft to fly more sorties in a day.

If each aircraft flies more daily sorties then fewer aircraft are required.

Similarly,for more persistant sorties,shorter distances translate to longer time on station and hence fewer aircraft required to maintain round the clock coverage.

Carrier based aircraft also require less aerial refueling support.

In the major air wars which the United Kingdom has been involved in since 1945,carrier based aircraft have typically generated double the sortie rates of their land based counterparts.

For example,during the six week long air war over the Falkland Islands,carrier based fixed wing aircraft flew 1561 sorties while land based bombers completed just 5 tactical sorties.

Doubling the aircraft's sortie rate would halve the number of aircraft required to generate a given effect on the enemy.

Thus a carrier wing of 48 aircraft could do the same job as 96 land based aircraft.

However,this does not represent a saving of just 48 aircraft.

For every 4 aircraft with British Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) frontline squadrons there is typically 1 aircraft with an Operational Conversion Unit (O.C.U.) being used to train pilots on that aircraft type and a further 2 aircraft as attrition and maintenance reserves in what is known as the "depth fleet".

Fielding a wing of 48 frontline fighters then requires approximately 84 aircraft.

Thus if a carrier wing of 48 aircraft does the job of 96 land based aircraft we may reduce the size of our fighter aircraft fleet by 84 aircraft in total and still generate the same effect on target.

The operating costs of the Royal Navy's expected future carrier aircraft,the F35 Lightning II,are not known at present.

However,a Typhoon fighter of the R.A.F. costs £90,000 an hour to operate,including capital costs.

These aircraft are currently flying 30 hours a month or 360 hours a year.

That equates to a cost of £32,400,000 per aircraft per year in capital and operating costs.

This figure may not be representative of the cost of the Typhoon when the whole fleet is in service but it is the most recent published figure as of late 2009.

The Royal Air Force spends approximately £11,000,000 a year for every aircraft in it's fast jet fleet.

The annual cost of a Tornado bomber has been stated as £10,400,000.

As the costs of the Typhoon may not be representative of the type when it fully enters service,I will henceforth use the figure of £11,000,000 a year as the cost of a typical combat aircraft.

Based on these figures,if we could reduce the size of our combat aircraft fleet by 84 aircraft we would save £924,000,000 a year.

The annualised whole lifecycle cost of the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers is likely to be a little over £100,000,000 a year.

Thus the aircraft carrier permits a net annual saving of £824,000,000.

Clearly the annual savings generated by the aircraft carrier are immense.

It is noteworthy that the size of the airgroup dictates the size of this financial saving.

An air wing of just 36 fighters would typically generate the same workrate as 72 land based fighters.

This would allow us to cut the size of our air fleet by 36 frontline aircraft and 63 aircraft in total,again based on current ratios of frontline aircraft to training aircraft and the depth fleet.

At £11,000,000 per combat aircraft per year that equates to a saving of £693,000,000 a year for 63 fewer aircraft.

Which is £231,000,000 less than we could save with a 48 strong carrier airwing.

In other words the larger our aircraft carriers and the bigger their air wings the more money we save.

Also,whether an aircraft carrier has 40 aircraft aboard or 80,it still requires the same number of escorts to defend it and the same number of replenishment vessels to supply it.

But the ship with 60 aircraft may generate twice as many sorties as the ship with 30 aircraft.

Thus the cost per sortie "overhead" of the aircraft carrier and it's escorts is usually lower for the larger aircraft carrier than for the smaller ship.

The size of an aircraft carrier's airgroup then is a major factor dictating the efficiency with which the ship can generate sorties.

The greatest financial benefits come from the aircraft carrier with the largest practical air wing.

There are clearly significant financial savings to be had from increasing the size of the Queen Elizabeth class carriers so they can carry more aircraft.

The costs of buying aircraft carriers,let alone the cost of increasing their size,is inconsequential when compared to the massive cost savings they generate.

In summary,although the current Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier design suffers from a small airgroup,inefficient deck layout and slow speed,all of these problems can be easily rectified at an early stage in the build process.

With a 30 metre hull plug,a third gas turbine,a single island located to port and a revised deck layout with catapults and arrestor wires these ships will be more cost effective and more combat effective.

The cost of such modifications is repaid many times over by the additional savings which they permit.