What Have Kiowa Warrior And Lynx Wildcat Got In Common?

The Agusta Westland Lynx Wildcat reconnaissance helicopter is often criticised for having it's sensors mounted on it's nose.

Many believe a reconnaissance helicopter should have these sensors mounted above the rotor head in what is known as a Mast Mounted Sight (M.M.S.).

This is where the OH 58D Kiowa carries it's sensors.

Mounting the sensors up high allows the helicopter to see over cover while hovering behind it protected from enemy fire.

This was very useful during the Cold War when these helicopters were expected to be falling back on to friendly terrain ahead of advancing Soviet tank armies.

However,recent operations have seen American forces moving fast and high over terrain controlled by the enemy.

Seeing what is beneath the helicopter is now regarded as more important than hiding behind hills and you can't do that with an M.M.S..

Which is why the latest "F" model of the Kiowa Warrior will have it's sensors relocated to the aircraft's nose.

Just Like the Wildcat.

But with even better all round coverage thanks to the under nose location.

There have also been suggestions that Mast Mounted Sights suffer from vibration more than nose mounted sights.

Lessons Of The Falklands War

We covered the British combat aircraft fleet during the Falklands War in a recent post.

The above illustration shows the number of Royal Navy Sea Harriers and Royal Air Force Harriers with the British task force during the war.


Much of the discussion of the conflict centres on the use of the Sea Harrier fighters and Harrier ground attack aircraft as well as the Vulcan bombers.


But there are other important aspects to the conflict which are rarely if ever mentioned.




Force Generation


Throughout the war there was a significant shortage of combat aircraft.


This was particularly a problem before reinforcements arrived on the Motor Vessel Atlantic Conveyor on the 18th of May.


Air combat operations had started on the 1st of May.


At that point there were just 20 Royal Navy Sea Harriers with the task force.


However,on that same day 6 Fleet Air Arm Sea Harrier F.R.S.1 reinforcements had arrived at Ascension Island,2 more arrived at Ascension on the following day.


Between the 3rd of May and the 5th of May 8 Royal Air Force Harrier G.R.3s arrived at Ascension Island.


There was substantial aerial refuelling capacity on Ascension Island at this time,capacity which was at that time being used to support the ineffectual Black Buck bombing raids.


This refueling capacity could have permitted the Sea Harriers and Harriers to fly out to the task force rather than being carried South on a ship.

The above illustration* shows the shape of the task force's air fleet if the 6 Sea Harriers which arrived on Ascension Island on the 1st of May had flown to the task force on the 2nd of May with the other 2 Sea Harriers following on the 3rd of May.


Had the start of air combat operations been delayed by just 2 days until the 3rd of May the task force could have begun operations with 28 Sea Harriers rather than 20.


This would have added 126 "Sea Harrier days" to the task force's air power.


Based on the Sea Harrier F.R.S.1s average sortie rate this would equate to 178 additional Sea Harrier sorties during the first two weeks of combat operations.


As a single Sea Harrier bombing mission did more damage to Argentinian forces than the Black Buck raid of the 1st of May,this increase in Sea Harrier sorties would clearly have had a significant positive impact on operations.


Without those additional Sea Harrier sorties,over the period between 1st of May and the 18th of may H.M.S. Alacrity,H.M.S. Arrow and H.M.S. Glamorgan had been damaged,H.M.S.Glasgow had been put out of action for the duration of the conflict and H.M.S. Sheffield had been sunk.

Had combat operations been delayed by just 5 days,the task force could have had 33 Sea Harriers and Harriers on the first day of fighting.


This assumes that all 8 Harriers which had reached Ascension Island by the 5th of May fly out to the task force the day after arriving.


In 1982,2 of these 8 Harriers were retained for the very unlikely requirement of air defence of Ascension Island.


This would have more than doubled the number of Royal Air Force Harrier G.R.3 combat days from 140 to 289.


Based on the Harriers average sortie rate during the Falklands War this could have added 134 additional Harrier sorties to the task force's combat power.


Together with the additional Sea Harriers this represents an increase of 25% on the number of task force combat aircraft days.


This is achieved with no more aircraft than were present in 1982,it only requires that aircraft be flown rather than shipped from Ascension Island to the task force.


Sending the Harriers South by air would have had another side effect.


With Harrier G.R.3s available on the first day of combat the Sea Harriers could concentrate on air to air combat.


Consequently the 2 Sea Harriers lost to ground fire would have been Harrier losses instead.

This would have had the above effect on the shape of the combat aircraft fleet.


The result is 1130 Sea Harrier combat days versus an actual number of 948 in 1982 and 233 Harrier G.R.3 combat days versus 140 in 1982.


This would result in a 19% increase in Sea Harrier sorties over actual 1982 figures based on the average sortie generation rate.


As there were not enough Sea Harriers to provide adequate air defence in 1982,this 19% increase would have had a very significant impact on operations.

This gives a different perspective on the Royal Air Force Black Buck Vulcan bomber raids.


It is often argued that thery were a waste of resources as they had far less impact on the Argentinians than even a single Sea Harrier attack.


The usual counter argument is that the resources used for the Black Buck raids would have been sitting idle on an airfield somewhere if they were not used for bombing the Falkland Islands.


But it is clear from the above that the tanker aircraft could have been used for other more useful purposes.


The aerial refueling resources used to support the first 2 Black Buck raids could have had a very substantial effect on the outcome of the conflict if they had instead been used to support Sea Harriers and Harriers transiting to the British aircraft carriers.

There is just one question mark against the idea of flying those additional aircraft to the carriers early in the conflict.


That is,can the carriers support all those extra aircraft?


With 3 Sea harriers having been lost in the first week of operations there was certainly spare capacity.


The carriers were equipped to operate the Sea Harriers and the additional airframes and pilots would have been useful even if maintainers could not make full use of all 8.


The Harriers,being somewhat different to the Sea Harriers,would have been more problematic,requiring some specialist support equipment not found on the carriers they may have required maintainers,parts and equipment to be air dropped to the task force.




Accident Prevention


It is not uncommon to lose more aircraft to accidents than to combat.


This was also the case during the Second World War.


Even famous combat aircraft such as the Messerschmitt Bf 109 were known for suffering heavy losses to accidents.


Today aircraft are far safer than they were then and combat losses have been far lower for Western air arms in recent conflicts.


But with aircraft fleets being far smaller and combat losses negligible aircraft accidents are again having a significant effect on operations.


During the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm lost 2 Sea King A.S.A.C. Mk.7s in a collision,this was probably 2 thirds of the fleet in theatre and 2 of 13 aircraft in total.


There have been similarly significant losses to the Merlin,Nimrod and Chinook fleets.


Back in 1982 the Sea Harrier fleet also suffered as a result of accidents.


Of the 28 Sea Harriers which joined the task force during the Falklands War,4 were lost to accidents in theatre,14% of the combat fleet.


Another 2 Sea Harriers were lost to accidents in the United Kingdom before and during the war.


In total,of the 32 completed Sea Harriers,6 had been lost to accidents before the end of the Falklands War,19% of the total fleet.


These accidents were as follows:


1 Sea Harrier lost as a result of controlled flight in to H.M.S. Invincible during a peacetime air display;


2 Sea Harriers lost as a result of colliding in poor visibility during a combat interception during the Falklands War;


1 Sea Harrier lost as a result of an asymetric fuel load while undertaking trials in the United Kingdom during the Falklands War;


1 Sea Harrier lost as a result of sliding off the deck of H.M.S. Invincible when she turned sharply during combat operations near the Falklands;


1 Sea Harrier lost after exploding on take off during the Falklands War.




In addition a Royal Air Force Harrier G.R.3 was lost in an accident during the last week of the Falklands War.


In total,the British task force lost 5 aircraft to accidents (13%) out of the 38 aircraft which took part in combat operations during the Falklands War and lost 6 aircraft (16%) to enemy fire.


Without looking at accident reports most if not all of these accidents appear to have been avoidable.

If those 7 accidental losses had not occurred the British combat fleet in the Falklands would have appeared as shown above (assuming the aircraft lost during trials was retained in the United Kingdom).


This gives a 16% increase on combat aircraft days available to the task force.


Including a 17% increase in Sea Harrier days and a 5% increase in Harrier G.R.3 combat days.

The above illustration shows the British task force's combat aircraft fleet in ideal circumstances.


It assumes that no aircraft are lost to accidents,aircraft fly to the task force the day after arriving on Ascension Island and that all ground attack sorties (and losses) are performed by the Harrier G.R.3 fleet.


This would have given the British task force more than twice as many combat aircraft as it actually had in the early stages of the Falklands War.


It gives 1535 combat aircraft days in total,a 41% increase over the actual figure from 1982.


Of these,1295 would be Sea Harrier combat days,a 37% increase in Sea Harrier days and,pro rata,Sea Harrier sorties compared to 1982.


In addition the Harrier G.R.3 fleet would generate 240 combat days,an increase of 71% over the 1982 figures.




Conclusions


The Falklands war was a precursor to the future of air combat where cost dictates that combat aircraft fleets will be small in size.


In future,reducing accidental aircraft losses,both in and out of combat,will become of critical importance to the success of combat operations.


In addition,Lanchester's Theorem suggests that it will be important to maximise the proportion of the combat aircraft fleet which is available at the beginning of combat operations. 


In future,it will be necessary to maintain a larger percentage of the combat aircraft fleet at a high state of readiness.


This must extend to ending the "Fitted For But Not With" culture in the British armed forces.


Sidewinder missiles,laser guided bombs,Shrike anti-radiation missiles and electronic countermeasure systems should all have been available to the Sea Harrier and Harrier fleets on the first day of the war but were not.


Instead they were rapidly integrated during the conflict,in many cases arriving in theatre too late to see action.




In 1982,British forces were not ready for the Falklands War and suffered accordingly.


Despite this they were victorious largely as a result of the extraordinary performance of the Sea Harrier fleet.


That victory would have been far easier won had reinforcements been deployed to the task force more rapidly.




*It would be mathematically correct to start with the relative strengths of the combatants on the first day of war fighting and derive from that the attrition rate and length of the conflict.


However,that requires a number of assumptions which could be called in to question.


Instead we have applied a mathematically imperfect approach of counting the actual aircraft losses during the conflict.


This throws up the problem of 3 aircraft being lost before the 6th of May,which we propose should have been the start of combat operations.


We have also counted the total number of combat aircraft days between the 1st of May and the 14th of June.


Even though delaying combat operations until the 6th of May would eliminate many of these and increased attrition resulting from a larger air fleet would shorten the conflict.


We concluded that a mathematically flawed approach based on real figures was preferable to a mathematically correct approach using invented figures.

Warship Nomenclature (Work in progress)

Discussion of naval matters is often clouded by the many and various names by which types of warships are known and by the varying definitions of those names.

Each nation has it's own traditions of naming warship types and these change over time.

In the British Royal Navy a "frigate" was originally a "cruising ship" which patrolled independently when not operating in support of the ships of the battle line.

This term was also colloquially applied to "post ships" which were not technically frigates.

When Her Majesty's Ship Warrior joined the fleet in 1861 she was rated as an "armoured frigate" despite being more powerful than any ship of the battle line.

By the end of the nineteenth century,"cruising ships" had become known as "cruisers" and the term "frigate" fell out of use.

During the Second World War a new type of dedicated anti-submarine escort was given the title "frigate".

It is from these escort vessels which the modern British anti-submarine frigate is desceded,even though today it performs roles similar to those of it's eighteenth century ancestors.

In the days of sail,the United States Navy also used the term "frigate" to describe a cruising ship,though these American ships were much larger than British frigates.

After World War Two,American frigates were large fleet escorts confusingly also known as destroyers and destroyer leaders (after 1975,many of these were redesignated as cruisers!).

The current Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates are simple,low cost escorts intended for non fleet work.

These are descendents of the Second World War "destroyer escort",the American equivalent of the British wartime "frigate".

American "DD" destroyers are more comparable to modern european "frigates".

The French navy seems to be confused,giving the destroyer's "D" flag superior to ships which it calls frigates.

The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force has no "frigates" at all,it does however use the term "destroyer escort" to describe warships which would be frigates in most other navies.

While the latest Japanese "destroyers" are what most would refer to as "helicopter carriers".



The naming of different types of warships is a matter which has troubled seafighting men since the dawn of time.

Over two thousand years ago navies employed a rating system every bit as confusing as those in use today.

In ancient times rowed galleys  were rated by the number of files of oarsmen they carried on each side of the vessel.

The ram was the primary weapon of the warship and more oarsmen made a warship a faster more effective ram ship.

The ancient penteconters were uniremes with a single file of oarsmen to port and starboard.

Biremes had two rows of oars and oarsmen on each side.

Triremes had three rows of oars on each side.

However,quadquiremes instead had four oarsmen on each side,two per oar.

Just to add to the confusion there were also quinqueremes,hexaremes,septiremes,octeres,enneres and deceres.

Polyremes went all the way up to a "forty".

All of these ships had various combinations of more oars or more men per oar.

The distinction between ship types must have been every bit as unclear as the distinction between modern warship types.

Over the following centuries,sails became the primary means of propulsion at sea.

In the days of sail vessels were distinguished by the arrangement of their rigging.

Thus a sailor could distinguish between a brigantine,a snow,a brig,a ship or a schooner on the basis of her masts and sails.

However,vessels of many sizes often shared the same form of rigging.

For example,most large ships of the battle line were square rigged and three masted but so were frigates.

It was neccessary to differentiate between warships in other ways.

For five hundred years until the twentieth century the armament of warships was almost entirely made up of guns.

With all warships being similarly armed,warship types were differentiated by the number of guns they could carry.

This led to the development of the British Royal Navy's "rating system".

The most powerful warships were first rate "ships of the line" with 100 guns or more.

These were the vessels which were intended to do battle with enemy fleets.

Second rate ships were similar but carried fewer guns,though not less than 90.

Third rates were the mainstay of the battle fleet,carrying 60 to 90 guns.

Fourth rates were the smallest ships of the line which were also used as cruising ships.

Fifth rates were not ships of the battle line but "frigates",cruising ships with single gundecks and 30 to 44 guns.

Sixth rates were smaller "frigates" of 26 to 28 guns and "post ships" of 20 to 24 guns.

Below sixth rate were unrated minor warships such as snows,brigs,sloops,cutters and schooners which were usually defined by their rigging rather than their guns.

By the mid nineteenth century steam power was supplementing sail power on warships. 

By the end of the nineteenth century steam had replaced sails on most warships.

As warships no longer had rigging,terms such as brig,schooner and snow fell out of use for describing warship types.

With the advent of the Whitehead torpedo in the late nineteenth century naval warfare began a dramatic change.

Even the largest warships could be sunk by a weapon carried by the very smallest naval craft.

The threat posed by these "torpedo boats" was countered by a new type of warship,the "torpedo boat destroyer".

At the start of the twentieth century the torpedo armed "submarine" added to the range of threats at sea.

During the First World War the aircraft came of age as a weapon of war,attacking ships with torpedoes,bombs,guns and later rockets and guided missiles.

These developments rendered obsolete the historic order of precedence of warships as even the most powerful battleship could be sunk by both aircraft and submarines.

The number and size of guns a warship could carry became less important than it's ability to engage the whole range of threats.

As a ships rigging and number of guns was becoming irrelevant,warship types began to be named after the role they performed.

Ships of the line of battle became "battleships".

Frigates and other "cruising ships" became "cruisers".

The new torpedo carrying vesels were known as "torpedo boats".

Vessels designed to destroy torpedo boats were called "torpedo boat destroyers",later shortened to just "destroyer".

Submersible vessels were named "submarines".

While boats designed to hunt submarines were named "sub chasers".

The new aircraft carrying ships were simply named "aircraft carriers".

During the second world war there was an explosion of new types of warship.

The submarine threat to convoys led to the development of anti-submarine escorts which the British named "corvettes" and "frigates" despite them not being "cruising ships" like the corvettes and frigates of old.

Frequent amphibious operations led to a wide range of new amphibious warfare vessels.

Most new types of vessels were given descriptions rather than names.

The Landing Ship Dock.

The Landing Ship Infantry.

The Landing Craft Assault.

The Landing Ship tank.

The increased air threat led to the need for increased air defences on ships.

In addition,some vessels became specialised anti-aircraft ships.

Ships generally retained their earlier names when they took on new roles.

Cruisers in the anti-aircraft role were still cruisers.

Destroyers with added  anti-submarine capabilities were still destroyers.

Though the British reused the old terms "corvette" and "frigate" for new anti-submarine ships.

These descriptions were commonly abbreviated.

This led to a confusing array of acronymmery which continues to this day.

If an L.C.M. is a Landing Craft Mechanised,why is an L.C.S. a Littoral Combat Ship?

If an L.P.D is a Landing Personnel Dock,why is an A.P.D. an Attack Personnel Destroyer?

While there was a brief period of clarity at the turn of the twentieth century,today warship naming conventions are a mass of confusion.

There is now no clear definition of what constitutes a cruiser,destroyer,frigate,corvette,aircraft carrier or the recently fashionable "mothership".