The above illustration shows the number of Royal Navy Sea Harriers and Royal Air Force Harriers with the British task force during the war.
Much of the discussion of the conflict centres on the use of the Sea Harrier fighters and Harrier ground attack aircraft as well as the Vulcan bombers.
But there are other important aspects to the conflict which are rarely if ever mentioned.
Force Generation
Throughout the war there was a significant shortage of combat aircraft.
This was particularly a problem before reinforcements arrived on the Motor Vessel Atlantic Conveyor on the 18th of May.
Air combat operations had started on the 1st of May.
At that point there were just 20 Royal Navy Sea Harriers with the task force.
However,on that same day 6 Fleet Air Arm Sea Harrier F.R.S.1 reinforcements had arrived at Ascension Island,2 more arrived at Ascension on the following day.
Between the 3rd of May and the 5th of May 8 Royal Air Force Harrier G.R.3s arrived at Ascension Island.
There was substantial aerial refuelling capacity on Ascension Island at this time,capacity which was at that time being used to support the ineffectual Black Buck bombing raids.
This refueling capacity could have permitted the Sea Harriers and Harriers to fly out to the task force rather than being carried South on a ship.
The above illustration* shows the shape of the task force's air fleet if the 6 Sea Harriers which arrived on Ascension Island on the 1st of May had flown to the task force on the 2nd of May with the other 2 Sea Harriers following on the 3rd of May.
Had the start of air combat operations been delayed by just 2 days until the 3rd of May the task force could have begun operations with 28 Sea Harriers rather than 20.
This would have added 126 "Sea Harrier days" to the task force's air power.
Based on the Sea Harrier F.R.S.1s average sortie rate this would equate to 178 additional Sea Harrier sorties during the first two weeks of combat operations.
As a single Sea Harrier bombing mission did more damage to Argentinian forces than the Black Buck raid of the 1st of May,this increase in Sea Harrier sorties would clearly have had a significant positive impact on operations.
Without those additional Sea Harrier sorties,over the period between 1st of May and the 18th of may H.M.S. Alacrity,H.M.S. Arrow and H.M.S. Glamorgan had been damaged,H.M.S.Glasgow had been put out of action for the duration of the conflict and H.M.S. Sheffield had been sunk.
Had combat operations been delayed by just 5 days,the task force could have had 33 Sea Harriers and Harriers on the first day of fighting.
This assumes that all 8 Harriers which had reached Ascension Island by the 5th of May fly out to the task force the day after arriving.
In 1982,2 of these 8 Harriers were retained for the very unlikely requirement of air defence of Ascension Island.
This would have more than doubled the number of Royal Air Force Harrier G.R.3 combat days from 140 to 289.
Based on the Harriers average sortie rate during the Falklands War this could have added 134 additional Harrier sorties to the task force's combat power.
Together with the additional Sea Harriers this represents an increase of 25% on the number of task force combat aircraft days.
This is achieved with no more aircraft than were present in 1982,it only requires that aircraft be flown rather than shipped from Ascension Island to the task force.
Sending the Harriers South by air would have had another side effect.
With Harrier G.R.3s available on the first day of combat the Sea Harriers could concentrate on air to air combat.
Consequently the 2 Sea Harriers lost to ground fire would have been Harrier losses instead.
This would have had the above effect on the shape of the combat aircraft fleet.
The result is 1130 Sea Harrier combat days versus an actual number of 948 in 1982 and 233 Harrier G.R.3 combat days versus 140 in 1982.
This would result in a 19% increase in Sea Harrier sorties over actual 1982 figures based on the average sortie generation rate.
As there were not enough Sea Harriers to provide adequate air defence in 1982,this 19% increase would have had a very significant impact on operations.
This gives a different perspective on the Royal Air Force Black Buck Vulcan bomber raids.
It is often argued that thery were a waste of resources as they had far less impact on the Argentinians than even a single Sea Harrier attack.
The usual counter argument is that the resources used for the Black Buck raids would have been sitting idle on an airfield somewhere if they were not used for bombing the Falkland Islands.
But it is clear from the above that the tanker aircraft could have been used for other more useful purposes.
The aerial refueling resources used to support the first 2 Black Buck raids could have had a very substantial effect on the outcome of the conflict if they had instead been used to support Sea Harriers and Harriers transiting to the British aircraft carriers.
There is just one question mark against the idea of flying those additional aircraft to the carriers early in the conflict.
That is,can the carriers support all those extra aircraft?
With 3 Sea harriers having been lost in the first week of operations there was certainly spare capacity.
The carriers were equipped to operate the Sea Harriers and the additional airframes and pilots would have been useful even if maintainers could not make full use of all 8.
The Harriers,being somewhat different to the Sea Harriers,would have been more problematic,requiring some specialist support equipment not found on the carriers they may have required maintainers,parts and equipment to be air dropped to the task force.
Accident Prevention
It is not uncommon to lose more aircraft to accidents than to combat.
This was also the case during the Second World War.
Even famous combat aircraft such as the Messerschmitt Bf 109 were known for suffering heavy losses to accidents.
Today aircraft are far safer than they were then and combat losses have been far lower for Western air arms in recent conflicts.
But with aircraft fleets being far smaller and combat losses negligible aircraft accidents are again having a significant effect on operations.
During the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm lost 2 Sea King A.S.A.C. Mk.7s in a collision,this was probably 2 thirds of the fleet in theatre and 2 of 13 aircraft in total.
There have been similarly significant losses to the Merlin,Nimrod and Chinook fleets.
Back in 1982 the Sea Harrier fleet also suffered as a result of accidents.
Of the 28 Sea Harriers which joined the task force during the Falklands War,4 were lost to accidents in theatre,14% of the combat fleet.
Another 2 Sea Harriers were lost to accidents in the United Kingdom before and during the war.
In total,of the 32 completed Sea Harriers,6 had been lost to accidents before the end of the Falklands War,19% of the total fleet.
These accidents were as follows:
1 Sea Harrier lost as a result of controlled flight in to H.M.S. Invincible during a peacetime air display;
2 Sea Harriers lost as a result of colliding in poor visibility during a combat interception during the Falklands War;
1 Sea Harrier lost as a result of an asymetric fuel load while undertaking trials in the United Kingdom during the Falklands War;
1 Sea Harrier lost as a result of sliding off the deck of H.M.S. Invincible when she turned sharply during combat operations near the Falklands;
1 Sea Harrier lost after exploding on take off during the Falklands War.
In addition a Royal Air Force Harrier G.R.3 was lost in an accident during the last week of the Falklands War.
In total,the British task force lost 5 aircraft to accidents (13%) out of the 38 aircraft which took part in combat operations during the Falklands War and lost 6 aircraft (16%) to enemy fire.
Without looking at accident reports most if not all of these accidents appear to have been avoidable.
If those 7 accidental losses had not occurred the British combat fleet in the Falklands would have appeared as shown above (assuming the aircraft lost during trials was retained in the United Kingdom).
This gives a 16% increase on combat aircraft days available to the task force.
Including a 17% increase in Sea Harrier days and a 5% increase in Harrier G.R.3 combat days.
The above illustration shows the British task force's combat aircraft fleet in ideal circumstances.
It assumes that no aircraft are lost to accidents,aircraft fly to the task force the day after arriving on Ascension Island and that all ground attack sorties (and losses) are performed by the Harrier G.R.3 fleet.
This would have given the British task force more than twice as many combat aircraft as it actually had in the early stages of the Falklands War.
It gives 1535 combat aircraft days in total,a 41% increase over the actual figure from 1982.
Of these,1295 would be Sea Harrier combat days,a 37% increase in Sea Harrier days and,pro rata,Sea Harrier sorties compared to 1982.
In addition the Harrier G.R.3 fleet would generate 240 combat days,an increase of 71% over the 1982 figures.
Conclusions
The Falklands war was a precursor to the future of air combat where cost dictates that combat aircraft fleets will be small in size.
In future,reducing accidental aircraft losses,both in and out of combat,will become of critical importance to the success of combat operations.
In addition,Lanchester's Theorem suggests that it will be important to maximise the proportion of the combat aircraft fleet which is available at the beginning of combat operations.
In future,it will be necessary to maintain a larger percentage of the combat aircraft fleet at a high state of readiness.
This must extend to ending the "Fitted For But Not With" culture in the British armed forces.
Sidewinder missiles,laser guided bombs,Shrike anti-radiation missiles and electronic countermeasure systems should all have been available to the Sea Harrier and Harrier fleets on the first day of the war but were not.
Instead they were rapidly integrated during the conflict,in many cases arriving in theatre too late to see action.
In 1982,British forces were not ready for the Falklands War and suffered accordingly.
Despite this they were victorious largely as a result of the extraordinary performance of the Sea Harrier fleet.
That victory would have been far easier won had reinforcements been deployed to the task force more rapidly.
*It would be mathematically correct to start with the relative strengths of the combatants on the first day of war fighting and derive from that the attrition rate and length of the conflict.
However,that requires a number of assumptions which could be called in to question.
Instead we have applied a mathematically imperfect approach of counting the actual aircraft losses during the conflict.
This throws up the problem of 3 aircraft being lost before the 6th of May,which we propose should have been the start of combat operations.
We have also counted the total number of combat aircraft days between the 1st of May and the 14th of June.
Even though delaying combat operations until the 6th of May would eliminate many of these and increased attrition resulting from a larger air fleet would shorten the conflict.
We concluded that a mathematically flawed approach based on real figures was preferable to a mathematically correct approach using invented figures.
Much of the discussion of the conflict centres on the use of the Sea Harrier fighters and Harrier ground attack aircraft as well as the Vulcan bombers.
But there are other important aspects to the conflict which are rarely if ever mentioned.
Force Generation
Throughout the war there was a significant shortage of combat aircraft.
This was particularly a problem before reinforcements arrived on the Motor Vessel Atlantic Conveyor on the 18th of May.
Air combat operations had started on the 1st of May.
At that point there were just 20 Royal Navy Sea Harriers with the task force.
However,on that same day 6 Fleet Air Arm Sea Harrier F.R.S.1 reinforcements had arrived at Ascension Island,2 more arrived at Ascension on the following day.
Between the 3rd of May and the 5th of May 8 Royal Air Force Harrier G.R.3s arrived at Ascension Island.
There was substantial aerial refuelling capacity on Ascension Island at this time,capacity which was at that time being used to support the ineffectual Black Buck bombing raids.
This refueling capacity could have permitted the Sea Harriers and Harriers to fly out to the task force rather than being carried South on a ship.
The above illustration* shows the shape of the task force's air fleet if the 6 Sea Harriers which arrived on Ascension Island on the 1st of May had flown to the task force on the 2nd of May with the other 2 Sea Harriers following on the 3rd of May.
Had the start of air combat operations been delayed by just 2 days until the 3rd of May the task force could have begun operations with 28 Sea Harriers rather than 20.
This would have added 126 "Sea Harrier days" to the task force's air power.
Based on the Sea Harrier F.R.S.1s average sortie rate this would equate to 178 additional Sea Harrier sorties during the first two weeks of combat operations.
As a single Sea Harrier bombing mission did more damage to Argentinian forces than the Black Buck raid of the 1st of May,this increase in Sea Harrier sorties would clearly have had a significant positive impact on operations.
Without those additional Sea Harrier sorties,over the period between 1st of May and the 18th of may H.M.S. Alacrity,H.M.S. Arrow and H.M.S. Glamorgan had been damaged,H.M.S.Glasgow had been put out of action for the duration of the conflict and H.M.S. Sheffield had been sunk.
Had combat operations been delayed by just 5 days,the task force could have had 33 Sea Harriers and Harriers on the first day of fighting.
This assumes that all 8 Harriers which had reached Ascension Island by the 5th of May fly out to the task force the day after arriving.
In 1982,2 of these 8 Harriers were retained for the very unlikely requirement of air defence of Ascension Island.
This would have more than doubled the number of Royal Air Force Harrier G.R.3 combat days from 140 to 289.
Based on the Harriers average sortie rate during the Falklands War this could have added 134 additional Harrier sorties to the task force's combat power.
Together with the additional Sea Harriers this represents an increase of 25% on the number of task force combat aircraft days.
This is achieved with no more aircraft than were present in 1982,it only requires that aircraft be flown rather than shipped from Ascension Island to the task force.
Sending the Harriers South by air would have had another side effect.
With Harrier G.R.3s available on the first day of combat the Sea Harriers could concentrate on air to air combat.
Consequently the 2 Sea Harriers lost to ground fire would have been Harrier losses instead.
This would have had the above effect on the shape of the combat aircraft fleet.
The result is 1130 Sea Harrier combat days versus an actual number of 948 in 1982 and 233 Harrier G.R.3 combat days versus 140 in 1982.
This would result in a 19% increase in Sea Harrier sorties over actual 1982 figures based on the average sortie generation rate.
As there were not enough Sea Harriers to provide adequate air defence in 1982,this 19% increase would have had a very significant impact on operations.
This gives a different perspective on the Royal Air Force Black Buck Vulcan bomber raids.
It is often argued that thery were a waste of resources as they had far less impact on the Argentinians than even a single Sea Harrier attack.
The usual counter argument is that the resources used for the Black Buck raids would have been sitting idle on an airfield somewhere if they were not used for bombing the Falkland Islands.
But it is clear from the above that the tanker aircraft could have been used for other more useful purposes.
The aerial refueling resources used to support the first 2 Black Buck raids could have had a very substantial effect on the outcome of the conflict if they had instead been used to support Sea Harriers and Harriers transiting to the British aircraft carriers.
There is just one question mark against the idea of flying those additional aircraft to the carriers early in the conflict.
That is,can the carriers support all those extra aircraft?
With 3 Sea harriers having been lost in the first week of operations there was certainly spare capacity.
The carriers were equipped to operate the Sea Harriers and the additional airframes and pilots would have been useful even if maintainers could not make full use of all 8.
The Harriers,being somewhat different to the Sea Harriers,would have been more problematic,requiring some specialist support equipment not found on the carriers they may have required maintainers,parts and equipment to be air dropped to the task force.
Accident Prevention
It is not uncommon to lose more aircraft to accidents than to combat.
This was also the case during the Second World War.
Even famous combat aircraft such as the Messerschmitt Bf 109 were known for suffering heavy losses to accidents.
Today aircraft are far safer than they were then and combat losses have been far lower for Western air arms in recent conflicts.
But with aircraft fleets being far smaller and combat losses negligible aircraft accidents are again having a significant effect on operations.
During the invasion of Iraq in 2003 the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm lost 2 Sea King A.S.A.C. Mk.7s in a collision,this was probably 2 thirds of the fleet in theatre and 2 of 13 aircraft in total.
There have been similarly significant losses to the Merlin,Nimrod and Chinook fleets.
Back in 1982 the Sea Harrier fleet also suffered as a result of accidents.
Of the 28 Sea Harriers which joined the task force during the Falklands War,4 were lost to accidents in theatre,14% of the combat fleet.
Another 2 Sea Harriers were lost to accidents in the United Kingdom before and during the war.
In total,of the 32 completed Sea Harriers,6 had been lost to accidents before the end of the Falklands War,19% of the total fleet.
These accidents were as follows:
1 Sea Harrier lost as a result of controlled flight in to H.M.S. Invincible during a peacetime air display;
2 Sea Harriers lost as a result of colliding in poor visibility during a combat interception during the Falklands War;
1 Sea Harrier lost as a result of an asymetric fuel load while undertaking trials in the United Kingdom during the Falklands War;
1 Sea Harrier lost as a result of sliding off the deck of H.M.S. Invincible when she turned sharply during combat operations near the Falklands;
1 Sea Harrier lost after exploding on take off during the Falklands War.
In addition a Royal Air Force Harrier G.R.3 was lost in an accident during the last week of the Falklands War.
In total,the British task force lost 5 aircraft to accidents (13%) out of the 38 aircraft which took part in combat operations during the Falklands War and lost 6 aircraft (16%) to enemy fire.
Without looking at accident reports most if not all of these accidents appear to have been avoidable.
If those 7 accidental losses had not occurred the British combat fleet in the Falklands would have appeared as shown above (assuming the aircraft lost during trials was retained in the United Kingdom).
This gives a 16% increase on combat aircraft days available to the task force.
Including a 17% increase in Sea Harrier days and a 5% increase in Harrier G.R.3 combat days.
The above illustration shows the British task force's combat aircraft fleet in ideal circumstances.
It assumes that no aircraft are lost to accidents,aircraft fly to the task force the day after arriving on Ascension Island and that all ground attack sorties (and losses) are performed by the Harrier G.R.3 fleet.
This would have given the British task force more than twice as many combat aircraft as it actually had in the early stages of the Falklands War.
It gives 1535 combat aircraft days in total,a 41% increase over the actual figure from 1982.
Of these,1295 would be Sea Harrier combat days,a 37% increase in Sea Harrier days and,pro rata,Sea Harrier sorties compared to 1982.
In addition the Harrier G.R.3 fleet would generate 240 combat days,an increase of 71% over the 1982 figures.
Conclusions
The Falklands war was a precursor to the future of air combat where cost dictates that combat aircraft fleets will be small in size.
In future,reducing accidental aircraft losses,both in and out of combat,will become of critical importance to the success of combat operations.
In addition,Lanchester's Theorem suggests that it will be important to maximise the proportion of the combat aircraft fleet which is available at the beginning of combat operations.
In future,it will be necessary to maintain a larger percentage of the combat aircraft fleet at a high state of readiness.
This must extend to ending the "Fitted For But Not With" culture in the British armed forces.
Sidewinder missiles,laser guided bombs,Shrike anti-radiation missiles and electronic countermeasure systems should all have been available to the Sea Harrier and Harrier fleets on the first day of the war but were not.
Instead they were rapidly integrated during the conflict,in many cases arriving in theatre too late to see action.
In 1982,British forces were not ready for the Falklands War and suffered accordingly.
Despite this they were victorious largely as a result of the extraordinary performance of the Sea Harrier fleet.
That victory would have been far easier won had reinforcements been deployed to the task force more rapidly.
*It would be mathematically correct to start with the relative strengths of the combatants on the first day of war fighting and derive from that the attrition rate and length of the conflict.
However,that requires a number of assumptions which could be called in to question.
Instead we have applied a mathematically imperfect approach of counting the actual aircraft losses during the conflict.
This throws up the problem of 3 aircraft being lost before the 6th of May,which we propose should have been the start of combat operations.
We have also counted the total number of combat aircraft days between the 1st of May and the 14th of June.
Even though delaying combat operations until the 6th of May would eliminate many of these and increased attrition resulting from a larger air fleet would shorten the conflict.
We concluded that a mathematically flawed approach based on real figures was preferable to a mathematically correct approach using invented figures.
