Air Defence Of The United Kingdom

The most serious air threat to the United Kingdom is that of nuclear armed long range ballistic missiles.

Photo: C.P.O.A. (Phot.) Tam McDonald Crown Copyright

The Royal Navy's nuclear armed submarines shall attempt to deter nuclear ballistic missile attack against the United Kingdom supported by the Reconnaissance Corps skywave,and allied line of sight,early warning radars (which we shall discuss further below).

Photo: Ralph Scott Missile Defense Agency U.S. Department of Defense

Defence against the next most serious,air threat to the United Kingdom,following the failure of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty,nuclear or conventional theatre ballistic missile attack (and countering satellite reconnaissance) shall be provided by one Royal Garrison Artillery,army level,guided missile battery which shall use the same radars,missiles and combat system as the upgraded Falklands class frigates,supported by the Reconnaissance Corps skywave,and allied line of sight,early warning radars.

Photo: Grand Logistics

This may be supplemented by upgraded Royal Navy Falklands Class frigates on the Northern,Western and Channel stations.

The third most serious air threat to the United Kingdom is that of long range (nuclear or conventional) cruise missiles which may be launched from thousands of miles away to attack high value targets such as nuclear submarine bases.

Photo: Original photo by Addicted04 modifications by Grand Logistics

The southern and eastern approaches to the United Kingdom shall be screened by continental allied and neutral countries with their own air defence networks and therefore cruise missile attacks against the United Kingdom are most likely from the north and west,particularly from long range bombers,submarines and warships approaching via the North Cape.

Photo: Sgt. Fenwick Crown Copyright

In order to intercept submarines,bombers and warships before they launch cruise missiles,and to intercept missiles after launch,it shall be necessary to have a system to detect and track them.

Photo: Grand Logistics

Due to the very long range of Russian cruise missiles,some of which are claimed to have ranges of over three thousand miles,and the "tyranny of distance",neither the Sentry airborne early warning aircraft fleet,nor it's expected replacement,the Wedgetail,shall be capable of providing a complete,continuous and robust air and surface surveillance capability and the Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft shall not be capable of providing a complete,continuous and robust submarine surveillance capability.

Photo: Staff Sgt. Michael Battles United States' Air Force

This may be demonstrated by considering a notional fleet of patrol aircraft,each of which has an endurance of nine hours at a speed of five hundred miles an hour and flies for an average of six hours per day during high intensity combat operations (there are many variables relating to aircraft endurance,for example,flying at slower speeds may increase endurance while carrying a heavier weapon load may reduce endurance,consequently,using these notional performance figures makes it much easier to explain the fundamentals whilst still using figures typical of actual aircraft performance),such aircraft would typically average one or two budgeted flying hours per day during peace time.

Photo: Grand Logistics

This graph shows the time such an aircraft can spend on station at the given radii from it's base,without aerial refuelling.

Photo: Grand Logistics

This graph shows the number of daily nine hour sorties which must be generated to keep one such aircraft on station at the given radii (for the sake of clarity this and subsequent graphs have been limited to a radius of two thousand miles but the trend is apparent).

Photo: Grand Logistics

This graph shows the number of daily flying hours which must be generated to keep one aircraft on station at the given radii.

Photo: Grand Logistics

This graph shows the number of aircraft required to generate the flying hours necessary to keep one aircraft on station at the given radii (note that this does not include any aircraft undergoing servicing,being used for training and trials or being held in reserve for other contingencies).

Photo: Grand Logistics

If we assume that each of these notional aircraft costs as much to operate as a Sentry aircraft,thirty three thousand pounds per flying hour eight years ago,which is likely to be over forty thousand pounds per hour today after being adjusted for inflation,we may calculate the cost of keeping one aircraft on station at the given radii for a single day.

Photo: Grand Logistics

We may extrapolate from this the annual cost of keeping one of these notional aircraft on station at the given radii,again,this is without adding the cost of training and trials flying hours and the cost of aircraft held in reserve or undergoing servicing (note that the United Kingdom's entire budget for transport and support aircraft is around eighteen hundred million pounds per year).

Photo: 대한민국 국군 Republic of Korea Armed Forces

There is no need for continuous surveillance coverage when enemies have the good manners to provide advanced notice of attack,however,when fighting less well mannered opponents,continuous surveillance shall be necessary,but as costs of real aircraft are likely to be somewhat similar to those of our notional aircraft,it is clear that the United Kingdom can only afford to occasionally keep a single airborne early warning or anti-submarine aircraft on station within the current defence budget,to maintain continuous coverage would require a significant increase in spending.

Photo: Unknown Photographer Charles Daniels Photo Collection album "English Aircraft" 

Keeping a single aircraft on station continuously is a fragile capability which may interrupted for long periods until a replacement arrives on station if the aircraft were to become unavailable due to enemy action,accident or technical failure,a robust capability is one which is tolerant of these things,this would require at least two aircraft to be kept on station continuously at twice the cost of keeping one on station.

Photo: Grand Logistics

Beyond a radius of three hundred miles from an airborne early warning aircraft flying at an altitude of forty thousand feet,a low flying cruise missile shall be concealed by the curvature of the earth and even within that radar horizon,depending on the performance of the radar and the radar cross section of the target,may only be visible to the airborne early warning aircraft at a significantly smaller radius than shown (and not visible at all below and close to the aircraft as the radar does not look downwards),consequently,as can be seen above,a single aircraft may provide only partial airborne early warning coverage of the northern and western approaches to the United Kingdom,to provide complete coverage would need many aircraft to be on station continuously which is not possible with a fleet of six aircraft.

Photo: Sgt. Rob Travis Royal Air Force Crown Copyright

The concentration of Typhoon fighters and Royal Artillery missile batteries in the Falkland Islands makes this the most heavily defended part of British airspace and indicates that the government sees the Falklands as being at greatest risk of air attack,despite this,there are no land based Sentry airborne early warning aircraft in the Falkland Islands which suggests that their limited contribution to air defence is well understood,as does their neglect by the Royal Air Force.

Photo: Unknown origin

The mathematical reality of air warfare is the reason why the United Kingdom's substantial expenditure on land based maritime patrol aircraft caused the deaths of tens of thousands of men and the loss of thousands of ships during the Second World War.

Photo: Unknown photographer United States' Department of Defense photograph

Subsequently,when the United Kingdom was facing a severe threat of attack by nuclear armed cruise missiles at the height of the Cold War,it did not waste resources on a fleet of land based airborne early warning aircraft but it did maintain a fleet of ship based airborne early warning and maritime patrol aircraft.



Mathematics favours sea based naval airborne early warning and maritime patrol aircraft as they shall have a much smaller area to defend and they shall be based within it,being on the very ships which enemy's warships,submarines and aircraft shall be trying to sink,and hence they shall be on station almost as soon as they take off which is extremely efficient as fewer flying hours shall be required to keep an aircraft on station continuously.



Unfortunately,by the nineteen seventies the level of "expertise" found at the most senior positions in the Ministry of Defence had declined to such a point that British Defence Secretaries were persuaded to retire the Royal Navy's flying ships and their maritime patrol,airborne early warning,electronic countermeasures and aerial refuelling aircraft.



Only four years later British forces,just like their predecessors forty years earlier,found themselves suffering heavy casualties in the Falklands War while fighting against combat aircraft and submarines without fixed wing airborne early warning and anti-submarine support because the land based Shackleton and Nimrod aircraft were mathematically incapable of maintaining round the clock patrols at a radius of almost four thousand miles from the nearest available land base on Ascension Island (unlike the recently retired,ship based,Gannet aircraft which had been designed to do just that).

Photo: Unknown photographer Parliamentary photograph

Senior decision makers at the Ministry of Defence do not appear to be the sort of people who allow reality to influence defence policy,since the Falklands War they have procured,or are planning to procure,two more fleets of land based airborne early warning aircraft,the Sentry and Wedgetail,and two more fleets of land based maritime patrol aircraft,Nimrod Mark 4 and Poseidon,none of which would have been capable of protecting British forces during the Falklands War,the only occasion on which they have been needed in combat since the end of the Second World War.

Photo: Sgt. Si Pugsley Royal Air Force Crown Copyright

Land based patrol aircraft such as the Poseidon,Wedgetail and Rivet Joint are neither viable as a means of providing surveillance in support of British land and sea forces deployed far from secure land bases,nor in the off shore defence of the United Kingdom but fortunately there are alternatives.

Photo: P.H.3 Hanselman United States' Navy


A small fleet of Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service Perseus,subsonic,fifty ton class,multispectral surveillance,attack and logistical aircraft,able to operate from short and poorly surfaced runways and catapult equipped flying ships,shall support deployed forces at a far lower cost than the current,much larger,fleet of Merlin Crowsnest,Sentry/Wedgetail,Poseidon,Rivet Joint,Sentinel,Shadow,Reaper,BAe 146 and Voyager aircraft whilst also contributing to domestic defence when not deployed (the cost of developing and manufacturing Perseus shall be more than paid for by the resulting dramatic reduction the number of peace time budgeted flying hours which must be generated annually).

Photo: Unknown photographer United States' Navy photograph

 The primary wide area,but low resolution,air and surface early warning sensors shall be a small network of Reconnaissance Corps,army level,skywave radars with overlapping,three hundred and sixty degree,coverage from a minimum radius of five hundred miles to a maximum (first bounce) radius of twenty five hundred miles.

   
Photo: Grand Logistics

Located at Orfordness (or other suitable site),the site of the defunct Cobra Mist radar station,in Scotland,Akrotiri on Cyprus,where a skywave system called Pluto is currently operating,and potentially also at Bermuda,Ascension Island,Diego Garcia and the Falkland Islands,these shall provide affordable and hence continuous,complete 
and robust wide area over the horizon air and surface surveillance.

Photo: Grand Logistics

Where radars are not less than five hundred miles apart but not more than two thousand miles apart they shall cover each other's short range blind spots,as shown above (two French skywave radar systems just happen to be five hundred miles from each other).

Photo: Unknown photographer BAe Systems photograph

Surface wave radars perform poorly over land but very well over water,fortunately,British territory is a collection of islands and peninsulas surrounded by water,the Canadians have demonstrated that the cost of operating an unmanned surface wave radar station for a whole year is similar to the cost of operating an airborne early warning aircraft for a couple of hours,a network of dozens of such stations,held as army level assets,shall provide over the horizon air and surface surveillance within about two hundred miles of the coast in day time and about one hundred miles at night time (sunlight affects the propagation of radio waves).

Photo: Unknown photographer Ministry of Defence photograph Crown Copyright

Nine,deployable,Royal Flying Corps Quick Reaction Alert flights,each of which shall consume an average of three peace time budgeted flying hours per day,shall routinely intercept and identify contacts generated by these radars,providing each of their six pilots with the one hundred and eighty flying hours per year required to maintain their skills,whilst updating the recognised air and surface picture around the United Kingdom and its overseas territories at no extra cost.

Photo: L.H. C.Davies Crown Copyright

The first defence against cruise missile attack shall be naval attacks on naval and air bases in Northern Russia by the Royal Navy's (and allied) battle squadrons for the purpose of destroying submarines,ships and aircraft capable of launching cruise missiles,and their bases,attack being the most effective form of air defence.

Photo: L.A.(Phot.) Simmo Simpson Crown Copyright 

The second defence against cruise missile attack shall be navy operations,ranging approximately from the Barents Sea in the north to Newfoundland in the west and the Canaries in the south,by the Royal Navy's (and allied) battle and patrol squadrons supported by land based Reconnaissance Corps sky wave radars for the purpose of destroying submarines,ships and aircraft before they launch cruise missiles.

Photo: Cpl. Tim Laurence Royal Air Force Crown Copyright

The third defence against cruise missile attack shall be army and navy operations,ranging approximately from the Straights of Gibraltar to the North Cape and out in to the mid Atlantic Ocean,by Royal Navy assets including frigates,helicopters,fighters and patrol aircraft and land based fighter squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps combat aircraft brigade and undeployed Royal Naval Air Service squadrons supported by land based Reconnaissance Corps sky wave radars for the purpose of intercepting cruise missiles in the air. 

Photo: Cpl. Tim Laurence Crown Copyright

The fourth defence against cruise missile attack shall be army and navy operations,within approximately two hundred miles of the United Kingdom's coast,by land based fighter squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps combat aircraft brigade and undeployed Royal Naval Air Service squadrons supported by land based Reconnaissance Corps surface wave radars for the purpose of intercepting cruise missiles in the air.

Photo: Glenn Fawcett Department of Defense 

The fifth defence against cruise missile attack shall be army operations,within approximately one hundred miles of the coast,by corps level Long Range Multirole Missile batteries of the Royal Artillery,at least a third of which shall be tasked with coastal defence whilst in the standby phase of their readiness cycle or relieved by fencibles if deployed,for the purpose of intercepting cruise missiles in the air.

Photo:Soldatnytt from Oslo, Norway

The sixth defence against cruise missile attack shall be army and navy operations over land,within about twenty five miles of high value targets,by division level Medium Range Multirole Missile batteries of the Royal Field Artillery and Royal Horse Artillery,at least a third of which shall be tasked with domestic defence whilst in the standby phase of their readiness cycle or relieved by fencibles if deployed,and undeployed Royal Marine Artillery missile batteries,for the purpose of intercepting cruise missiles in the air.

Photo: Nilfanion

The last defence against cruise missile attack shall be army and navy operations over land,within about five miles of high value targets,by battalion level army manportable Short Range Multirole Missile platoons,up to a third of which shall be tasked with domestic defence whilst in the standby phase of their readiness cycle or relieved by fencibles if deployed,and undeployed Royal Marine Light Infantry missile troops,for the purpose of intercepting cruise missiles in the air.



Defence against attacks by hijacked airliners or military aircraft shall be by the same systems used to defend against cruise missile attacks,with the addition of army level Reconnaissance Corps very long range,line of sight,surveillance radars and passive receivers.



Defence against attacks by the toy aircraft which are currently fashionable with the British,and other,armed forces shall be by army and navy operations,within about half a mile of high value targets,by section level Six Inch Rocket Launcher teams,up to a third of which shall be tasked with domestic defence whilst in the standby phase of their readiness cycle or relieved by fencibles if deployed,and undeployed Royal Marine Light Infantry rocket teams,except where collateral damage necessitates the use of non lethal solutions.