Something which looks nothing like Warspite.
What is it?
Saturday, 29 January 2011
Thursday, 27 January 2011
Wednesday, 26 January 2011
Tuesday, 25 January 2011
Monday, 24 January 2011
Where Fuel Comes From
It is not difficult to get the impression that some people think that aircraft fuel appears at an air base with the wave of a magic wand.
In most parts of the World the reality is that air bases,in one way or another,rely on ships to deliver fuel.
If the navy can't protect those ships,the air force can't fly it's planes.
Without aircraft carriers,the navy can't protect those ships.
The difficulty of keeping air bases supplied with fuel was emphasised by tanker Ohio breaking through the siege of Malta at the end of Operation Pedestal.
The importance of sea based logistics to air power is also emphasised in lots of very long and dull documents.
However,someone has summed it up in a far more succinct manner with these comments on aerial refuelling.
The Author,Mark Hasara,introduced himself with the following line:
"Folks,
As the Chief of the Air Refueling Control Team for both air campaigns in Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2002-2003)"
Lieutenant Colonel Mark Hasara is obviously a man who knows a great deal about putting fuel in to aircraft.
This is a short extract from what he had to say about the logistics of operations in Iraq in 2003:
"Fuel resupply and storage has not been talked about much.
Every one talks about how big an airframe is and so forth.
It is important but if I cannot get gas into the base then it cannot support long endurance tanker ops tempos.
WE RAN A MIDDLE EAST COUNTRY OUT OF GAS!
We had a 4 kilometer long line of 8500 gallon fuel trucks waiting to get on one base to fill one tank farm at one base back up.
We used it all in 3 days and had to do it again.
We had Super Tankers (ST’s) in the Persian Gulf to keep one place full and they pumped it straight from the ST's to the base.
20 KC-10s were flying 38 sorties with 320,000 pound fuel loads.
That is 1.87 million gallons just to fly the KC-10 lines of an ATO at one base."
Some sources say there may have been as many as 14 tanker bases used during that operation.
The immense scale of logistical support can be imagined.
We briefly discussed the costs of convoys of fuel trucks in another post.
The cost of air based logistics was also covered in an earlier post.
Even when aircraft are flying from bases on top of the World's largest oil fields,they still depend on ships to bring them fuel.
It doesn't matter how quickly an aircraft can deploy,without fuel it can't do anything useful when it gets there.
To deliver the fuel will probably require tanker ships.
Those ships will need a navy to protect them.
We briefly discussed the costs of convoys of fuel trucks in another post.
The cost of air based logistics was also covered in an earlier post.
Even when aircraft are flying from bases on top of the World's largest oil fields,they still depend on ships to bring them fuel.
It doesn't matter how quickly an aircraft can deploy,without fuel it can't do anything useful when it gets there.
To deliver the fuel will probably require tanker ships.
Those ships will need a navy to protect them.
Saturday, 22 January 2011
Bunga Mas Lima
We have mentioned the Royal Malaysian Navy auxiliary cruiser Bunga Mas Lima previously in a Ship Spotting post.
She is proof that the Malaysians have the good sense to choose a large,long legged,helicopter capable vessel for use on the huge expanses of the Indian Ocean.
Those with less foresight and understanding continue to push for "small water" warships to be used in these "big water" areas.
Such an approach is logistically demanding and tactically limiting.
Big ships like the 10,000 tonne plus Bunga Mas Lima have the range and endurance for long range counter piracy escort in the vastness of the World's oceans without the need for an expensive "fleet train" to support them.
Bunga Mas Lima has been in the news recently.
Yesterday she stormed a hijacked vessel,freeing it's crew and capturing the pirates into the bargain.
Well done the Royal Malaysian Navy.
Friday, 21 January 2011
David Hobbs On Aircraft Carriers
Most readers probably will not have heard of David Hobbs.
He is one of the World's foremost experts on aircraft carriers and naval aviation.
He is also the author of many books on the subject.
A Century Of Carrier Aviation and Moving Bases are particularly recommended.
But if you don't wish to buy a book,you will find some of his work reproduced here,on the PhoenixThinkTank.
Just in case you can't find it,there is another,fuller article at the bottom of that page:
HERE!
Click to turn the pages.
Just in case you can't find it,there is another,fuller article at the bottom of that page:
HERE!
Click to turn the pages.
Thursday, 20 January 2011
More British Defence Cuts Coming Soon?
Various media outlets have recently been reporting that the British Ministry Of Defence will have to make significant additional cuts in the near future.
These cuts will be on top of the significant reductions announced in the Strategic Defence and Security Review in October 2010.
The Financial Times reports that there is a shortfall of at least £1,000 Million a year in the defence budget.
It is difficult to know whether these reports are correct given the media's history of inaccuracy on defence matters.
However,if they are correct,there will need to be substantial cuts.
David Cameron personally took the decision to eliminate the United Kingdom's ability to independently conduct combat operations when he chose to cut the Harrier fleet and retain the Tornados.
However,cutting the entire Tornado fleet would have saved a great deal more than cutting the Harriers,according to Lord West of Spithead:
"In terms of cost, if we remove the Tornado force, we would be looking at (saving) about £7.5 billion by 2018.
With the Harriers, we are looking at less than £1 billion."
That additional saving of £6,500 Million over the 7 years to 2018 equates to an average saving of £928 Million a year.
David Cameron's personal decision to retain the Tornado fleet appears to be the direct cause of the latest financial crisis at the Ministry Of Defence.
At least,if there is another financial crisis.
At least,if there is another financial crisis.
Reversing that decision is still possible.
Not only would that save a great deal of money but it would also restore the United Kingdom's ability to independently conduct war fighting operations.
Without that ability the British armed forces cannot serve the interests of the British taxpayer.
Making them little more than an expensive vanity project.
Another of the Strategic Defence and Security Review's strange omissions was the decision not to cut the obvious overcapacity in the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft project.
These aircraft will cost a minimum of £441 Million a year over the contract's 27 year life from 2008 to 2035,over £497 Million for each of the 24 years the new tankers will be in service from 2011 to 2035 or £627 Million for each of the 19 years of full operating capability from 2016 to 2035.
It is difficult to see any need for more than half of the 14 A330 aircraft provided under this contract.
Had Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft been cut to an appropriate size in October hundreds of millions of pounds a year would have been saved.
Another obvious saving would be to cancel the badly thought out Future Rapid Effects System (F.R.E.S.),or what remains of it.
Not only would this save the British Army from being lumbered with an unsuitable vehicle for the next 50 years but it would also eliminate the damage to the economy caused by buying thousands of millions of pounds worth of foreign made ASCOD armoured vehicles.
A far cheaper option is upgrading the very similar and already in service Warrior vehicles (a direct equivalent of ASCOD).
The British Army could then get a more suitable,less economically damaging and more exportable,domestically designed and built modern armoured personnel carrier at a later date.
A type of vehicle which would be in high demand on the export market but which is not currently available anywhere.
The alternative is being stuck with a sexed up 1990s era infantry fighting vehicle with a flat bottom and hull penetrating torsion bar suspension until 2060.
A new armoured personnel carrier design with shallow vee hull and non hull penetrating suspension,capable of carrying 2 pallets or 8 infantrymen in addition to it's 2 man crew,would allow the British Army to reduce it's frontline vehicle fleet to just 3 major types (light,medium and heavy) in the medium term.
Most importantly,cancelling F.R.E.S. Scout/ASCOD would eliminate the threat to the British Army's security of supply caused by a reliance on foreign countries which are often opposed to British military operations.
Armed forces without security of supply cannot serve the interests of the people who pay for them.
There is no reason for the taxpayer to pay for armed forces which can not serve his best interests.
The Americans had the good sense to kill off the Future Combat Systems vehicles.
Perhaps the current financial situation will save the British Army from Future Rapid Effects System.
Wednesday, 19 January 2011
Aerial Refuelling Demand:By The Numbers
We have discussed the over capacity if the Royal Air Force's Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (F.S.T.A) project in an earlier post.
We pointed out that demand for tanker aircraft was declining significantly while F.S.T.A. was committing the British taxpayer to fund massive overcapacity at vast expense until 2035.
We suggested that Britain needed only 6 or 7 A330 tanker transport aircraft.
We also suggested that these should have been bought outright.
We did not go into detail about that number.
We shall do so here.
The cost to the taxpayer of the air refuelling fleet is defined by the capacity which must be maintained in peacetime.
The air refuelling capacity must satisfy peak air refuelling demand.
Peak air refuelling demand occurs during major war fighting operations.
The last time Britain was engaged in a major war fighting operation was during the 2003 invasion of Iraq,known as Operation Telic or Iraqi Freedom.
Developments in weapons and sensors,the Royal Navy's new aircraft carriers,reductions in the size of British military aircraft fleet and longer ranged aircraft entering service all suggest that future peak air refuelling demand will be significantly less than it was in 2003.
Let us look at what was needed in 2003.
Let us look at what was needed in 2003.
The United States Air Force (U.S.A.F.) publication "Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – By The Numbers" gives statistics for the 31 days of the air war during the Iraq invasion.
It says that the Royal Air Force deployed 12 air refuelling tankers for Operation Telic/Iraqi Freedom,these flew 359 sorties and offloaded 18,884,000 pounds of fuel.
The latter figure is listed under the phrase "coalition" but as no other coalition country is listed as providing aerial refuelling aircraft this must presumably have been delivered by the Royal Air Force.
In Chapter 6 of a "Short History of the Royal Air Force","RETURN TO EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE",the following figures were given for the British aerial refuelling effort during the Iraq invasion:
"The AAR (Air to Air Refuelling) capability contributed by the RAF was highly valued,particularly by the
Americans.
VC10s and Tristars flew 355 sorties dispensing nearly 19 million lbs of fuel.
Over 40% of this was given to US Navy and Marine Corps aircraft.*"
*Aircraft of the United States Air Force are unable to receive fuel from the "hose and drogue" equipped British tanker aircraft.
These numbers are almost identical to those given by the United States Air Force.
The Royal Air Force contribution amounted to about 4.5% of the coalition aerial refuelling effort which offloaded a total of 417,137,233 pounds of fuel.
A summary of the relevant figures is as follows:
Number of refuelling aircraft.
United States Air Force 182
United States Marine Corps 22
United States Navy 52
Royal Air Force 12 (4.5%)
Total 268
Number of Refuelling Sorties Flown.
United States Air Force 6,193
United States Marine Corps 454
United States Navy 2,058
United States Navy 2,058
Royal Air Force 359 (4%)
Total 9,064
Pounds of fuel offloaded.
United States Air Force 376,391,000
United States Marine Corps 12,545,786
United States Marine Corps 12,545,786
United States Navy 9,316,447
Coalition (Royal Air Force) 18,884,000 (4.5%)
Total 417,137,233
Using the more precise American figures we get a total of 8,584 tonnes of fuel offloaded by British tanker aircraft in 359 sorties during 31 days of combat operations.
An average of 277 tonnes offloaded per day by an average of 11.6 daily tanker sorties.
This is an average of 0.97 sorties per tanker aircraft per day*.
An average of 23.9 tonnes of fuel was offloaded per sortie.
An average of 23.1 tonnes of fuel was offloaded per aircraft per day.
Only 60% of the above was offloaded to British military aircraft.
*This figure is higher than that achieved by Royal Air Force combat aircraft during operation Telic.
The Royal Air Force often generates far lower sortie rates than other air arms and air forces.
However,Royal Air Force tanker aircraft often generate far higher sortie rates than other elements of the Royal Air Force.
Unfortunately none of the above figures gives any indication of where the fuel was offloaded.
For the receiving aircraft,the important metric in aerial refuelling is the weight of fuel received and the distance from the operating area at which it is received.
Fuel received close to the operating area is of more benefit than fuel received far from the combat area.
It is important to note that the range from the tanker aircraft's base is of no relevance at all to this.
This gives us a problem when comparing the performance of aerial refuelling aircraft.
The most obvious and easily compared metric is the fuel the tanker aircraft can offload at a given range from it's base.
But as it is the distance from the combat aircraft's operating area at which the fuel is transferred which is important,this figure is of no benefit.
A smaller tanker aircraft which can generate a large number of daily sorties from an aircraft carrier or shorter runway on a base closer to where the fuel offload is needed may be of more benefit than a large tanker aircraft which can fly fewer sorties from a more distant base with a long runway.
It is essential to consider where the tanker aircraft can operate from and where the fuel offload is needed.
This dictates how far the tanker aircraft must fly on each sortie and thus how many sorties it can generate in a day,how much fuel it will burn on each sortie and how much it will have left to transfer to the receiving aircraft.
For example,an A400M tanker may carry only half as much fuel as an A330 tanker (58 tonnes versus 111 tonnes) but it might be based much closer to it's tanker track as it does not require a 10,000 foot runway.
Thus a small carrier based tanker aircraft or a rough field capable tanker convertible A400M might be more cost effective options than a large long runway A330 tanker aircraft - depending on the basing options available.
However,as the A330 tankers are already in production,we shall consider only them here.
During the Iraq invasion,British tanker aircraft (probably 4 Tristars and 8 VC10s) operated from Al Udeid in Qatar,as did most British military aircraft.
Al Udeid is about 400 miles from the border of Iraq.
As orbiting tanker aircraft are highly vulnerable we may assume that the tanker orbits (an image of a tanker orbit can be seen here) were some distance South of the Iraqi border during initial combat operations at least.
They later moved further North as the threat declined later on.
This would place the tanker orbits perhaps about 350 nautical miles North of Al Udeid initially,distances increasing later in the conflict.
An A330 tanker can deliver 60 tonnes of fuel at 500 nautical miles from base with 5 hours on station.
At shorter ranges it can offload far more fuel than that.
The average of 277 tonnes offloaded per day by the Royal Air Force Tristars and VC10s could probably be delivered by about 4 daily A330 tanker sorties.
Assuming the A330 generates the same sortie rates as the Tristars and VC10s managed,we would probably require only 4 A330 tanker aircraft to generate the offload capacity delivered by 12 tanker aircraft in 2003.
Assuming 80% availability of the A330 fleet,we would require a fleet of just 5 A330s to satisfy peak tanker demand during major war fighting operations.
If we were to exclude the 40% of the British tanker capacity which was not offloaded to British aircraft in 2003,the requirement would be for about 2.5 A330 tanker sorties per day.
This could be provided by a total fleet of just 3 A330 tankers.
As we said earlier,future tanker demand is likely to be far lower than it was in 2003,with longer ranged aircraft like F35C replacing the short ranged Harrier and new aircraft carriers usually allowing them to be based closer to the combat area.
Buying tanker conversion kits for A400Ms and F35Cs would reduce demand for dedicated tanker aircraft still further.
Even allowing for aircraft undergoing maintenance,and on transport tasks,there appears to be no need for more than half the 14 A330 tankers which will be provided under the F.S.T.A. contract.
Unfortunately none of the above figures gives any indication of where the fuel was offloaded.
For the receiving aircraft,the important metric in aerial refuelling is the weight of fuel received and the distance from the operating area at which it is received.
Fuel received close to the operating area is of more benefit than fuel received far from the combat area.
It is important to note that the range from the tanker aircraft's base is of no relevance at all to this.
This gives us a problem when comparing the performance of aerial refuelling aircraft.
The most obvious and easily compared metric is the fuel the tanker aircraft can offload at a given range from it's base.
But as it is the distance from the combat aircraft's operating area at which the fuel is transferred which is important,this figure is of no benefit.
A smaller tanker aircraft which can generate a large number of daily sorties from an aircraft carrier or shorter runway on a base closer to where the fuel offload is needed may be of more benefit than a large tanker aircraft which can fly fewer sorties from a more distant base with a long runway.
It is essential to consider where the tanker aircraft can operate from and where the fuel offload is needed.
This dictates how far the tanker aircraft must fly on each sortie and thus how many sorties it can generate in a day,how much fuel it will burn on each sortie and how much it will have left to transfer to the receiving aircraft.
For example,an A400M tanker may carry only half as much fuel as an A330 tanker (58 tonnes versus 111 tonnes) but it might be based much closer to it's tanker track as it does not require a 10,000 foot runway.
This reduces fuel burn in transit,and fuel burn on station for the smaller A400M is also less leaving more fuel for offloading.
With each sortie taking less time,more sorties can be flown in a day,off setting the capacity deficit of the smaller aircraft.
The lower overall fuel consumption also reduces the logistical burden on the ground.
Thus a small carrier based tanker aircraft or a rough field capable tanker convertible A400M might be more cost effective options than a large long runway A330 tanker aircraft - depending on the basing options available.
However,as the A330 tankers are already in production,we shall consider only them here.
During the Iraq invasion,British tanker aircraft (probably 4 Tristars and 8 VC10s) operated from Al Udeid in Qatar,as did most British military aircraft.
Al Udeid is about 400 miles from the border of Iraq.
As orbiting tanker aircraft are highly vulnerable we may assume that the tanker orbits (an image of a tanker orbit can be seen here) were some distance South of the Iraqi border during initial combat operations at least.
They later moved further North as the threat declined later on.
This would place the tanker orbits perhaps about 350 nautical miles North of Al Udeid initially,distances increasing later in the conflict.
An A330 tanker can deliver 60 tonnes of fuel at 500 nautical miles from base with 5 hours on station.
At shorter ranges it can offload far more fuel than that.
The average of 277 tonnes offloaded per day by the Royal Air Force Tristars and VC10s could probably be delivered by about 4 daily A330 tanker sorties.
Assuming the A330 generates the same sortie rates as the Tristars and VC10s managed,we would probably require only 4 A330 tanker aircraft to generate the offload capacity delivered by 12 tanker aircraft in 2003.
Assuming 80% availability of the A330 fleet,we would require a fleet of just 5 A330s to satisfy peak tanker demand during major war fighting operations.
If we were to exclude the 40% of the British tanker capacity which was not offloaded to British aircraft in 2003,the requirement would be for about 2.5 A330 tanker sorties per day.
This could be provided by a total fleet of just 3 A330 tankers.
As we said earlier,future tanker demand is likely to be far lower than it was in 2003,with longer ranged aircraft like F35C replacing the short ranged Harrier and new aircraft carriers usually allowing them to be based closer to the combat area.
Buying tanker conversion kits for A400Ms and F35Cs would reduce demand for dedicated tanker aircraft still further.
Even allowing for aircraft undergoing maintenance,and on transport tasks,there appears to be no need for more than half the 14 A330 tankers which will be provided under the F.S.T.A. contract.
Monday, 17 January 2011
Logistics:Air Versus Sea
Air based logistics is the most expensive of all.
Combat aircraft can deploy quickly over long distances,if they are supported by expensive fleets of aerial refuelling aircraft.
But combat aircraft are no use at all without runways,fuel bowsers,bombs,parts,technicians and all kinds of support equipment which must also be moved around the World.
This is TSGT John A Chapman,one of the ships which the United States Air Force relies on to move it's combat supplies.
During the liberation of Kuwait in 1990 1991 (Operation Granby),Britain's Royal Air Force used VC10 transport aircraft to deliver bombs to the Persian Gulf.
Each VC10 could carry up to 50 1,000 pound bombs on each trip.
The Royal Air Force dropped about 6,000 1,000 pound bombs during that conflict.
It would have taken 120 VC10 flights to deliver those bombs by air.
It would have taken just 1 trip by a small cargo ship to deliver them by sea.
A ship would cost less to buy and operate than even a single VC10.
The VC10 might be able to deliver 50 bombs more quickly than the ship but the ship would deliver 6,000 bombs far more quickly than the aircraft.
It would take a single VC10 at least 4 months to deliver 6,000 bombs to the Gulf.
It would take a ship about a week.
The Royal Air Force also used VC10s and Hercules' to deliver bombs to Ascension Island during the Falklands War.
The Royal Air Force also used VC10s and Hercules' to deliver bombs to Ascension Island during the Falklands War.
In the recent past,the United States Air Force has also used aircraft to transport bombs for it's land based bombers during Operation Enduring Freedom,the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.
This was discussed in "STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EXPEDITIONARY ARMY" by Lieutenant Colonel David D. Briggs,United States Army:
"The benefit of pre-positioning logistics stocks and equipment afloat can not be overestimated.
This is not just a matter of having the stocks,but making the strategic decision early enough to have an effect that encourages more cargo to be moved via surface rather than the dependency on air.
In a recent instance of indecision and the air-centric associated costs,during the bombing campaign in Afghanistan in 2001,the Air Force stood on the verge of running short of precision guided munitions and 2000 lbs. bombs.
The bombs and Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits were flown to Diego Garcia from CONUS for several weeks before the Air Force decided to release one of its pre-positioned ammunition ships, the MV (Motor Vessel) Major Bernard L. Fisher.
The need to fly these critical munitions as cargo bled throughput and airlift assets away from the transportation and deployment of other cargo.
In terms of the cost in delaying a modal transportation decision,a USTRANSCOM brief to the
Defense Science Board in 2002 showed that moving 16 thousand JDAM to Diego Garcia by air cost $253 million,vice a surface deployment and utilization of pre-positioned stocks costing only $10.7 million."
According to "INTERTHEATER AIRLIFT CHALLENGES OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM" by Dr. Daniel L. Haulman:
"If more air munitions had been deployed on pre-positioned ships or at land bases in or near the theater during ENDURING FREEDOM,the number of hazardous airlift flights could have been reduced.
Increasing forward-deployed precision-guided munition stockpiles would release more airlift assets for the transportation of other cargo.
At one point,the base at Diego Garcia nearly ran out of munitions for the warplanes it was
sending to Afghanistan.
The need to airlift such weapons to Diego Garcia for accelerated combat air operations from that Indian Ocean island demanded more airlift resources and increased risks.
At some of the staging bases,the temporary storing of hazardous cargo or its transfer from one aircraft to another was a problem.
Regulations required that such cargo be stored at certain distances from buildings, for example.
Another pre-positioned ship or two could have eliminated this problem.
One such ship could carry enough munitions to fill 400 C-130s (Hercules)."
The problems of air transport were ably expressed by Lieutenant General Daniel G. Brown,United States Army,then Deputy Commander in Chief,United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in an interview with Dr. James K. Matthews in 2002:
"For example,the cost of shipping HDRs [humanitarian daily rations] via air is $7.24 a meal vice sixteen cents a meal for sea transport.
The difference in cost is tremendous.
The issue is,that when you wait until the last minute to make deployment decisions,
the only way to get to your destination fast may be by high-cost airlift.
The problem with airlift is you can’t deploy very much very fast.
You can only load so much on a plane, and everyone’s competing for the same limited capacity.
One thing is true:regardless of what you move,it will be extremely expensive by air.
I don’t think that most people fully appreciate how expensive
airlift is.
You’re paying several thousand dollars an hour for an airplane,and that’s not including the cost of the crew,training,the airplane, and all the other associated costs.
In addition,you’re flying 36-hour roundtrips and also have costs associated with air
refueling."
The problems of air transport were ably expressed by Lieutenant General Daniel G. Brown,United States Army,then Deputy Commander in Chief,United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in an interview with Dr. James K. Matthews in 2002:
"For example,the cost of shipping HDRs [humanitarian daily rations] via air is $7.24 a meal vice sixteen cents a meal for sea transport.
The difference in cost is tremendous.
The issue is,that when you wait until the last minute to make deployment decisions,
the only way to get to your destination fast may be by high-cost airlift.
The problem with airlift is you can’t deploy very much very fast.
You can only load so much on a plane, and everyone’s competing for the same limited capacity.
One thing is true:regardless of what you move,it will be extremely expensive by air.
I don’t think that most people fully appreciate how expensive
airlift is.
You’re paying several thousand dollars an hour for an airplane,and that’s not including the cost of the crew,training,the airplane, and all the other associated costs.
In addition,you’re flying 36-hour roundtrips and also have costs associated with air
refueling."
But if your combat aircraft are flying from the deck of a large aircraft carrier,there won't be any need to transport bombs by air.
A single large aircraft carrier and it's station ship carry with them more bombs than the Royal Air Force has dropped in any major war fighting operation since 1945.