Showing posts with label Type 42. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Type 42. Show all posts

Friday, 15 June 2018

The Type 23M Frigate




This post should not be regarded as an endorsement of the Royal Navy's plan to purchase the Type 31 frigates.


Picture: Grand Logistics

It is the position of this blog that the Royal Navy should have replaced it's Type 22 frigates,Type 23 Frigates and Type 42 destroyers with a single class of multirole surface combatants instead of the Type 45 anti-aircraft destroyer,Type 26 anti-submarine frigate and Type 31 "general purpose" frigates.
Had it done so,it would not be in the mess it is in today.


There would have been no need to develop,manufacture and maintain three different surface combatant hulls and three different propulsion,steering and power generation systems.


 
There would have been no need to develop,manufacture and maintain two different medium range radars and two different anti-aircraft missile systems.



There would have been neither the need for expensive design,manufacture and support of very low production volume warships,weapons and equipment,nor the need to spend hundreds of millions of pounds on River class patrol vessels to keep ship yards open.

 
Picture: P.O.A. (Phot.) Ian Arthur,Crown Copyright

The savings from reduced development spending and,more efficient,higher volume manufacturing would have paid for a larger fleet of more capable surface combatants.

 
This is the Type 23 frigate,which the Royal Navy plans to replace with a combination of eight Type 26 Frigates and five Type 31 frigates.
The Type 23,or Duke Class,is the most successful class of warships designed for the Royal Navy since the Second World War.
Though they are far from perfect,the Type 23s have proven to be perfectly adequate in most respects,unlike their predecessors,the more expensive and less flexible Type 22 frigates.
The £1250 million allocated for the procurement of five Type 31e frigates is similar to the original procurement cost of five Type 23 frigates,after allowing for inflation.
The Type 23 frigates have had long service lives,their longevity is a result of their flexibility,sound design (unlike the preceding Types 21,22 and 42 they have not suffered from structural problems and unlike the succeeding Type 45 they have not suffered from engine problemsand moderate operating costs.
Their moderate operating and procurement costs spread thinly over long service lives have resulted in excellent value for money.
A stark contrast to the shorter lived Type 22 class which,despite costing more to build,was less useful,more expensive to operate and,in the longer,multirole batch three,suffered from hull cracks.



As is the case with military aircraft,multirole ships stay in service for longer,providing better value for money,because they are more useful more often.



The Type 23's most significant weakness,the short range and limited utility of it's Sea Wolf air defence missile system,has been mitigated by it's replacement with the longer ranged and multipurpose Sea Ceptor missile system.



The 4.5" Mark 8 gun has been out ranged by land based artillery guns for over forty years,a significant problem for ships which engage in Naval Gunfire Support (N.G.S.) which cannot be solved by spending forty five million pounds per ship on the 5" Mark 45 gun,which also suffers from the same problem,but which may be solved with our proposed Five and a Half Inch Naval Gun or mitigated at more moderate cost by means of a slower burning propellant and a longer barrel for the 4.5" Mark 8 gun,to increase it's range and reduce time of flight at all ranges.

 
Picture: Katie Chan

The Type 23 frigate's two DS30M Mark 2 30mm Automated Small Calibre Guns are unable to fire dead ahead and astern and,as they do not cover overlapping sectors,only one gun may be brought to bear on any target with no redundancy in the event that a gun is unavailable due to technical failure,battle damage or a lack of ammunition (this very poor design is common to many British warships).
In emergencies and when performing special tasks a single helicopter hangar is a significant inconvenience,even for a ship which routinely carries only one helicopter.


 
The Type 23's boats' lack of horse power,fire power and protection may be a cause of embarrassment to naval boarding parties.


 
The Royal Navy is often unable to participate in cruise missile bombardments,one of the most common naval engagements,due to a total absence of long range land attack missiles on it's surface warships.
When the ship's helicopter is unavailable (due to maintenance,technical failure,battle damage,crew fatigue,weather,refuelling,rearming or accident),the Type 23's only anti-submarine weapon is the light weight Stingray torpedo which is out ranged by the heavy weight torpedoes used by submarines.


This is the Type 23M frigate,our proposed replacement for five Type 23 frigates,which is intended to satisfy the Type 31 requirement and to provide a basis for an entry to the United States' Navy's F.F.G.(X.) competition.


The superstructure of the Type 23M shall be enclosed to increase structural depth,increase reserve buoyancy,increase internal volume,reduce maintenance and reduce electromagnetic reflections,added top weight being counter ballasted by thicker bottom plates (doors shown concealing the boats and replenishment equipment may be omitted to reduce weight,cost and maintenance).
From the flight deck level upwards,Type 23M frigates shall be parallel sided from the front of the superstructure back to the transom in order to reduce the cost of design and construction,increase righting moment and structural width,widen the flight deck and maximise useable internal volume.
The Type 23M shall be a modernised Type 23 frigate,based on the same hull form,with similar internal arrangements and using much of the same,newly built or refurbished,equipment as the current Type 23 frigates.

 
Picture: Grand Logistics

New types of equipment shall be specified only where it is operationally or financially beneficial.


For example,to replace obsolescent components,reduce manpower requirements,reduce maintenance or reduce fuel consumption.

The two,venerable,Rolls Royce Spey gas turbines of the original Type 23 frigate shall be replaced with a single,more efficient,Rolls Royce MT30 gas turbine on the Type 23M (these also being used by the Type 26 frigates and Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers) to extend the vessel's range and endurance.

The Type 23M shall use the same,recently upgraded,Rolls Royce M.T.U. 12V 4000 M53B diesel generators as the current Type 23 frigates.

The Type 23M shall use newer and more efficient electric propulsion motors than those fitted to the current Type 23 frigates to extend it's range and endurance.

The Type 23M shall use the same propellers,shafts,seals and bearings as the current Type 23 frigates.

The Type 23M shall use the same rudders and steering gear as the current Type 23 frigates.

The Type 23M shall use the same,recently upgraded,towed and hull mounted,sonars and countermeasure systems as the current Type 23 frigates.

The Type 23M shall use the same,recently upgraded,Artisan and SharpEye radars as the current Type 23 frigates.



The Type 23M shall use the same Sea Ceptor missiles which are being fitted to the current Type 23 frigates.



The Type 23M shall use the 4.5" Mark 8 Modification 2 gun,this being a modest upgrade on the 4.5" Mark 8 Modification 1 gun used by the current Type 23 frigates,with a barrel of seventy two calibres length and slower burning propellants,a more economical way to increase gun range than adopting the 
5" Mark 45 gun.



The Type 23M shall use the same DS30M 30mm cannon as the current Type 23 frigates but shall carry them atop the bridge and hangar where they shall cover wider,overlapping,sectors and be able to fire ahead and astern.
The Type 23M shall use the same Merlin and Wildcat helicopters,with the same support equipment,as the current Type 23 frigates but shall have a wider hangar,able to accommodate two Merlins when needed,and a wider flight deck.

The Type 23M shall use two Pacific 950 boats,with more power,payload,protection and firepower than the two Pacific 24 boats carried by the current Type 23 frigates.


Picture: Intelligence Specialist 1st Class Kenneth Moll,United States Navy photograph

The Type 23M shall use two,eight cell,strike length Mark 41 Vertical Launch System modules,in a narrow vee configuration,in lieu of the eight Harpoon Mark 141 Guided Missile Launch System on the current Type 23 frigates,enabling the use of vertically launched anti-ship,anti-submarine and land attack missiles,a typical payload being eight vertically launched Anti Submarine Rockets  (V.L-A.S.ROC.) or Spearfish Torpedoes and eight dual purpose Tomahawk or Perseus missiles.


A lighter,cheaper,more flexible and less intrusive alternative to the strike length Mark 41 launcher which may be fitted to the Type 23M,Type 23,Type 26 frigates and Type 45 destroyers,is to have Spearfish torpedoes and Perseus,Tomahawk,Harpoon or Naval Strike Missiles launched from canisters on the fore deck (along with a single eight cell tactical length Mark 41 launcher for thirty two quad packed Sea Ceptor missiles on the Type 23M).


The Type 23M shall use either the same Magazine Torpedo Launch System and Stingray lightweight torpedoes as the current Type 23 frigates,supplemented by a handful of vertically launched anti-submarine missiles for use when the helicopter is not available or,preferably,canister,tube or vertically launched Spearfish heavyweight torpedoes which shall be useful against both submarines and surface ships.



The Type 23M,or Type 23 Batch 2,frigates shall be known as the Duke of Cambridge or Royal Duke class after the lead ship H.M.S. Cambridge,her sister ships being Cornwall,Edinburgh,Gloucester,Normandy and,should further funding become available,Rothesay,Sussex and York.

Saturday, 20 February 2010

How To Invade The Falkland Islands

Since long before their invasion in 1982,the government of Argentina has regularly threatened and inconvenienced the people of the Falkland Islands.

The islanders are well used to such bluster and regard it with a haughty disdain.

However,many outside the Falklands,particularly those not familiar with the situation,regard such behaviour with more seriousness than it deserves.

This is particularly the case when the World's media decides that Argentina's latest rhetoric is a newsworthy story.

Such coverage can give many the impression that a second Falklands War is imminent,however unlikely that may be.

Even though an Argentinian invasion of the Falklands is a remote possibility,it is interesting to consider how they might go about such an operation.


First let us consider the opposing forces,for the sake of brevity we will list only the major combat units on both sides.

British forces in the Falkland islands consist of:one Type 42 destroyer somewhere in the South Atlantic;one infantry company;one anti aircraft battery and 4 Typhoon combat aircraft of 1435 Flight.

In addition,there is likely to be a British nuclear powered submarine somewhere in the Atlantic,though not necessarily near the Falklands.

Argentine forces consist of:five destroyers;six frigates;three corvettes;three submarines;eleven army brigades with all support arms (including one parachute brigade and other elements of the Fuerza de Despliegue Rápido rapid deployment force);two brigades of marines with supporting arms;forty eight fighter aircraft;thirty six light ground attack aircraft,eleven maritime patrol aircraft and 10 Hercules transport aircraft.


The first problem which the Argentinian forces must consider is that they are unlikely to be able to counter the British submarines which may be operating in the area.


Fortunately Britain's small submarine fleet is unlikely to be able to sustain more than one submarine in the Falklands and that can only be in one place at one time.


It would also be unable to engage Argentinian vessels which could quite legally approach close to the Falklands prior to the commencement of hostilities.


If Argentinian vessels dispersed and approached from different directions the submarine may be able to sink only a single vessel before the invading troops are landed.

Subsequent to combat operations beginning,the British Submarine will have less restrictive rules of engagement and will be able to interdict sea traffic to the Falklands.


Consequently it may be neccessary to support Argentinian ground forces by air after the commencement of hostilities as they did in 1982.

Argentinian air assault forces are likely to be the brigade sized Fuerza de Despliegue Rápido.

However,the Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) Typhoons based at Mount Pleasant airbase could shoot down any Argentine transport aircraft.

The Typhoons will then have to be neutralised before the air assault.

Argentine combat aircraft are far less capable than the Typhoon but far more numerous.

They would have little chance of destroying the Typhoons in air combat.

Fortunately there are only 4 Typhoons based in the Falklands,with only 3 likely to be operational on any day,and these are dependent on a single airfield.

Neutralising that airfield even temporarily may permanently neutralise the Typhoons.

The airbase on the Falklands is protected by a battery of Rapier anti-aircraft missiles.

While a direct bombing attack on the airfield may prevent the Typhoons from taking off or landing,such an attack is likely to be costly.

It is then more desirable to neutralise the airfield by other means.

The small size of the Falklands infantry garrison makes a ground assault on the airfield a viable proposition.

However,it would be time consuming to deploy an adequate force to the islands and for them to get to and seize the airfield.

Such an operation is then only viable after the Typhoons have been neutralised.

If an artillery battery could be positioned within range of the air base (a twenty five mile radius for the latest types of Argentine artillery),it could temporarily neutralise both the airfield and it's air defences.

By cratering the runway,or scattering mines on it an artillery battery can neutralise a runway temporarily.

Airborne Typhoons would be unable to land when they ran out of fuel.

Aircraft on the ground would be unable to take off.

British reinforcements would not be able to be brought in without a runway to land on.

Although the runway could be cleared,it could not be cleared quickly enough.


A similar effect can be acheived by getting man portable weapons such as the Argentinian R.B.S70 anti-aircraft missile,various long range sniper rifles,machineguns,mortars or anti-tank weapons within effective radius of the runway to engage aircraft on the ground.

Again however,the Typhoon threat must be neutralised for a short time in order to land an artillery battery and the infantry needed to protect it from the Falklands garrison or a major ground force.

As the primary means of air defence for the Falklands airspace these aircraft must conduct regular patrols as well as maintain a "Quick Reaction Alert" (Q.R.A.) to deal with any intrusions.

With just 4 Typhoons on the Falklands,it is likely that there are no more than 3 aircraft available for operations at any one time.

Fighter aircraft operate in pairs.

With just 3 available aircraft it is unlikely that 1435 Flight could sustain two daily patrols and maintain two aircraft permanently on Q.R.A.,this would be well above what British combat aircraft have generated in recent conflicts.

Once a patrol (and it's supporting tanker) run low on fuel,they must land.

After landing those aircraft are unavailable for a time due to the need for fuel and maintenance.

If the Q.R.A. pair can be encouraged to scramble while a patrol is out,then all of the defending aircraft may run low on fuel at a similar time.

In a peacetime situation,Argentinian aircraft can enter Falklands airspace with little fear of engagement.

Having no airborne early warning* and few fighters,defending British forces would have to intercept to investigate any contact which appeared above the horizon of their land based radars.

With many aircraft available and able to operate beneath this radar horizon,Argentinian forces can force the Typhoons to quickly consume their fuel investigating widely dispersed contacts.

However,this is unlikely to force the British to scramble their Q.R.A. pair.

The Falklands Islands government operates fisheries protection vessels within it's territorial waters.

With ten maritime patrol aircraft operating below the radar horizon of British land based radars,Argentina would have little difficulty locating one of these vessels.

The arrest of one of these vessels by the Argentinian Navy would certainly attract the attentions of the only British warship in the area,Her Majesty's Ship York.

However,York has little anti-submarine and anti-ship capability.

The fourteen anti-ship missile armed Argentinian destroyers,frigates and corvettes and three submarines would then be in a position to commence hostilities by destroying H.M.S. York.

The only assets able to assist the British warship in a hurry would be the two remaining Typhoons on Quick Reaction Alert.


Unfortunately they do not have anti ship missiles and would have to use laser guided bombs** dropped from well within the missile engagement envelopes of the Argentinian warships.

Thus all defending aircraft may be airborne at the same time.

From the moment those aircraft run low on fuel,it will be some considerable time before they can return to base,land,be refuelled and maintained and take off again.

During this period,air assault forces can be deployed by the ten Argentinian Hercules transport aircraft with little fear of interception .

Once artillery is set up within range of the runway,the Typhoons will be grounded for the duration of the conflict.

The British will be unable to reinforce their troops by air while Argentina will be able to quickly build up a substantial superiority in ground forces.

With no prospect of victory or evacuation,British forces in the Falkland Islands would have little option but to surrender.






*Open source material refers to 2 different "surface wave" Over The Horizon radars on the Falklands,an older system made by Marconi and a more recent system made by Insyte (there is also a civilian "sky wave" radar at Goose Green) it is possible that these may be located in the North West of East Falkland but we are not aware of any official acknowledgement of the existence of such radars.


**Update:at the start of operations against Libya it was found that Typhoons were not equipped even to drop laser guided bombs.