The Light Infantry Division's independent air drop capability,that is air drops unsupported by other forces,is specifically intended for use in the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Both areas are prone to frequent natural disasters and political instability which may demand rapid humanitarian or military intervention.
In these areas the Light Infantry Division's brigades are unlikely to encounter superior enemy forces and the threat to transport aircraft is low.
Most ground forces in these areas are modern day "warriors armed to the teeth with kiwi fruit and dry guava halves",being poorly trained and motivated and predominantly equipped with Cold War era Soviet or Chinese made weapons such as medium mortars,heavy machine guns,rocket propelled grenades,light machine guns,sniper rifles,assault rifles and mines.
The Light Infantry Division is designed to conduct tactically offensive or defensive,mounted or dismounted operations against such opposition.
It may also conduct tactically offensive or defensive,mounted or dismounted operations against poorly equipped medium weight forces such as the British Army's conceptually flawed Strike Brigades.
When faced with heavier opposition such as the 4th Guards Tank Division,the Light Infantry Division shall be used in an offensive manner at the strategic and operational levels but as a defensive mounted skirmishing force or,in close terrain,a defensive dismounted blocking force,at the tactical level.
The low fuel consumption and maintenance requirements of the Light Protected Truck minimise the logistical requirements of the Light Infantry Division and make it well suited to low intensity combat operations which are characterised by a low bullet to mile ratio.
The Light Infantry Division is therefore a suitable formation for anti terrorist operations in the Sahel.
This may be illustrated by considering a recent military operation in this area in which a platoon sized force of soldiers from Niger and the United States of America was defeated by a slightly larger Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant platoon.
"The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat,and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy."
The outcome of battle is often decided before the fighting starts.
In Tongo Tongo the Islamic State platoon had the advantages of heavier weapons,superior numbers and superior intelligence while their opponents had a handful of more highly trained soldiers,superior communication systems and air support.
The Nigerien and American platoon suffered failures of intelligence,failures of communication,both within and without the platoon,failures of air support and failures of morale within the Nigerien elements,all of which are normal events in combat,Clausewitz's "friction".
However,there was not sufficient margin of error to allow for success despite these failures,the platoon could not defend it's self without external assistance because senior decision makers had chosen not to exploit one of the greatest advantages available to them,the ability to operate protected vehicles.
Some seem to believe that driving around Africa in Toyota pick up trucks confers invisibility on heavily armed,white men with beards and baseball caps.
The low fuel consumption and maintenance requirements of the Light Protected Truck minimise the logistical requirements of the Light Infantry Division and make it well suited to low intensity combat operations which are characterised by a low bullet to mile ratio.
The Light Infantry Division is therefore a suitable formation for anti terrorist operations in the Sahel.
This may be illustrated by considering a recent military operation in this area in which a platoon sized force of soldiers from Niger and the United States of America was defeated by a slightly larger Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant platoon.
"The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat,and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy."
The outcome of battle is often decided before the fighting starts.
In Tongo Tongo the Islamic State platoon had the advantages of heavier weapons,superior numbers and superior intelligence while their opponents had a handful of more highly trained soldiers,superior communication systems and air support.
The Nigerien and American platoon suffered failures of intelligence,failures of communication,both within and without the platoon,failures of air support and failures of morale within the Nigerien elements,all of which are normal events in combat,Clausewitz's "friction".
However,there was not sufficient margin of error to allow for success despite these failures,the platoon could not defend it's self without external assistance because senior decision makers had chosen not to exploit one of the greatest advantages available to them,the ability to operate protected vehicles.
Some seem to believe that driving around Africa in Toyota pick up trucks confers invisibility on heavily armed,white men with beards and baseball caps.
This is what white men used to drive around Africa over century ago.
M
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This is a Second World War convoy equipped with First World War era Rolls Royce armoured cars,one may imagine how this convoy might have performed in the Tongo Tongo ambush.One may also imagine how a platoon from the Light Infantry Division may have dealt with this situation.
A platoon from the Light Infantry Division would consist of forty infantrymen and four Light Protected Trucks,armed with forty Quarter Inch Rifles,four Six Inch Rockets,Four Three Inch Mortars and four Three Eighths Inch Machine Guns.
If this platoon were ambushed outside Tongo Tongo it would be able to drive through the ambush without casualties and turn to face the enemy flank.
This is due to the vehicles ballistic protection,when someone is shooting at you,protection is mobility (this is why the tank was invented).
The vehicle commander's machine guns would then be able to exploit their superior external ballistic qualities and three to twenty four times magnification day scopes to engage enemy vehicles and infantry from beyond the effective range of return fire.
These may be supported by fire from Quarter Inch Rifles and Six Inch Rockets fired from the two rear roof hatches for a total of twelve weapons firing in any direction from within the protection of the still mobile vehicles.
When the enemy is sufficiently attrited and deprived of their mobility the infantry may dismount half a mile from the enemy and advance behind the protection of their vehicles to clear remaining hostile positions with rifle,rocket and mortar fire.
The platoon from the Light Infantry Division would have defeated the Islamic State force because it had the correct tools for the job at hand.
