Italian Frigate Fired On By Missile Off Libya

There are reports that there has been a possible attack on an Italian Frigate off the Libyan coast.

The Italian warship Bersagliere was operating just 12 miles (some sources say 15 miles) from the Libyan coast at the time of the incident.


This is close enough for her 127mm gun to bombard targets ashore.

The missile is reported to have missed the Soldati class frigate Bersagliere by 2,000 metres.

The origins of the missile have been described as unknown which leaves open the possibility that this may have been a "friendly fire" incident (Edit : it has since been confirmed that the missile was fired by Libyan forces).

The Soldati class are small frigates related to the Lupo class.

These ships had an interesting history,having been originally ordered by Iraq they were never delivered due to an arms embargo,an incident demonstrating the importance of security of supply.

Royal Air Force Tornados Bomb Libya From Norfolk

Reports are coming in that Royal Air Force Tornados have launched Storm Shadow missiles against targets in Libya.

The Tornados are said to have made 3,000 mile round trips to launch the missiles against targets in Libya.

If this is true (we await confirmation) it will be the longest British bombing mission since the ineffectual Black Buck bombing raids in the Falklands War of 1982.

The United States Air Force has flown far longer missions in numerous conflicts in recent years,including in Kosovo,Iraq and Afghanistan.

Unlike the Black Buck raids,Storm Shadow attacks are at least likely to have hit their targets.

Applying air power at such long ranges when closer bases are available is an example of grotesque military inefficiency.

War is not about setting records,it is about doing damage to the enemy.

Very long range sorties result in very low sortie rates.

Low sortie rates mean less damage is done to the enemy.

The resources required are out of all proportion to the effect on the enemy.

There is no military advantage to bombing Libya from Norfolk rather than Cyprus or Sicily when closer bases are available.

A 3,000 mile sortie from Norfolk to Libya is likely to have taken at least 6 hours and to have required substantial aerial refuelling support.


Historic trends suggest that these Tornados will generate around 0.6 sorties per aircraft per day.

Time will tell if the Royal Air Force Tornados can match that number.

In contrast a Harrier on an aircraft carrier off the coast of Libya could have flown up to 4 sorties in a single day with no tanker support.

Royal Navy Sea Harriers did just that during the Falklands War.

All at ranges similar to those which they would have faced flying from an aircraft carrier off the coast of Libya.

That is more than 6 times our estimate of what Tornados will manage attacking Libya from Norfolk.

The Defence Secretary should compare these figures with the sortie rates acheived by Tornados during the current operation.

British and American warships have launched 112 cruise missiles against Libya in a single night.

Had Storm Shadow been integrated on to Harrier as was planned,an Invincible class aircraft carrier with 18 Harriers could easily have delivered up to 144 such missiles in a single day with no aerial refuelling.

We will see how many Storm Shadows the Royal Air Force managed to deliver at vast expense with this long range Tornado raid.

British Ballistic Missile Defence

With the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and the ever increasing accuracy of those missiles,ballistic missile defence has emerged as an important capability.

British forces do not yet have an operational anti-ballistic missile capability.

It is worth considering whether they need one.

For the United Kingdom,ballistic missile threats can be broken down into the following categories:

Strategic nuclear missiles;

Theatre range land attack ballistic missiles;

Theatre range ship attack ballistic missiles.

Strategic nuclear missiles are deterred by the United Kingdom's strategic nuclear detterent.

Hence there is little need for a anti-ballistic missile system to protect against strategic threats.

Theatre range land attack ballistic missiles primarily pose a threat to large,high value fixed installations.

Smaller targets are easier to disperse,conceal and protect and generally of lower value and consequently not worth the expenditure of a long range missile.

The most vulnerable of high value installations is the air base.

Aircraft are expensive and difficult to protect,particularly the larger transport and support types.

They also rely on large runways and parking areas which are easy targets for ballistic missiles.

Ballistic missiles are a highly likely,highly cost effective and highly combat effective threat to fixed air bases.

A ballistic missile defence system will be essential if the United Kingdom wishes to use land based aircraft from airfields within 2,000 miles of a ballistic missile armed opponent during major war fighting operations.

However,If the United Kingdom uses aircraft carriers to provide airpower during major warfighting operations it will have no air bases to protect from ballistic missiles.

The second most vulnerable target for conventional ballistic missile attack is a port.

Such facilities are highly congested when an armed force is deploying in to theatre.

Ships are expensive but their cargoes are worth far more,both before and after they have been unloaded.

A ballistic missile attack on a port has a high probability of causing significant material loss and also of disrupting land force operations.

However,a navy which can put an army ashore without the need for a port has little to fear from land attack ballistic missiles.

At present the United Kingdom does not possess the ability to land it's army without port facilities.

It is therefore faced with the choice of acquiring a ballistic missile defence capability or of acquiring the ability to land it's army without a port.

Theatre range ship attack ballistic missiles do not at present pose a threat.

Only China is currently developing such a system and that is not yet operational.

The massive cost of the network needed to make such a system viable dictates that only the wealthiest of nations could attempt to field such a system and even then it would be many years before such systems became operational outside China.

It is highly unlikely that The United Kingdom will have the need to singlehandedly go to war against China within range of Chinese land based missiles.

Consequently there is no need to field a counter to these systems at present,though there may be a need in the long term.

In summary:

There is no need for an anti-ballistic missile system to engage strategic nuclear missiles.

There is a need for an anti-ballistic missile system to protect the ports through which the army must be landed at present.

If landing ships capable delivering the army of over the beach were to enter service then there would be no such requirement.

There is a requirement for an anti-ballistic missile system to protect air bases at present.

If the new Queen Elizabeth class carriers enter service with a full capability air wing then there will be no such requirement.

There is no requirement at present for an anti-ballistic missile system to protect ships at sea.

If such anti-ship systems proliferate in future decades then such a requirement may materialise.

At present the United Kingdom does have a requirement for an anti-ballistic missile system.

It does not however have such a system.

An upgrade of the Type 45 destroyers is the cheapest means of acquiring an anti-ballistic missile system.

However,such an upgrade to the destroyer fleet,including missiles is likely to cost approximately £500 Million.

Given current financial difficulties it is difficult to imagine such funds being found.

It is also questionable whether it is worth while tying up such high value assets in the anti-ballistic missile role when the need for such a system could be negated for decades at least by replacing the current sealift fleet with more flexible ships capable of landing the army over a beach.