The S.D.S.R. By Vice Admiral John McAnally

There is an excellent piece published on the Phoenix Think Tank which has been written by Vice Admiral John McAnally.

It is titled simply "The S.D.S.R.".

The whole article can be read here:

"What do I think about the outcome of the Strategic Defence and Security review?

I wanted to report to Shipmates earlier.

Trafalgar dinners followed by presiding over the International Maritime Confederation left me short of time.

It also seemed worth reading others’ immediate reflections and taking time to simmer down. 

But the more I think about it the more wound up I get.

Not least by the way in which the late decision to scrap the Fleet Flagship Ark Royal was leaked overnight before the Captain could tell his horrified Ship’s Company - an outrage for which a public apology is merited.

So are the short answers to my question to agree with American comment: a punch in the gut for the Royal Navy and UK Defence is in dreamland?

Read on.

Let’s consider the Strategic context.

The main effort of UK Defence is locked into a campaign in Afghanistan which we re-entered under false pretences in 2006 and from which the Governments of both the UK and the USA evidently wish to withdraw as soon as possible.

Meanwhile ours is determined to avoid being accused like its predecessor of underfunding this very costly war.

But it continues the innovation started by Labour and which the Tories condemned in opposition, of drawing a very great chunk from the existing Defence Budget at the expense of all other operations and of future capability.

The Coalition has thereby institutionalised preparing for the last war.

I am indebted to Sir Jeremy Blackham for pointing out that we now plan approximately to halve the Navy considered necessary by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review despite a world of growing maritime significance and danger not least to our energy supplies.

Turning to some elements of the review itself.

To use a metaphor devised by Professor Paul Cornish, ‘Affordability should have been the cart and Strategy the horse’.

It looks like it was the other way round and conducted far too hastily to boot - half the time spent in 1998 with twice the remit given that Security was added to Defence.

Even the just departed Permanent Under Secretary and Chief of Defence Staff who presided over the Review have in their internal letter to MoD staff admitted that the result has left a programme which will be incoherent for at least 10 years.

How incoherent?

Let’s look at a few recent declarations in the White Paper (Cm 7948), in the National Security Strategy and by the Prime Minister and Ministers:

“we require an independent ability to defend the Overseas Territories militarily”

 “an enduring presence within priority regions of the world”

“the ability to command UK and allied naval forces at up to Task Force level”

“.....ensure continuous carrier strike capability”

 “we will still punch above our weight- we have no less ambition” (PM 19 Oct 10)

“we will retain the ability to act separately when national interests require it” (SofS for Defence Today Programme 2 Nov 10)

“This is no time to be sea blind ..“ (Liam Fox on numerous occasions in opposition)

All seem hollow. 

Leaving aside the reduction to 19 destroyers and frigates (13 below that deemed necessary in the quieter world of 1998) which will render us incapable of meeting current mandated tasks and further risk vital maritime trade and energy supplies together with more than halving the only world class amphibious force outside the USN just recently painfully acquired and paid for, let us look at Carrier Strike in more detail.

It is amazing that these vessels have become so totemic and occupied more than 90% of the debate despite being able to contribute less than 1% of the savings demanded.

On the other hand they and the nuclear deterrent are iconic symbols of national power and the true keystone of whether or not the UK remains a serious player on the world stage which is why it was right to sign a binding contract for them and thereby to ensure national capability to build warships.

The essentiality of large aircraft carriers is clearly recognised by India,China and Russia all of whom are in no doubt of their need for them.

It is also noteworthy that US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton singled out British Aircraft Carriers as a capability they wanted us to retain.

Not surprising when the USN inventory is down to 10 carriers against rising maritime dangers and competition.

Land forces are, in the words of a retired General of my acquaintance,horribly vulnerable to air attack.

The horrible truth for him and other Generals is that until Carrier Strike capability including fighters is restored the British Army cannot safely deploy outside the UK or Germany without the support of a foreign country either to provide access, basing and overflight for the RAF or air capability from that supporting nation’s own armed forces.

So much for an independent ability to defend Overseas Territories.

Falklands Strategy.

Our current strategy for the increasingly valuable and contested Falkland Islands is to rely on our in place garrison of four Typhoons (£200M apiece and more costly than a Type 23 frigate), a company group, the constant presence of two warships and the occasional unadvertised appearance of a nuclear submarine. 

It is true that the Argentine Armed Forces have declined more than our own but the enemy always has a vote and the UK has a long tradition of being caught with its pants down at the opening of a conflict.

Another horrible truth is that without Carrier Strike including fighters and a Brigade level Amphibious force we have no prospect of responding to a coup de main which takes over Mount Pleasant airfield other than by a submarine blockade or attack on mainland Argentina – neither likely to be viable political options.

For the next 10 years at least there is a window of opportunity for Argentina to inflict on us a national humiliation on the scale of Singapore in WW2 and one from which we might never recover.

The treaty with france.

The Carrier co-operation element of the treaty with France while good in itself needs far more exploration since it is quite unlikely to achieve the stated objective of ensuring continuous carrier strike capability.

Do we know that:

• Charles De Gaulle will be able to launch and recover our new Joint Strike Fighters when we eventually get them?

• They will demand much more than France’s Rafale and Super Etendard?

• Or that either nation’s carriers would be able to supply the other’s aircraft with weapons to carry out military missions?

Just achieving a common and compatible weapons inventory would be far more expensive than the more effective solution of running both our new Carriers.

Scrapping the harrier.

Perhaps the most inexplicable and least defensible decision is scrapping Harrier in favour of Tornado. 

In Afghanistan:

• which of these aircraft can take off and land from Kandahar runway if half of it is  blocked?

• which responds in 30 minutes and which in less than 10?

• which performs better in hot weather and requires fewer ground crew?

More widely:

• which can deliver from Carriers close air support of ground forces, interdiction of surface units with Maverick missiles, rockets and smart bombs?

• deploy Storm Shadow with a little extra investment?

• has nearly twice as many airframes provided with precision guided ground attack capability?

• which will require a further £1.4B to re-engine it in 2014?

• which can remain in service until 2023 without any significant investment?

• Finally which will cost seven times as much to keep as the other?

In every case the advantage lies with the Harrier yet Tornado has been chosen.

I urge all RNA members and everyone who reads this article to sign the petition at http://www.ipetitions.com/petition/primeminister/

The fiscal Deficit.

It is said that these risky reductions are essential to the vital elimination of our fiscal deficit.

Yet just before the SDSR announcement several billion extra pounds were allocated to an extension of education to two year olds and the Coalition also decided on a vast expansion of DfiD’s budget. 

Both seem of dubious value at least I would have thought to most Tory supporters.

Indeed a case could be made that we are subsidising India’s new Carrier and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons at the expense of our own. 

Defence is planned to get only about 5% of total Government spending which is still rising.

Clearly political choices have been made and Defence cannot be said to have the priority so often stated and the Maritime element of it least of all.

We will for at least the next 10 years apart from nuclear submarines slide below France, Italy, Spain, India and Japan’s maritime capability.

Work in Progress.

It is important to realise that the SDSR outcome announced on 19 October is a work in progress not a single event.

It is as underfunded as its 1998 predecessor and that is before many of its decisions have been costed.

No one yet knows where the 5, 000 Naval and Royal Marine manpower reduction is to come from.

There is much discussion to be had over implementation, on how to reach the desired 2020 state and in the next Review due in 2015 in which Afghanistan will be seen as something to avoid rather than an overwhelming priority.

Shipmates might be tempted to believe the Naval Staff in MoD have done a poor job - shades of the earlier planned loss of Carriers in 1966.

For the record that is not my view.

I have been privileged to know as much about what has been going on as my retired status allows and I believe it was much worse at earlier stages and could have ended up that way.

The Naval Staff have a strong intellectual case. 

It should be given more attention.

This is an episode; there is plenty more to come and our serving Shipmates need and deserve our support and encouragement if the best result for our nation is to be achieved.

Such a result should include:

• Carrier Strike capability to be regained as soon as possible on the basis of at least one RN Carrier fully operational at all times.

• Rescinding the inexplicable decision to retire the Harrier in favour of the Tornado.

• Recovering a Brigade level amphibious capability including one LPH continuously at high readiness (R2).

• Speedy fulfilment of the pledge to develop a new programme of less expensive modern frigates.

Vice admiral John Mcanally"

The Admiral wrote about the outcome of the recent Strategic Defence and Security Review (S.D.S.R.).

In particular he focussed on the decision to remove the Harrier from service,a subject which we have covered here.

The Admiral added:

"I urge all R.N.A. (Royal Naval Association) members and everyone who reads this article to sign the petition."

The petition he refers to can be found here.

(The Phoenix Think Tank dead link removed,whole article posted in lieu and the removed Debretts entry link replaced by a wikipedia link on 04/09/2020)