An Independent Navy For An Independent Nation: Palma,Mozambique,Twenty-fourth of March,Twenty Twenty-one

 

On the Twenty-fourth of March,Twenty Twenty-one,insurgents of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant attacked the town of Palma in Mozambique killing civilians,includings citizens of the United Kingdom,herein we shall consider how the proposed Independent Navy For An Independent Nation might have responded to this event.

 

The town of Palma shall lie within the area of responsibility of the East Indies squadron,which shall be commanded by a commodore (who shall also be in administrative command of the Fourth Mining Squadron) who shall answer to the eastern patrolling division commander,a rear admiral (who shall also be the administrative commander of the Third Fisheries Protection Division).

 

The rear admiral in turn shall answer to the vice admiral commanding the away flotilla (who shall also be the administrative commander of the First Frigate Flotilla),who shall be subordinate to the full admiral in administrative and operational command of the active Second Fleet.

 

The East Indies patrolling squadron shall normally have a patrolling brig,a mining sloop and a destroying frigate at it's disposal which it shall commit to Combined Task Forces 151,150 and 152 as required.

 

The Persian Gulf shall lie within the area of responsibility of the East Indies squadron,however,for the last thirty years one of the four battle divisions shall have been operating in this area continually and,in this case,the Third Battle Division's operational commander,a rear admiral (who shall also be the administrative commander of the Flying Division) shall have been appointed Commander In Chief Persian Gulf,flying his flag in the Second Fleet's flagship Her Majesty's Ship Africa,alongside the full admiral commanding the fleet,the major general commanding the First Royal Marines division,the commodore commanding the fleet's air assets and their subordinates.

 

Also aboard Africa shall be her,half sized,peace time air wing of two dozen Furious fighting aircraft,half a dozen Perseus patrolling aircraft and a dozen Hermes helicopters along with fifteen hundred men of the Seventh Royal Marines Light Infantry Battalion Group (a battalion reinforced with divisional assets,including two troops of Royal Marines Artillery),and the flotilla's third echelon medical facilities.

 

Her Majesty's Ship Royal William,the Third Battle Division's replenisher and the other half of Africa's battle squadron,shall carry half of the combat supplies and headquarters and train elements of the fleet's Fifth Royal Marine Battalion Group,the rest of which shall be dispersed as ship detatchments on frigates and other vessels of the Second Fleet.

 

Each of the big Falkland class frigates (Falcon,Fearless,Formidable and Foudroyant of the battle division's destroying squadron and Her Majesty's Frigates Fiji and Furious of the eastern patrolling division) shall carry a troop of forty marines from the Fifth Royal Marine Battalion Group in addition to a flight of two Hermes Helicopters and various jollyboats,pinnaces,launches,lighters and vehicles.

 

Her Majesty's Submarine Courageous shall also be lurking somewhere in the vicinity of the East Indies station.

 

All of these vessels shall be logistically supported by a small Royal Naval Harbour Service squadron at Diego Garcia,one of four regional logistical support areas,the others being Bermuda,Gibraltar and the Falklands,and whilst each base area shall be unique,all may be categorised as either soft,firm or hard depending on their value and the cost of defending them.

 

For example,the proposed east coast base area shall include a wind farm,a biomass power plant,a blast furnace,a steel mill,a ship breaking yard,a ship building yard,refitting docks,a naval dockyard,an armaments depot,a fuel depot,a marine barracks and civilian housing,in an area with secure supply lines and defensive depth,surrounded by multi layered air,surface and submarine defences,all of which shall necessitate and facilitate it's hard defence.

 

On the other hand,the proposed Waterguard anchorage at Ducie shall offer only a small anchorage,little land,no industry,no population,no defensive depth and tenuous supply lines in an area of little strategic value,therefore,it shall be softly defended,permanent facilities being limited to a dredged channel,moorings,dolphins and navigation marks,Her Majesty's Waterguard Cutter Kingfisher (an Albatross class patrolling cutter,that is,an escorting sloop fitted for but not with it's fighting systems) and the Pegasus aircraft based there being supported by the medium sized depoting vessel Fort Detroit carrying thirty thousand long tons of fuel and armed only to repel pirates,smugglers,poachers,sabateurs and terrorists,but able to run away bravely when faced with more substantial threats.

 

Diego Garcia shall fall between these two extremes,with tenuous supply lines,little land and no industry or population but with a large anchorage and air base,in a strategic position,far from potential threats,with enough land to accommodate an army garrison and over the horizon radar systems,therefore,it shall be firmly defended by an infantry company,artillery battery and a flight of Royal Flying Corps' Furious aircraft.

 

Her Majesty's Ship Polyphemus,a large Antaeus class Royal Naval Harbour Service depoting vessel,shall deploy to Diego Garcia for a year at a time carrying three hundred thousand long tons of fuel and thousands of tons of ordnance and dry stores with a pair Royal Naval Harbour Service Aidful class tug boats and an eighty foot Albacore class patrolling launch on her deck and aircraft in her hangar along with the requisite command,logistic,medical,maintenance and hotel facilities,and supplies for the army garrison.

 

Civil Waterguard assets protecting the British Indian Ocean Territory from pirates,smugglers,polluters and invaders shall include a brace of Pegasii,Her Majesty's Waterguard Launch Flying Fish (of the Albacore class),Her Majesty's Waterguard Cutter Cormorant (of the Albatross class) and Her Majesty's Rescue Tug Rambler (of the Racer class),all supported by the giant Polyphemus.

 

Potential reinforcements for the East Indies station shall include naval vessels drawn off the Third Battle Division or the neighbouring Pacific,South Atlantic and Mediterranean stations and,from the United Kingdom,two battle divisions from the fleet's ready and standby groups and the ready brigade from the British Army's Light Infantry Division.

 

Diplomatic,signals,satellite,human and open source strategic intelligence shall be used to keep deployed commanders informed of events in their areas of responsibility and based on this intelligence the fleet,flotilla,division and squadron commanders shall be engaged in a continuous process of evaluating potential contingencies,planning potential responses and training to execute those plans such that they may have a relevant plan in place to modify as required when actual events occur.

 

It shall be reasonable for the East Indies squadron's commander to assume that his mining sloop shall be most useful in the Gulf of Oman,Gulf of Aden,Red Sea or Straits of Malacca,that his destroying frigate shall most likely be required anywhere from the Gulf of Oman to the Mozambique Channel and that his patrolling vessel,Her Majesty's Brig Folkestone,shall be best used to cover the rest of his vast area of responsibility but that he shall need another frigate for high noon at Whitsun Reef.

 

It shall be reasonable for the eastern patrolling division's commander to assume that Her Majesty's Frigate Fiji from the quiet Pacific station might be of more use to the East Indies squadron in the South China Sea. 

 

It shall be reasonable for the Third Battle Division's commander to assume that he shall be unable to disengage from combat operations in the Persian Gulf as his Furious aircraft shall likely be needed for bombing targets around Erbil but that his replenishing vessel,marines and some of his patrolling aircraft and destroying frigates may be released for use elsewhere if necessary (the large bunkers and magazines of the Africa class shall allow them to operate for long periods without replenishment) and that a flight of Hermes helicopters shall therefore be cross decked from Her Majesty's Ship Africa to Royal William.

 

It shall also be reasonable for the away flotilla commander to assume that two troops of his battle division's marines and two flights of it's Hermes helicopters may be of more use to the East Indies squadron whose mining sloop and patrolling brig shall have the spare capacity to accommodate them.

 

Thus on the Twenty-fourth of March,Twenty Twenty-one,the stage is set.

 

Rationalising The Helicopter Fleet

Photo: Sgt. Andy Malthouse Royal Air Force Crown Copyright

There is no shortage of funding at the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence,and there never has been,the department's frequent financial crises,including the current one,are the result of incompetence induced waste,the United Kingdom's military and naval helicopter fleet being an excellent example.



Picture: L.A. (Phot.) Angie Pearce,Crown Copyright

A lack of rotary winged capability has been a significant problem for the United Kingdom's armed forces on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and arguably contributed to the British Army's defeats there.



Picture: Corporal Rupert Frere,Crown Copyright

Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe had warned the Ministry of Defence that a lack of helicopters was putting the lives of his troops at risk before his own death in Helmand province,Afghanistan.



Picture: C.P.O.A. (Phot.) Preece,Crown Copyright

Yet there was never a shortage of helicopters (at the time there were five hundred and twenty-four in service),but a shortage of the right kind of helicopters in the right place at the right time,which is not the same thing.

Picture: L.A. (Phot.) Angie Pearce,Crown Copyright

In Two Thousand and Six,Joint Helicopter Command provided Lord Drayson with advice on the numbers of helicopters available to Operation Telic: four Lynx Mark Seven from a Joint Helicopter Command total fleet of ninety-five;eight Sea King Mark Four from a Joint Helicopter Command total fleet of thirty-seven;and seven Merlin Mark Three from a Joint Helicopter Command total fleet of twenty-two.



Picture: L.A. (Phot) Paul A'Barrow,Crown Copyright

Indeed,in the three-quarters of a century that the United Kingdom's armed forces have operated helicopters,there has never been an occasion on which more than a fraction of the helicopter fleet has been deployed on operations.



Photo: L.A. (Phot.) Trotter Crown Copyright

It has been said that amateurs talk tactics but experts talk logistics,with respect to aircraft fleets,amateurs talk procurement costs but experts talk capability costs.

Photo: P.O. (Phot.) Mez Merrill Crown Copyright

A significant proportion of the cost of delivering rotary winged capability is the wages of aviators and aircraft maintainers,who would much rather talk about procurement costs.



Picture: Richie Willis,Crown Copyright

In recent years the Ministry of Defence has adopted a policy of reducing procurement costs by purchasing "off the shelf" helicopters,even though there are no "off the shelf" helicopters which are well suited to British military and naval requirements.



Picture: L.H. Kyle Heller,Crown Copyright

Theoretical savings which result from buying "off the shelf" helicopters,such as the Chinook and Apache,are a small proportion of the helicopter fleet's procurement cost and the helicopter fleet's procurement cost is a small proportion of the helicopter fleet's life cycle cost.



Picture: P.O.A. (Phot.) Mez Merrill,Crown Copyright

This is because the cost of operating a military or naval aircraft is many times greater than the cost of buying it.

Photo: S.A.C. Neil Chapman Royal Air Force Crown Copyright

For example,the Royal Air Force Merlin Mark Three fleet,since transferred to the Royal Marines,had a unit acquisition cost of nineteen million pounds.



Picture: Corporal Ian Forsyth,Royal Logistics Corps,Crown Copyright

However,with a flying hour costing thirty-four thousand pounds,in Two Thousand and Seven,and an average airframe life of less than it's ten thousand hour designed life (due to attrition) the total life cycle cost per Merlin is likely to be somewhat less than three hundred and forty million pounds.



Picture: P.O. (Phot.) Mez Merrill,Crown Copyright

It should be noted that the cost per flying hour most often quoted by the Ministry of Defence includes depreciation of development,procurement and other capital costs averaged across the flying hours generated by the aircraft fleet in addition to direct operating costs such as fuel and replacement parts,thus annualised cost and annual expenditure are not the same thing.

Picture: P.O. (Phot.) Russel-Stevenson,Crown Copyright

Had the Merlin fleet been larger these costs would have been spread more thinly over a larger number of flying hours,thereby reducing the cost per flying hour by thousands of pounds.



Picture: L.A. (Phot.) Steve Johncock,Crown Copyright

For example,for a fleet of around two hundred and forty of our proposed Hermes (Ultra Merlin) helicopters (one hundred and eight for the British Army,forty-eight for the Royal Marines,forty-eight for the Royal Navy and an additional thirty-six Royal Navy aircraft for charter to other government departments in peace time) with air frame lives of ten thousand hours per helicopter,every thousand million pounds spent on development shall add only about four hundred and seventeen pounds to the aircraft's cost per flying hour.



Picture: S.A.C. Tommy Axford,Crown Copyright

But that same one thousand million pounds spread over the ten thousand hour air frame lives of just forty-four Royal Navy and twenty-two Royal Air Force Merlins shall add fifteen hundred and fifteen pounds to the cost of each flying hour.

Photo: Peter Davies Ministry of Defence Crown Copyright

The single most important factor in the cost of a helicopter fleet is the number of front line helicopter crews,each helicopter crew must fly at least one hundred and eighty hours per year to maintain their skills,whether they are deployed on operations or not.



Picture: Ian Forshaw,Crown Copyright

Many more hours must be flown to train new air crews and instructors,the more front line air crews there are,the more trainee air crews and instructors there must be,each of those flying hours costs tens of thousands of pounds.



Photo: Sgt. Si Longworth R.L.C. (Phot.) Crown Copyright

In the Two Thousand and Seven to Two Thousand and Eight financial year the British Army Lynx helicopter fleet flew seventeen thousand nine hundred and fourteen hours,costing more than four hundred and twelve million pounds at a rate of twenty-three thousand pounds per hour.

Photo: Cpl. Tim Laurence Crown Copyright

In the Two Thousand and Seven to Two Thousand and Eight financial year the Royal Air Force Chinook helicopter fleet flew thirteen thousand three hundred and sixty-six hours,costing more than three hundred and twenty million pounds at a rate of  twenty-four thousand pounds per hour.



Photo: S.A.C. James Stier Royal Air Force Crown Copyright

In the Two Thousand and Seven to Two Thousand and Eight financial year the Royal Air Force Merlin helicopter fleet flew five thousand four hundred and seventy-nine hours,costing more than one hundred and eighty-six million pounds at a rate of thirty-four thousand pounds per hour.

Photo: L.A. (Phot) Pete Smith Crown Copyright

In the Two Thousand and Seven to Two Thousand and Eight financial year the Royal Navy Merlin helicopter fleet flew six thousand seven hundred and thirty-seven hours,costing more than two hundred and eighty-two million pounds at a rate of forty-two thousand pounds per hour.



Photo: Harland Quarrington Crown Copyright

In the Two Thousand and Seven to Two Thousand and Eight financial year the Royal Navy Lynx helicopter fleet flew eleven thousand seven hundred and ten hours,costing more than two hundred and twenty-two million pounds at a rate of nineteen thousand pounds per hour.



Photo: P.O.A. (Phot.) Mez Merrill Crown Copyright

The Ministry of Defence pays for "peace time budgeted flying hours" but additional hours flown on operations are paid for by the Treasury and therefore of little relevance to the defence budget.



Photo: L.A. (Phot.) Stuart Hill Crown Copyright

One way to reduce the number of annual peace time budgeted flying hours consumed by the helicopter fleet is to change the air crew's uniforms.



Picture: Unknown photographer,Crown Copyright

The British armed forces operate,or are supposed to operate,within the constraints of "Harmony Guidelines" which limit the amount of time for which helicopter squadrons may be deployed (these have been standardised on a thirty-six month reporting period since the following was published).

Photo: Peter Davies (M.o.D.) Photographer Crown Copyright

"Army harmony guidelines are that individuals should not exceed 415 days of separated service in any period of 30 months.".



Picture: Peter Davies,Crown Copyright

 "At unit level,tour intervals (a tour being 6 months) should be no less than 24 months.".



Picture: P.O.A. (Phot.) Mez Merrill,Crown Copyright

Thus Army Air Corps helicopter squadrons may spend no more than twenty percent of their time deployed on operations without exceeding their harmony guidelines.

Photo: P.O.A. (Phot.) Tony Leather Crown Copyright

"Harmony Guidelines for the RAF are based on formed unit tour intervals rather than individual personnel,whereby formed units,or sub-elements within them should spend four months on deployed operations followed by 16 months at base."

Picture: S.A.C. Phil Cooke,Crown Copyright

"The RAF Individual Separated Service assumption is that an individual should spend no more than 140 days of duty detached away from home in a rolling 12-month period."

Picture: Sergeant Ray Cooper,Royal Air Force,Crown Copyright

Thus Royal Air Force helicopter squadrons may spend no more than twenty percent of their time deployed on operations without exceeding their harmony guidelines.

Photo: L. (Phot.) Alex Knott Crown Copyright

"Royal Navy harmony guidelines are that no individual should exceed 660 days of separated service in a three-year rolling period."

Picture: L.A. (Phot.) Jennifer Lodge,Crown Copyright

"Over a similar time span, ships or other units should not be deployed for more than 60 per cent. of their time."



Picture: L.A. (Phot.) Angie Pearce,Crown Copyright

Thus Royal Navy and Royal Marines helicopter squadrons may spend no more than sixty percent of their time deployed on operations without exceeding their harmony guidelines.

Photo: S.A.C. Andrew Seaward Crown Copyright

Therefore for every three front line British Army or Royal Air Force helicopter crews continuously deployed on operations there should be twelve more at home,each consuming one hundred and eighty flying hours per year to maintain their skills.



Picture: P.O.A. (Phot.) Hamish Burke,Crown Copyright

This means that in order to maintain the ability to continuously deploy three British Army or Royal Air Force helicopter crews on operations,in peace time the Ministry of Defence must pay for two thousand and seven hundred peace time budgeted flying hours annually (not counting hours flown by training and trials squadrons).

Photo: Cpl. Rob Knight Crown Copyright

In Two Thousand and Seven it cost twenty-four thousand pounds to fly a Royal Air Force Chinook for an hour,at which rate it would cost sixty-four million and eight hundred thousand pounds per year to generate two thousand and seven hundred peace time budgeted flying hours.

Picture: P.O.A. (Phot) Ray Jones,Crown Copyright

In Two Thousand and Seven it cost forty-six thousand pounds to fly an Army Air Corps Apache for an hour,at which rate it would cost one hundred and twenty-four million and two hundred thousand pounds per year to generate two thousand and seven hundred peace time budgeted flying hours.

Photo: P.O.A. (Phot.) Mez Merrill Crown Copyright

For every three front line Royal Navy or Royal Marine helicopter crews continuously deployed on operations there should be two more at home,each consuming one hundred and eighty flying hours per year to maintain their skills.

Picture: P.O. (Phot.) Des Wade,Crown Copyright

This means that in order to maintain the ability to continuously deploy three Royal Navy or Royal Marine helicopter crews on operations,in peace time the Ministry of Defence must pay for nine hundred peace time budgeted flying hours annually (not counting hours flown by training and trials squadrons).

Photo: P.O. (Phot.) Si Ethell Crown Copyright

In Two Thousand and Seven it cost thirty-four thousand pounds to fly a Royal Air Force Merlin (now flown by the Royal Marines) for an hour,at which rate it would cost thirty million and six hundred thousand pounds per year to generate nine hundred peace time budgeted flying hours.

Photo: P.O. (Phot.) Si Ethell Crown Copyright

Thus the peace time cost of maintaining the ability to keep three Royal Marine Merlin crews deployed continuously is less than half the cost of maintaining the ability to keep three Royal Air Force Chinook crews deployed continuously,even though the hourly cost of flying a Merlin is forty percent higher than the hourly cost of flying a Chinook.



Picture: S.A.C. Nicholas Egan,Royal Air Force,Crown Copyright

One can imagine a senior decision maker at the Ministry of Defence looking at the hourly cost of the Merlin and Chinook helicopters and concluding that a fleet of Chinooks would cost less,but as we can see,that is not the case.



Picture: P.O.A. (Phot.) Mez Merrill,Crown Copyright

Another way to reduce the number of annual peace time budgeted flying hours consumed by the helicopter fleet is to procure helicopters which may perform many roles.

Photo: P.O.A. (Phot.) Ray Jones Crown Copyright

An attack helicopter like the Apache is of no use when there is a need to hunt submarines.

Photo: Cpl Lee Goddard Crown Copyright

A transport helicopter like the Chinook is of no use when there is a need to reconnoitre.

Photo: P.O.A. (Phot.) Paul A'Barrow Crown Copyright

An anti-submarine helicopter like the Merlin is of no use when there is a need to destroy armoured vehicles.

Photo: Peter Davies,Crown Copyright

A reconnaissance helicopter like the Wildcat is of no use when there is a need to transport artillery.



Picture: Graeme Main,Crown Copyright

When there is a need to deploy helicopters,it is unlikely that the mixture of capabilities in any fleet of specialised helicopters would be in proportion to the operational demand for rotary wing capability.

Picture: Grand Logistics

It is also unlikely that the demand in theatre for any given capability at any given time shall be in proportion to the mixture of capabilities of the helicopters deployed there.



Picture: Sergeant Wes Calder,Royal Logistics Corps,Crown Copyright

Therefore,in order to deliver the same operational capability,a fleet of specialised helicopters must be larger than a fleet of multirole helicopters in order to deploy more aircraft on operations to compensate for peaks in demand for the capabilities of each type of specialised helicopter.



Photo: Richie Willis Crown Copyright

When a specialised helicopter fleet is not deployed on operations,because it's narrow capability is not required,it's air crews still have to fly one hundred and eighty flying hours per year each to maintain their skills and the Ministry of Defence still has to pay for those hours.

Picture: Corporal Rob Travis,Royal Air Force,Crown Copyright

Unfortunately,there are few useful tasks to which the flying hours of undeployed specialised helicopters,such as the Chinook and Apache,may be put.



Photo: Unknown photographer Leonardo photograph

Our proposed Hermes (Ultra Merlin) and Super Merlin helicopters which may perform many different tasks,often at the same time,shall be of use when there is a need to hunt submarines,reconnoitre,destroy armoured vehicles,transport artillery and even shoot down cruise missiles.



Photo: L. Phot. Seeley Crown Copyright

Therefore a front line fleet of multirole helicopters,such as the Hermes,shall have a larger proportion of it's aircraft available to deploy for any necessary task at any given time than a fleet of single role helicopters.



Photo: P.O.A. (Phot.) Mez Merrill Crown Copyright

They shall also be more likely to be suitable to perform whatever role may be required when deployed in theatre.



Picture: Unknown photographer,R.N.A.S. Yeovilton Photographic Section,unknown copyright.

Thus the front line Hermes (Ultra Merlin) or Super Merlin fleet shall be be significantly smaller than the current specialised helicopter fleet whilst delivering the same capability in theatre.



Picture: L.A. (Phot.) Bernie Henesy,Crown Copyright

This smaller front line helicopter fleet shall require fewer front line helicopters and fewer pilots consuming fewer peace time budgeted flying hours each year.



Picture: Peter Davies (MOD) Photographer,Crown Copyright

Further,a rotary wing fleet made up of a single front line helicopter type shall permit economies of scale in design,manufacture,maintenance,servicing,upgrading and training,allowing both a smaller ratio of total fleet size to forward fleet size and lower costs per flying hour.



Photo: P.O.A. (Phot.) Mez Merrill Crown Copyright

Thus the all Hermes (Ultra Merlin) or Super Merlin fleet shall deliver the same capability as the current mixed fleet of specialised helicopter types at a lower cost,or a greater capability for any given cost.



Photo: L. Phot. Seeley Crown Copyright

Under our proposed naval readiness cycle,in a four year period sailors and marines shall be on leave for three hundred and sixty-five days,away from home non-operationally (trials,training and transiting) for one hundred and twenty-two days,working eight hours per day at their home base for two hundred and forty-three days and deployed or ready to deploy on operations,for not more than seven hundred and thirty-one days.



Photo: L. Phot. Dan Rosenbaum Crown Copyright

This shall allow a Commando Helicopter Force of four front line squadrons,each with twelve Hermes (Ultra Merlin) or Super Merlin helicopters and twelve crews,to continuously deploy two full squadrons providing search and rescue,transport,surveillance and attack capabilities.



Picture: L.A. (Phot.) Dan Hooper,Crown Copyright

The two undeployed squadrons shall generate an average of a dozen peace time budgeted flying hours per day which may be used for training,training support,aid to civil powers and,unlike the Chinook or Apache,coastal submarine hunting,air defence,sea surveillance,search and rescue or ferrying "Fosties" out to warships (thereby eliminating the cost of chartering civilian helicopters).



Picture: L. (Phot.) Kyle Heller,Crown Copyright

In a similar manner,two Royal Navy wings,each of three squadrons of twelve front line pilots and twelve Lightning II combat aircraft,shall be able to continuously keep one full strength wing of thirty-six aircraft deployed at sea,or ready to deploy at short notice,a larger force than the United Kingdom has deployed on operations since the invasion of Iraq sixteen years ago.



Photo: S.A.C. Tim Laurence Crown Copyright

The undeployed wing may keep up to two aircraft on Quick Reaction Alert at their home base and/or perform training support tasks,at an annual cost of around fifteen thousand peace time budgeted flying hours,for both wings,including training and trials squadron flying hours.

Picture: S.A.C. Tim Laurence,Crown Copyright

Aircraft not required by the undeployed wing shall either be used by training and trials squadrons,be returned to the depot for servicing or be held in reserve.



Picture: Sergeant Nik Howe,Crown Copyright

Under Royal Air Force harmony guidelines one hundred and eighty front line pilots would be required to continuously deploy the same thirty-six pilot carrier air wing at an annual cost of around forty thousand peace time budgeted flying hours,including training and trials squadron flying hours.



Photo: Unknown Royal Navy official photographer

Given sufficient notice to bring their readiness cycles in to phase,it shall be possible to deploy all of these naval fighter squadrons at the same time,generating a combat aircraft force larger than the United Kingdom has deployed on any operation since the liberation of Kuwait twenty-nine years ago.



Photo: L.A. (Phot.) Ray Jones Crown Copyright

It is apparent that there is the potential both to reduce the cost of the United Kingdom's military and naval helicopter fleets,by over ten thousand peace time budgeted flying hours and hundreds of millions of pounds per year,and at the same time to increase the fleet's capability.



Picture: Richard Townshend,copyright UK Parliament 2020

A competent Secretary of State for Defence shall have no difficulty identifying the waste in the helicopter fleet and eliminating it.



Picture: Staff Sgt. Reed Knutson,160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne),United States' Army

An incompetent Secretary of State for Defence may perpetuate the waste for decades to come by ordering more single purpose aircraft,such as the Chinook and Apache,and operating them under inefficient British Army or Royal Air Force harmony guidelines.