One Nation,One Air Force?

This blog has never suggested abolishing the Royal Air Force*.

However,there are those who suggest that it would be cheaper to consolidate all aviation in a single organisation (usually the Royal Air Force).

This is called the "one nation,one air force" approach.

Here we shall consider if there are any savings to be had from this approach.

The cost of maintaining the means of delivering air power is defined by the following factors:




The number of sorties and/or hours on station required in theatre;


The number of aircraft required in theatre to generate that capability;


The number of aircraft required in the fleet to generate the required number of aircraft in theatre;


The cost of operating each of those aircraft;


Overhead costs.




For example,during the Falklands War in 1982,the Royal Navy required a total fleet of 31 Sea Harriers to deploy 28 aircraft in to theatre in order to generate about 30 sorties per day - 1.03 aircraft required per sortie per day.


In contrast,today the Royal Air Force requires a fleet of 136 Tornados to deploy just 20 aircraft in to theatre for operations over Afghanistan and Libya where they are probably (there are only limited figures available for Libya) generating about 10 sorties per day in total - about 13.6 aircraft required per sortie per day.


In addition,the Royal Navy's Sea Harriers cost far less than the Royal Air Force Tornados and had very little in the way of overhead costs as the Fleet Air Arm is an integral part of the Royal Navy rather than an independent air service with it's own "head office".


By factoring in costs for each aircraft type and overheads we could compare cost effectiveness.


Though it should be noted that we should be comparing aircraft which can do the same jobs,a Tornado is not much use at air defence and would be better compared to a Harrier G.R.9a.

Capability Requirement

This is the required number of daily sorties and/or hours on station,depending on the type of misson being flown.

First we must consider the number of sorties required for major war fighting operations.


Major War Fighting Operations:


The peak of British air power since the Second World War was the Suez crisis in 1956 when hundreds of combat sorties were flown each day,2 thirds of them from aircraft carriers.

Since then however,there have been significant changes in technology with the result that a modern combat aircraft can do in a single sortie what would have taken dozens of sorties by an entire wing of aircraft back in 1956.

Suez then is not a good guide for future requirements.

The next highest example of sortie generation was the liberation of Kuwait,Operation Granby,in 1990 - 1991.

British combat aircraft averaged 74** sorties per day during the 43 day air war.

Precision guided weapons were in the minority during this conflict and consequently fewer sorties would be required to perform the same tasks today.

Then there is the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

British combat aircraft averaged 50 sorties per day during the 31 day air war.

This was well within the modern era of precision guided weapons and is highly likely to be representative of future medium scale operations.

Below that is the Falklands War of 1982.

British combat aircraft averaged 33 sorties per day during the 45 day air war.

The number of sorties in the Falklands War was restricted by the limited number of available carrier capable aircraft and proved to be less than was needed.

Had larger aircraft carriers been available with more aircraft the average number of daily sorties would certainly have been far higher.

Lastly there is the Korean War of 1950 to 1953.

This was something of a mix of major war fighting operation and long term low level commitment.

British combat aircraft averaged 20 sorties a day during the 1128 day air war.

British,American and Australian aircraft carriers took turns on station off the Korean coast,consequently the average number of sorties flown during the war is far less than the average number generated in the course of a patrol.

Up to 126 sorties were flown in a day by British aircraft carriers (with air wings of similar size to the new Queen Elizabeth class) which often averaged over 80 sorties a day during their patrols.

Low Intensity Sustained Conflicts:

All other operations since 1945 averaged so few combat aircraft sorties per day (often none) that they cannot be considered major war fighting operations.

These sustained long term low level commitments often involve no more than a single squadron of combat aircraft.

Typical is the deployment of 8 Tornados to Afghanistan where they generate 5 or 6 sorties a day.

These sustained low intensity operations rarely exceed an average of 12 sorties per day.


On recent sustained operations in Afghanistan and Iraq the requirement could be expressed as 24 flying hours per day.


The Tornado fleet is probably generating a similar number of daily flying hours in operations against the Libyan government.


Conclusion:


50 sorties per day is highly likely to satisfy demand during a medium scale major war fighting operation.


This is within the capability of a single Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier.


24 hours on station a day is likely to satisfy demand during most sustained low intensity operations.

Capability Generation

This determines the number of aircraft which must be deployed to generate the required number of daily sorties/hours on station.


The greater the number of daily sorties/hours on station which each aircraft generates,the smaller the number of aircraft which must be deployed in to theatre.

The land based combat aircraft of the Royal Air Force have taken part in only 4 of the 7 major air wars the United Kingdom Has been involved in since 1945.

In every case they generated far fewer sorties per aircraft per day than carrier based naval aircraft which took part in those same conflicts.


We may consider sortie generation in terms of major war fighting operations which generally require a maximum effort and long term low intensity sustained conflicts where sortie generation is more demand based and generally lower.


Major War Fighting Operations:

Korea

No Royal Air Force combat aircraft took part in the Korean War of 1950 to 1953.

Aircraft of the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm provided all British combat air power during that conflict.

The small British carriers were regularly generating over 80 sorties per day and on occasions as many as 123 sorties per day,with just 31 aircraft.

The Fleet Air Arm's air wings routinely generated more than 2 sorties per aircraft per day and occasionally as many as 4 sorties per aircraft per day.

Suez

Land based combat aircraft of the Royal Air Force operated alongside carrier based aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm during the Suez Crisis of 1956.

During the 6 day air war,the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm generated twice as many sorties per aircraft per day as the Royal Air Force.

Falklands

During the Falklands War of 1982,Royal Navy Sea Harriers geneated 1.4 sorties per aircraft per day.

Royal Air Force Harriers based on the same ships generated just 0.9 sorties per aircraft per day.

Land based Vulcan bombers of the Royal Air Force generated just 0.03 sorties per aircraft per day - one of the worst examples of sortie generation in the history of air warfare.

Kuwait

During the liberation of Kuwait in 1990 - 1991,Aircraft flying from American aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf generated 40% more sorties per aircraft per day than land based aircraft of the Royal Air Force. 

Kosovo

During the bombing of Kosovo in 1999,American carrier based aircraft generated more than twice as many sorties per aircraft per day as the land based aircraft of the Royal Air Force.

Afghanistan

During the Invasion of Afghanistan in 2001,land based Tornados of the Royal Air Force flew no combat sorties at all,despite being based in the Persian Gulf near American F16s and F15s which did take part in that operation.

British aircraft carriers operated helicopters in the air assault role.

American carrier based F18s flying from ships in the Arabian Sea generated 4 times as many sorties per aircraft per day as the American land based F15s flying from bases in the Persian Gulf.

Iraq

During the invasion of Iraq in 2003 carrier based aircraft on U.S.S. Kittyhawk generated twice as many sorties per aircraft per day as land based aircraft of the Royal Air Force.

In major war fighting operations over the last 66 years,sortie generation by British combat aircraft has ranged from a peak of 4 sorties per aircraft in a single day by the Fleet Air Arm's carrier based aircraft in the Falklands and Korean wars and an average of 2.8 sorties per aircraft per day by carrier aircraft throughout the Suez conflict to just 0.03 sorties per aircraft per day by the Royal Air Force's Vulcan bombers during the Falklands War.

These figures can be translated into a requirement for the number of deployed aircraft required to generate a single sortie.

For example,during the Suez crisis it required just 0.36 Royal Navy carrier based aircraft to generate a sortie per day.

During the same conflict it required 0.71 Royal Air Force land based aircraft to generate a single sortie per day.

During the Falklands War it required just 0.71 Royal Navy carrier based Sea Harriers to generate a sortie per day.

During the Falklands War it required just 1.11 Royal Air Force carrier based Harriers to generate a sortie per day.

During the same conflict it would have required a massive 36 Royal Air Force land based Vulcan bombers to generate a single sortie per day.

Low Intensity Sustained Conflicts:

Sortie generation is also more demand based during these operations.

However,British and American aircraft carriers routinely sustain higher sortie rates than land based aircraft of the Royal Air Force in long term low intensity operations.

Conclusion:

In every major war fighting operation over the 66 years since 1945,carrier based aircraft have generated more sorties per day than land based combat aircraft of the Royal Air Force.

During low level,long term sustained conflicts sortie generation is of less economic importance as the number of aircraft required is only a small proportion of the fleet required to satisfy the sortie generation requirement for major war fighting operations.

The critical economic factor is the number of aircraft required to satisfy demand during major warfighting operations.

Force Generation

The percentage of the combat aircraft fleet which may be surged in to theatre for a major war fighting operation or sustained in theatre for a sustained low intensity conflict defines the size and cost of the combat aircraft fleet which the taxpayer must pay to maintain.


Major War Fighting Operations:

During the Falklands War of 1982 the Royal Navy deployed 90% of it's Sea Harrier fleet on combat operations.


This was one of the finest examples of force generation in the history of air warfare.


The Royal Air Force has never deployed more than 15% of it's combat aircraft fleet to any war in the 66 years since 1945.


Just under 15% of the 136 strong Royal Air Force Tornado fleet will be on operations (12 over Libya and 8 in Afghanistan) when 4 additional aircraft deploy to Italy.


This is despite despite the Tornados having no other commitments.


In addition 10 (originally,now 8) Typhoons were deployed to Italy which,combined with the 20 Tornados on operations in Libya and Afghanistan account for less than 15% of the 207 strong combined Tornado and Typhoon fleet.

Low Intensity Sustained Conflicts:

Harmony guidelines are the overriding factor in determining the size of force which may be sustained in theatre.


These are split into "Individual Separated Service" guidelines which cover individuals and "Unit Tour Intervals" which cover complete units (e.g. a fighter squadron):

"Army harmony guidelines are that individuals should not exceed 415 days of separated service in any period of 30 months.

 At unit level,tour intervals (a tour being 6 months) should be no less than 24 months.

The decision on who should deploy is made by Joint Commitments in consultation with Headquarters Land Command,ratified by the chain of command.

Royal Navy harmony guidelines are that no individual should exceed 660 days of separated service in a three-year rolling period.

 Over a similar time span, ships or other units should not be deployed for more than 60 per cent. of their time.

Harmony Guidelines for the RAF are based on formed unit tour intervals rather than individual personnel,whereby formed units,or sub-elements within them should spend four months on deployed operations followed by 16 months at base.

The RAF Individual Separated Service assumption is that an individual should spend no more than 140 days of duty detached away from home in a rolling 12-month period.

 This allows for a four-month operational tour followed by three weeks of separated service due to routine tasks,unestablished commitments,unit assistance,pre-detachment training etc."

These guidelines can be summarised as follows:

Percentage of Individuals who may be away from home at any one time:

Royal Navy/Royal Marines 60%

Army 45%

Royal Air Force 38%

Percentage of units which may be deployed at any one time:

Royal Navy/Royal Marines 60% 

Army 20%

Royal Air Force 20%

As these figures include time spent training away from home,in practice the proportion of each service which may be deployed on operations differs from these numbers.

The Army and Royal Air Force will conduct more of their training at home than the Royal Navy which has to go to sea for much of it's training.

The Royal Navy will routinely have 33% of it's units deployed on operations,even in "peacetime".

Rear Admiral Simon Charlier said the following in evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee on the 2nd of june 2009:

 "The Navy is configured against a set of parameters that it has used for many years that usually rotate round a six-month average deployment cycle at sea.

 We try to give the teams 12 months off after that.

 That means that 660 days over a three-year rolling period is the maximum time we can have people away.


Those are the terms and conditions of service in which people join the Navy. They are very clear and we understand them.


 In a normal cycle of deployment at sea—in surge operations we are content to go outside those parameters and give more time when they come back—that works adequately."


A real World example is the helicopter fleet in Afghanistan in 2009,according to Rear Admiral Johnstone-Burt:




 "Our average deployment cycle is about three months, so that gives us a 12-month gap between tours.


 That is the rule of thumb we are using and it is working well in the Chinook, Puma, Merlin and Lynx communities,so I am confident that the points you make are covered in those crews."


 "For the reasons I mentioned earlier,the Harmony rate for the Apache air crew, ground crew and engineers is about a rule of four,so one on three off,which is taking its toll."


 "Sea King crews are worse than that; they have a rule of between three and four,so they are doing one on two and a half off." 




 This can be summed up as follows:


Royal Air Force Chinooks,Merlins and Pumas,20% deployed;


Army Air Corps Lynx,20% deployed;


Army Air Corps Apache 25% deployed;


Royal Navy Sea King 28% deployed.

It can be seen both from the Harmony guidelines and from actual operations in Afghanistan that the Royal Navy deploys a much larger percentage of it's units and men.

Conclusion:

The Royal Air Force requires a much larger and more expensive combat aircraft fleet than the Royal Navy to surge the required number of aircraft for major combat operations.

It also requires a larger number squadrons to sustain a squadron on long term operations.

The Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm would require 3 squadrons to keep a single squadron deployed on operations.

The Royal Air Force would require 5 squadrons to keep a single squadron deployed on operations.


If all fast jet and support helicopters were transferred to the Royal Navy it could sustain operations in theatre with a 40% fewer units.


Transferring all combat aircraft and support helicopters to the Royal Navy will result in significant cost savings.

Overheads

The Royal Navy,Royal Air Force and British Army all have their "back office" - senior officers,training facilities,headquarters and other elements which add "overhead" costs.

If all military aviation were to be transferred to the Royal Air Force,there would be no significant saving on "overheads" as the Royal Navy and British Army would still require their "back offices" to support the sea and land elements of those services.

If all military aviation were to be transferred to the Royal Navy and/or British Army there would be no need for the Royal Air Force "back office" allowing the elimination of large numbers of senior officer's posts,head quarters,training facilities and other expenses resulting in substantial cost savings.

Conclusion:

Eliminating the Royal Air Force will result in substantial reductions in overhead costs.

Recommendation

We recommend that the Secretary of State for Defence should consider creating internal competion to decide which service delivers aviation capabilities.

The division of air assets should be decided by which service can deliver capability most cost effectively and not by history or inter service politics.

Competitive tendering as part of an internal defence market may be the solution.

Rather than the usual black propaganda and backstabbing,inter-service rivalry may be channelled in to positive competition to provide combat services to the taxpayer.

Services should be asked to submit fixed price tenders for the provision of a defined capability,for example the ability to surge a number of daily sorties/hours on station for short term major warfighting operations or sustained low intensity operations.

On the metrics we have studied here,it appears that the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm has a significant competitive advantage.

Any financial shortfalls resulting from under bidding should be taken from the budget of the provider which fails to deliver the service on cost.


Alternatively,Harmony guidelines could be standardised across the armed forces as per Royal Navy practice.

This would result in significant cost savings across the armed forces.

*Because people join the army and navy to see the world,not to see Norfolk.


**Official sources give figures which range from an average of 70-74 sorties per day.

Puma,Chinook And Serendipity

Despite the recent large cuts in the British defence budget as a result of the Strategic Defence and Security Review,recent reports suggest further cuts may be neccessary.


Peter Luff,the Minister for Defence Equipment,Support and Technology,recently confirmed the need for further cuts:


"The big decisions have been taken;the fundamental assumptions won’t be changed,but there were unallocated savings identified which were a matter of public record and which we now have to find.”

One of the areas which might be targetted for further cuts is the support helicopter fleet.


As helicopter shortages in Afghanistan have had a high media profile,cutting the helicopter fleet might sound inappropriate.

There have been significant shortages of helicopter capacity on operations in Afghanistan.


Men have almost certainly died as a result of those shortages.


However,the helicopter shortage in Afghanistan was never the result of not having enough helicopters.


On the 23rd of February 2009,British armed forces owned 603 helicopters.


Only a small fraction of those were in Afghanistan.


The problem was,not having enough in theatre flying hours from the right type of helicopters which could be useful in the "hot and high" Afghan conditions.

In recent years,the number of helicopter flight hours in Afghanistan has increased significantly.

Bill Rammell,then Minister of State for the Armed Forces,said the following on the 5th of October 2009:

"I can say,however,that between November 2006 and April 2009 we increased the number of helicopter flying hours in Afghanistan by 84 per cent."

On the 12th of October 2009,Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth said:

"This investment will,by May 2010,allow us to double the number of UK battlefield helicopters in Afghanistan and increase the number of flying hours by more than 130 per cent. compared with November 2006.


 We constantly keep this situation under review."


General Sir Kevin O'Donoghue,Chief of Defence Materiel said on the 1st of December 2009:


"I think the Chief of Defence Staff said the other day, you could always use more helicopters, but there is a sufficiency of helicopters in theatre at the moment.


 Yes, we are pushing more out there.


The figures I have got written here:there is a 48% increase in the numbers of helicopters between June 2009 and June 2010 and a 45% increase in flying hours.


They are building up the whole time but,as CDS said, you could always use more."

Merlins deployed to Afghanistan in 2009 and the Merlin fleet has also been increased in size with the purchase and refitting of Danish Merlin H.C.3as.

Army Lynx have been upgraded to make them more suitable for operations in Afghanistan.


Royal Navy Seakings have also been upgraded for use in Afghanistan.


The Chinook fleet has been upgraded for Afghan conditions and increased in size with the long delayed introduction of the 8 H.C.3.s.

Helicopter capacity is planned to increase further in the future.


Under the Future Helicopter Strategy,the Puma fleet is being upgraded for operations in Afghanistan and it's service life extended from an original Out of Service Date (O.S.D.) of 2012 to 2022,while an additional 24 Chinooks were due to be purchased.


Originally 30 of the 32 operational Pumas (from a total fleet of 45) were to be upgraded,that was reduced to 28 and then further reduced to just 24 following the Strategic Defence and Security Review.


Upgrading these 24 Pumas will cost £339 Million or £14.125 Million per helicopter,each of which will stay in service for just 10 years or less after the upgrade.

The Strategic Defence and Security Review also reduced the planned purchase of "F" model Chinooks from 24 aircraft to 14.

Unfortunately,much of this extra capacity will arrive too late for operations in Afghanistan.

British forces are expected to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014,according to British Prime Minister David Cameron speaking on the 20th of November 2010:


"The commitment we have entered into today to transfer the lead responsibility for 
security to the Afghan Government by the end of 2014 will pave the way for British 
combat troops to be out of Afghanistan by 2015."


The draw down of Western forces in Afghanistan is widely expected to begin in 2011.

Kevan Jones,then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence,said on the 1st of December 2009:


"The first Puma Mk2 aircraft will enter squadron service in 2012.


The upgrade of the entire fleet is planned to complete in 2014."

The upgraded Pumas will be coming in to service just as the need for helicopters in Afghanistan declines.


When it was announced back in 2009 that additional Chinooks would be purchased,they were expected to "roll off the production line in 2012":


"The first ten new Chinooks will start to roll off the production line in 2012 and be completed in 2013,increasing air support on the front line in Afghanistan.


 The Chinook fleet in total will increase in size from 48 to 70 airframes,which will include eight Mk3 Chinooks and replacements for two Chinooks lost on operations."


However,no order was placed for these helicopters at that time and they still had not been ordered in January 2011.


Delivery dates are therefore likely to start long after 2012.


A 3 year wait for Chinook delivery is typical.


If ordered in 2011,the new Chinook H.C.6s are unlikely to start arriving until 2014,too late to be of any use in Afghanistan.

The Recent Strategic Defence and Security Review also resulted in large cuts to the size of British forces which will in turn reduce the demand for support Helicopters in the long term.

With the recent large cuts to the size of the ground forces there may not be a need for these additional helicopters after the withdrawal from Afghanistan.


Britain is currently sustaining a division sized force in Afghanistan,in future it plans to sustain only a single brigade on operations.


The support helicopter requirement in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review was for 63 "Chinook equivalents".


A "Chinook equivalent" being a means to measure the capacity of the then planned 116 strong support helicopter fleet in multiples of what a single Chinook could carry.

Current plans will result in a fleet of 60 Chinooks,according to British Prime Minister David Cameron:


"The number of Chinooks is going from 46 to 60, and we will also be refurbishing the Puma helicopters to add to capacity."


Those 60 "Chinook equivalents" being in addition to the expanded 25 strong Merlin fleet and 24 upgraded Pumas.


Giving a total capacity well above the 63 "Chinook equivalents" planned under the previous Strategic Defence Review.


In total,the support helicopter fleet will in future have 109 Chinooks,Merlins and Pumas,only slightly less than the 116 support helicopters listed in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review.

Despite significant reductions planned in the size of deployable ground forces,support helicopter lift capacity will in future far exceed that which was planned in 1998.

Additional helicopter capacity purchased to counter shortfalls in Afghanistan will arrive too late to be of use in that theatre and may thereafter be surplus to requirements.


The cost of providing that capacity will have severe impacts on other elements of the armed forces during the current financial crisis.


There will be long term costs of operating that surplus capacity and retaining basing capacity at R.A.F. Benson.


These costs will be increased by the need to sustain an additional airframe type in the case of the Puma and a "fleet within a fleet" in the case of the new Chinook H.C. Mark 6s.

These problems were explained by the then Chief of the Air Staff (later Chief of the Defence Staff,now retired) Air Chief Marshal Stirrup in evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee Eleventh Report,Helicopter capability,published on the 14th of July 2009:

"In terms of the overall efficiency of the helicopter force, the sooner we can reduce the overall numbers of types, the more output we will get from the force as a total.

It is not just a case of extending old types in service to meet the requirement, that is not necessarily the most efficient way of doing it."

There are additional issues with the Puma upgrade.


The Puma Life Extension Programme (L.E.P.) has been criticised by the House of Commons Defence Committee:

 "Given the age of both Sea 

King and Puma and the  poor survivability of the Puma,extending their lives at 

considerable cost is not the best option,either operationally or in terms of the use of public 

money.

 We do not believe that these LEPs will provide adequate capability or value for the 

taxpayer.

Only a procurement of new helicopters can meet the original objective of 

reducing the number of types of helicopter in service within the UK Armed Forces."

Evidence to the committee suggested that the Puma update was being pursued due to time scale and budgetary issues rather than on the basis of capability and value for money.

According to General Sir Kevin O'Donoghue in testimony to the Defence Committee:

 "We would have required 44 Merlins,to replace Puma and Sea King.

 There were only between 14 and 16 affordable by 2015,which is in the middle of the gap,so we would not have had as many helicopters for the same amount of money as we have got with Puma."

The third supplementary memorandum from the Ministry of Defence,dated the 14th of January 2010,confirms some of the General's figures:

"To clarify, it was the view of AgustaWestland that 44 new Merlin helicopters could,when operated alongside our existing fleet of helicopters,deliver the same operational effect as the current Sea King Mk4 and Puma fleets.

Our analysis suggested that 49 new Merlin would be required to meet Defence Outputs."

But the same document also says this:

"To procure new helicopters with an equivalent level of capability as offered by the Puma LEP would have required an additional £500 million-£800 million over the next four years.

This additional funding could not be found without detrimental effects elsewhere across the Defence Programme.

  Within the current funding profile assigned to the sustainment of the Puma and Sea King Mk4 and the delivery of the Future Medium Helicopter project,we could only afford to buy a maximum of seven new helicopters by the end of 2012,with up to 18 helicopters delivered by mid-2015.

 This approach would create a substantial gap in lift helicopter numbers from 2012 until at least 2017 that, at its worst would reduce support helicopter Forward Fleet numbers by up to 40%.

Such a shortfall would reduce the numbers of support helicopters we could deploy on operations from 2013 for at least five years and would create a significant shortfall against the current requirement in Afghanistan. 

  We concluded,therefore,that within available resources we needed to sustain either the Puma or the Sea King Mk4 if we were to avoid an unacceptable impact on operations.

Of these two types,the Puma LEP will deliver a much more capable aircraft with significantly improved performance.

We now plan to retire all marks of Sea King during 2016 and the planned investment in the Sea King Mk4 has been substantially curtailed."

Note the claims that between 44 and 49 new Merlin helicopters would have been required to replace both the 42 Seaking Mark 4/6C and 32 Pumas which were "in service",a total of 74 helicopters.

This suggests that 2 Merlins were expected to do the job of 3 Seakings or Pumas.

This is also backed up by the following comment also taken from the same third supplementary memorandum from the Ministry of Defence:

"........the Merlin has about twice the lift capability of our current Puma fleet and offers slightly better performance than the upgraded Puma—this is why we want to focus our investment in Merlin on delivering our maritime requirement." 

Following the decision to withdraw the Seakings without replacement,it would take far fewer Merlins to replace the Puma fleet alone than to replace the Puma and Seaking fleets.

Perhaps around 16 Merlins would have been needed to replace the capacity of what was at that time a fleet of 32 Pumas.

While the 28 - 30 upgraded Pumas would only enter service between 2012 and 2014,the Merlin alternative was stated as "seven new helicopters by the end of 2012,with up to 18 helicopters delivered by mid-2015".

A fleet of 18 Merlins would give a greater lift capacity than the existing fleet of 32 Pumas.

These figures suggest that buying new Merlins instead of upgrading the Puma fleet would not "create a substantial gap in lift helicopter numbers from 2012 until at least 2017".

Note also the claim that buying new helicopters "would create a significant shortfall against the current requirement in Afghanistan".

This is claim difficult to understand,the Puma fleet is not used on operations in Afghanistan.

The Seaking fleet is operating in Afghanistan but spending the £339 million from the Puma upgrade budget on new Merlin helicopters would not have affected the Seaking fleet.


Both the Puma and Seaking fleets would have continued in service while new helicopters were built had the £339 Million from the Puma life extension instead been spent on buying new Merlins.


We must question the veracity of claims that buying new helicopters would have led to a shortage of capacity.

There does not appear to have been any sound logic for upgrading the Puma fleet rather than purchasing additional Merlins.

There were also concerns about the safety of the Puma fleet.

Older helicopters such as the Puma are built to far lower levels of crash worthiness than modern aircraft like the Merlin.


Their structure is less able to withstand the stresses imposed during a crash.


Other problems with the Puma were set out in the "Dixon,Moss report":


"A comparison of the S.H. (Support Helicopter) accident records,at Annex C,supports a common belief that Puma is more vulnerable to crash damage (and to subsequent loss of life) than other types of B.H. (Battlefield Helicopters) involved in similar missions.


A likely explanation for this may be the fact that,relative to other B.H.,Puma has a particularly high C of G (Centre of Gravity,more correctly Centre of Mass).


The resulting high crash moments generated by it's gearbox and engines,coupled with a relatively short wheelbase and tricycle undercarriage,makes for relatively poor crash worthiness compared with,for example,Chinook which has a lower C of G and wheels on each corner.


The propensity of Puma to turn over after a heavy landing is well known and increases the vulnerability of crewmen and passengers who are not properly restrained."


These problems cannot be fixed,they are integral to the design of the Puma according to Mr Nick Whitney:

 "If you require full crashworthiness  on an old aircraft that may not be 

possible because physically the structure is  incapable of being  upgraded to that point."


As the recent Nimrod crash demonstrated,the safety of the Puma fleet has the potential to become a political and legal liability.

There are alternatives to current plans.


Canada purchased a number of CH47D Chinooks for use in Afghanistan.


With Canadian forces pulling out of that country,the 5 remaining Chinooks may be available for purchase.


Those aircraft are in Afghanistan at present,they need no modifications to operate in theatre.


They will be available for use at least 2 years before any new Chinooks or upgraded Pumas can be delivered.


Those 5 Chinooks are CH47D standard,the aircraft which the British Chinook H.C.2 is derived from.


Thus they are eminently suitable for upgrading to the new H.C.4 standard under the ongoing project Julius after they are withdrawn from Afghanistan in 2014.


This would give the United Kingdom a largely homogenous Chinook force of 51 H.C.4/4a/5s.


It will reduce the support Helicopter fleet to just 2 types,Merlin and Chinook.


Combined with the current fleet of 25 Merlins this will give a total support helicopter fleet capacity similar to the 63 "Chinook equivalents" planned in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review.


Purchasing and later upgrading these Canadian Chinooks will be significantly cheaper than current plans to upgrade Pumas and purchase additional CH47F/H.C.6 Chinooks.


This financial saving will be especially important during the current difficult period before 2015.


There will be no need to update the Canadian Chinooks until after the Chinook H.C.3s are upgraded to H.C.5 standard in 2015.


Work on upgrading these helicopters will also be done at Fleetlands in Gosport,keeping money in the United Kingdom,in line with the government's policy on encouraging British industry.


Unlike the Puma upgrade which primarily benefits workers in Romania and France. 

A second alternative,if there is no immediate need for additional helicopters in Afghanistan,is to purchase additional Merlins instead of upgrading the Pumas and buying more Chinooks.


The Merlin is considerably cheaper than the Chinook,probably half the price.


It is also better suited to operating from ships.


Much of the money spent on Merlins would stay in the United Kingdom,creating jobs in a weak economy and importantly returning significant tax revenues to the Treasury.


Effectively giving the taxpayer a significant discount.


Purchasing more Merlins would also be in line with the European Union's Europeanist procurement policy which the Prime Minister subscribes to.